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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report



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24 February 1986

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CHAD

## HOW MAJOR GALOPIN DIED: RECENT CLARIFICATION

Paris POLITIQUE AFRICAINE in French Dec 85 pp 91-95

[Article by R. Buijtenhuijs]

[Text] The ghost of Major Galopin still haunts Franco-Chadian relations. About a year ago, on 19 December 1984, Roland Dumas, France's minister for foreign affairs, in replying before the National Assembly to a question put by General Bigeard on the matter of withdrawal of French support troops from Hissein Habre, used the floor to salute the French soldiers who had fallen in Chad, as well as their leader, Major Galopin, "who was murdered under conditions known to you all, and by the person or persons whose cause you seem eager now to espouse" (AFP-BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN D'AFRIQUE, 21 December 1984). Like it or lump it! And the QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS of 20 December had no qualms about displaying a banner headline: "Chad: Dumas calls Hissein Habre a murderer!" A few days later, Mahamat Nouri, President and CEO of Air Chad and a close political adviser to President Habre, issued a rebuttal to Dumas calling his statement "actionnable" and "unfriendly"; "It is not proper to make such a statement, especially when it is not consonant with the truth and when it impugns a head of state" (LE MONDE, 22 December 1984).

What, precisely, is it all about? First, the bare facts. In June 1974, at the express request of President Tombalbaye, the French government detached Major Galopin to the mission for negotiation with the Toubou rebels of the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), a dissident offshoot of the Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT), which, since 21 April, had detained Mme Claustre and another French national, Marc Combe. During the summer, Major Galopin met with their kidnapers on several occasions, until he was arrested on 2 August by Hissein Habre, head of the Command Council of the Armed Forces in the North (CCFAN). Found guilty by a "people's tribunal, and sentenced to death on 26 December 1974, Major Galopin was executed on 4 April 1975.

The main issue in the case, even today, is: who is primarily responsible for that execution? Christian Millet, in a thoroughly documented article that appeared in LE MONDE on 29 December 1984 (1), tried to answer that question by centering his story primarily on the "trial" of Major Galopin, the outcome of which, in

Millet's view, was entirely out of Hissein Habre's hands. Major Galopin, he says, was indeed sentenced to die by a revolutionary tribunal, but "not unanimously," we were told by Goukouni in May 1979, when he stated: "Hissein was against it, and he did everything in his power to prevent his being killed. That clearly proves that he was an undercover agent for the French Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service (SDECE) (...) We listened to what he had to say at great length, but, before the will of the combatants, we were forced to yield."

So be it. It is true, and Millet makes it quite clear in his article, that Goukouni Weddeye, who headed the FROLINAT second army until Habre rallied to his cause some time in 1972, had more reason than Habre had to hate Major Galopin. Galopin had already served (and tyrannized) in Chad during the sixties as adjutant to Major Gourvennec, head of the Chadian intelligence services. It seems that the methods used by these services were not entirely gentle, and a number of veterans from Goukouni's outfit blamed Galopin for torture inflicted on friends or relatives. In addition, at the time of negotiations between the Chadian government and the Tibesti rebels in 1966-1969, Major Galopin had managed to split the insurgents, after which Goukouki's partisans walked into an ambush on 14 April 1969. Goukouni's older brother, Moulimai, was killed in that action; a second brother was slain 8 days later during a Franco-Chadian assault on Guelta Mourso, where the second army had gone to over to the west of Zouar. And so, as we were told by a French officer, there was a "blood debt" between Goukouni Weddeye and Major Galopin who, as a consequence, became an enemy whom the people of Tibesti were "to shoot on sight," according to testimony reported by C. Millet.

Millet's version, according to which Habre had opposed the death sentence passed upon his prisoner, but had to yield in the end to pressure from Goukouni and his entourage (men like Adoum Togoi), thus becomes plausible -- even likely. Other informants have brought us stories in much the same vein, like the French officer who attributed a "bon mot" to Hissein Habre: "Major Galopin was sentenced by a revolutionary tribunal, by a majority of one vote. It was not mine." In that context, we cannot put much credence into the testimony of Rakhis Manani, as reported by Jacques Latremoliere (2), according to whom Goukouni was not present either at the sentencing of Major Galopin or at his execution, and that it was Habre, furthermore, who had insisted that the victim be hanged instead of put before a firing-squad, as was his right as an officer in the French army. This belated recollection, which dates back to the fall of 1983, seems to us suspect and altogether too pat: at the time, the National Union Transition Government (GUNT), of which Manani was part, had every reason to do its utmost to blacken the reputation of Habre, who had just welcomed reinforcements from French elements in the Manta operation to help him deal with offensives from the Goukounists and the Libyans.



Furthermore, all testimony brought forward by Habre's Chadian enemies seems questionable to us, because what they say has varied overmuch with the passage of time and the alteration of circumstances for it to be credible at any time whatsoever. After all, when they try to array against Habre the French army, and more particularly its career officers, they are casually assigning the Chadian president the role of sole "executioner" of Major Galopin (this is what Rakhis Manani is doing). On the other side of it, when the aim is to make Habre suspect in the eyes of a certain segment of the left, they suddenly "recollect" the way he hesitated over the Galopin affair, hoping to reveal thereby his (long assumed) affiliation with SDECE, as in Goukouni's testimony as reported by Millet. In this area, therefore, prudence is the only sound attitude to take, as it is, for that matter, not to take the protestations of innocence from Habre as conveyed by his political advisers at face value.

Even so, J. Latremoillere is not altogether wrong when he says, in his 4 January 1985 article, that even in Millet's version of events, Habre's culpability "would in any case remain his alone for having decided, on his own (...) to order an arrest in violation of the most basic rules of warfare, and for having "countenanced" his sentence to be hanged, imposed by a travesty of a tribunal." One might go even further. If you pursue the analysis, rather than focusing it on the sentence passed on Major Galopin, as C. Millet does, but center it instead on his execution, the issue of culpability arises in an altogether different light. It is practically certain, in fact, that Major Galopin's execution was not merely the sequel to the revolutionary tribunal's verdict, but that it constituted, above all, a tragic episode in the negotiations between Habre and the French government for the release of Mme Claustre. As of 10 December 1984, her kidnapers, furious at seeing the negotiations cavalierly entrusted to the first secretary of the French Embassy at N'djamena, an official they found "too light-weight" for their liking, announced that Major Galopin would be executed unless Paris sent an emissary from France within the shortest possible time. (3) This was 16 days before Major Galopin had been tried and found guilty, and it sheds quite a different light on the whole matter. The French government promptly acceded to the CCFAN's demands, and, in the event, the threat was not carried out. That was, however, merely a postponement. This is how the blackmail was resumed in April 1975, according to an official French document:

"On 29 March, Habre (...) again cited the conditions he had set for the liberation of our compatriots, and gave the French government until 2 April to make its position known. That position was brought to Habre's attention on 2 April. We agree to publication of FROLINAT's political manifesto. The Chadian government agrees to free all the persons named as detainees on the list it has sent us, with the exception of five of their number. We are ready to pay a very large sum, either in cash or deposited in a European bank in the name of the leader of the kidnapers.

"On that same day, Hissein Habre informed us that Major Galopin would be executed on 4 April unless the French government agreed to deliver weapons.

"The French government informed the leader of the kidnapers, on the evening of 3 April, that we were ready to continue with the negotiations, and warned him of the consequences that would unfailingly follow any impetuous move on his part.

"On 4 April, the kidnapers informed us that they considered our latest message as a refusal, and cut off all radio contact with the negotiators." (4)

It is astonishing that C. Millet, in his article, faults no allusion to this aspect of the Galopin case, which, it seems to us, clearly challenges the assumption of Habre's (relative) innocence. Habre had in fact always handled the negotiations in the Claustre matter personally, and shared that responsibility with nobody. Of course, he often tapped his deputies to represent him, to underscore his displeasure over the slow progress of the parleys or when the status of emissaries sent from France seemed to him unworthy of his standing as president of the CCFAN, though none of these underlings held plenipotentiary rank: quite the contrary. Testimony from all those who directly participated in the negotiations agree on that score (5). Goukouni Weddeye, in particular, seems not to have taken part in the exchanges, and the name of Adoum Togoi rarely appears in the reports submitted by the French emissaries. So, if Habre was the principal, if not the sole director of the negotiations, his responsibility in the execution of Major Galopin is equally onerous. It is possible and even probable that pressures were brought to bear during Galopin's trial in December 1974. On the other hand, we find it difficult to believe that such pressures were sufficient to affect Mr Habre's decision to execute the French negotiator, despite C. Millet's allusions in that direction. They do not fit into the logic of the negotiations themselves, nor do they square with the distribution of blame in the area of foreign relations in CCFAN.

In short, in our opinion, President Habre would do better to admit his involvement in the Galopin case, and the more so in that France would be very rash to insist too much in this area. Of course, Major Galopin was a French officer, but he was not in every respect just another officer. As we have seen, he played a fairly shady role in the repression of the Chadian rebellion, and the hatred some of the Toubou felt toward him is readily understandable. Of course, Major Galopin was a plenipotentiary negotiator, but he was not just a negotiator like any other. At the request of the Chadian authorities, with or without the consent of his French superiors, he tried, in June-July 1974, to re-run the 1969 "coup," seeking again to split the Toubou rebels to rally some of them to Mr Tombalbaye's government. It was not until he had managed to confound Major Galopin in the presence of those he had tried to



"buy" that Hissein Habre decided to have him arrested. That was known as early as 1975, and C. Millet's article provides some very helpful details on this count. Never, for that matter, had Hissein Habre interfered in any way whatever with the word of the other French negotiators who kept strictly within the confines of their official powers. All of this shows clearly that Major Galopin was a very special case indeed.

That leads us to raise the question of the accountability of the Chadian and French authorities. Major Galopin's reputation among Goukouni's partisans was well known and it was, to say the least, imprudent to make him one of the French emissaries in a delicate situation in which the meetings, without exception, took place in "enemy territory." It was worse than imprudent to ask him, in addition, to play a double game. If C. Millet's information is accurate, Major Galopin himself had more than a mild forboding that his mission was doomed to fail and that his life was in jeopardy. And yet he agreed to do what he doubtless considered his duty. That was a duty that should not have been thrust upon him. Hence our suspicions that some of the tears shed at his fate were nothing more than crocodile tears. The best we can do, therefore, is to allow Major Galopin to rest in peace. Guilt for his death is too widely spread for anybody to feel qualified to manipulate his memory in our latter-day Chadian-Chadian, Franco-Chadian (or even Franco-French) squabbles.

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CHAD

## ROLE OF PARENT TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS IN SCHOOLS

### Support Provided by Parents Associations

Ndjamena INFO TCHAD in French 30 Nov 85 pp 2-6

[Text] At the start of the 1985-1986 school year, the Ministry of Education asked everyone to become involved with the schools, especially parents of school children. The parents associations, which were founded in 1972, have not yet been able to fully play their role because of the events which have been taking place in Chad. In 1982, the Ministry of Education attempted to provide a legal framework for the APE [Parents Associations] in order to avoid chaos in the payment and management of dues. So bylaws for the APE, proposed by the Ministry of Education and approved by the Ministry of the Interior and Security, took effect on 31 July 1984. All persons responsible for the schools, without exception, hailed the providential birth of these associations, recognizing that without the APE, many schools would still be closed today.

Since their establishment, the APE have taken on the noble task of helping the state to cope with the immense problems facing education. The general impression now prevailing about the present situation and difficulties with which the state is confronted during this reconstruction phase, in terms of their impact on the resources available to the Ministry of Education--both in personnel and equipment--is that the resources available have not grown at the same pace as Chad's needs, and are certainly very far from being in a position capable of satisfying these needs. Officials of the Ministry of Education therefore decided to involve parents more closely in the actual administration of the schools.

The Parents Association of a school includes, without discrimination, all parents whose children attend the school, or all persons who have legal responsibility for one or more students attending the school. Its purpose is first of all to establish official cooperation between the school and the family in school-related matters, in order to encourage studies and the students' physical and mental well-being. To achieve this goal, the APE establishes close and ongoing contacts through its representatives between the teachers and parents, by a two-way information process, and also by taking

joint action in the areas of work and discipline, school attendance, and guidance. At the invitation of the school authorities, the APE also takes part in preparing for decisions concerning the management of APE resources, investigates extracurricular activities of a social, cultural, educational, recreational, or athletic nature, and plays an active role in the character formation and personality development of the students. By so doing, it contributes both material and financial aid for projects designed to help the students, in order to better their working conditions and well-being, by providing supplies, school buildings, and boarding facilities.

With the creation of the APE in our primary and secondary schools in order to take the education and training of children in hand in a concrete and effective way, people came to realize that school problems are now everyone's problems, and most of all, the problems of parents. We should mention that the APE have helped to overcome some enormous difficulties facing our primary and secondary schools. The reason why many of our schools did not close, the director of secondary education, Mr Michel Doromon, told us, was "primarily because of support from the APE." When asked about the specific support provided by the APE, Mr Dallah Mohamed, vice principal of the Lycee Felix Eboue, answered that right now, "the APE are the pillars of our schools, for they are buying everything the schools need in order to operate."

"The Lycee Felix Eboue has over 5,000 students and 68 classrooms. It uses an average of 12 boxes of chalk a day at a minimum, 15 reams of copying paper a week, not to mention the stencils, ballpoint pens, and books that have to be bought for the teachers when they need them. Let's not forget that the Lycee is operating largely through the support of dedicated teachers who need help. We must also recognize that for the time being," said Dallah Mohamed, "that without the APE, there would be no school." For not all needs can be met with the funding provided by the Ministry of Education. And sometimes that funding even goes unused, if no one take it in hand immediately. "Consequently, we are only able to operate with the support of the APE," said the vice principal of the school.

In speaking of specific achievements of Parents Associations, the director of secondary education, Mr Michel Doromon, cited the examples of parents in Torock and Iere who carried out huge construction projects. Similar work was done in Mongo, Bol, and Mao, where the parents' dues are used to directly assist needy teachers. In Sarh, where the parents paid 4.5 billion, the Lycee Ahmed Mangue was able to meet its expenses for 1 and 1/2 years, and to free 800,000 CFA [African Financial Community] francs to aid the teachers, said Mr Doromon. Ideally, though, APE money should not be used to pay salaries, but rather to purchase educational materials to improve the teachers' working conditions, he commented.

The APE are just as active in elementary education: at the Chagoua-Fdar school, two buildings containing six classrooms were built with the aid of the PAM [WFP: World Food Program?]. In Am-Riguabe, two buildings were

constructed with USAID support. In Dembe, five large buildings were entirely built by parents. These are just a few examples of such projects. And in the provinces, in Gounou-Gaya, the APE provided over 11 million CFA francs and built several school buildings in 1984, as they also did in Gore.

But are the Parents Associations really working very well? Even though there have been no official complaints filed concerning the management of the APE, rumors do persist, said the director of elementary education, Mr Abderamane Koko. The bylaws of the Parents Associations were prepared to smoothe away difficulties and improve management, for "we have known of some cases of friction," he added. The parents want to have a monopoly on management, and the school administrators also want to manage the funds. The bylaws have resolved this issue. Normally, the parents are to manage the funds, but the money will be kept or deposited in personal accounts, and also used for personal purposes.

The ideal would be to pay the dues into an APE account so that the funds would be used solely for the school's needs. However, much yet remains to be done. Concerning the composition of the APE's administration, its resources, and their use, according to the bylaws, everything seems fine. The APE are run by a board set up within the school. The board is elected for a term of 1 school year, at a general parents meeting. It consists of a president who is a parent, a secretary and a treasurer who are also parents. The technical advisor of the board is the head of the school, who inventories and presents a report of the school's needs, but does not handle the funds.

Upon the presentation of a report on the school's needs by the head of the school, expenditures are ordered by the president and paid by the treasurer. Any expenditure must be fully described in a detailed report signed by the president and countersigned by the treasurer, who keeps the records of receipts and expenditures, which he must present at any time to the auditing representatives, to the board, or to the general assembly of the APE. The collection of dues is the sole responsibility of the treasurer of the APE board. Two auditing representatives who are not employed by the school monitor the proper management of the APE's resources and the regularity of the treasurer's accounts.

It is the general parents assembly which sets the amount of the annual dues, based on the parents' ability to pay and the school's needs; it decides on actions to be taken by the APE board, approves the secretary's report and the treasurer's report, and elects the new bureau of the association. The APE bylaws were designed to provide for the proper management of the fees collected, and limit their misuse or their use for personal purposes. "To our relief, we have found a definite improvement in the management of these funds," commented the elementary education inspector in urban Chari-Baguirmi, Mr Abderamane Haman Bello. But after 2 years of experience, he added, "we are still finding that many schools are not really benefitting

from the parents' help. We have found that in the Ndjamenas schools, there is still a huge gap between schools in terms of their physical facilities."

"On one hand, the poorest schools stay poor because the parents would rather take their children out of the ruins and register them in schools where the physical facilities are fairly decent," remarked Abderamane Haman Bello. "This means that the funds collected are just enough to build temporary sheds, and every year the same cycle starts over again." On the other hand, continued the inspector of elementary education for urban Chari-Baguirmi, there are well built schools that don't need much money for maintenance, which are well equipped, and which have amassed colossal amounts of money that often go unused for the entire year. To foster a feeling of solidarity, recommended Abderamane Haman Bello, a change in strategy seems essential.

Mr Bello would like the bylaws to be amended so that the funds can be centralized within the ministry in one account, so that many schools will be helped with the construction of school buildings planned by a management board that will be set up for this purpose, he said. It will then be possible to give priority to the construction of schools that are most urgently needed. The ministry of education staff as a whole has asked parents to continue to help the schools to function, and is issuing a stirring appeal to the parents for this purpose.

That is why they are asking parents to become more closely involved with their children's education. To do so, parents must turn out "en masse" for all meetings to which they are invited by the school administration. The parents must take the school's problems to heart, for their children's future depends on it. That is why they should pay close attention to their children's studies even outside of class time, for the teacher's work alone isn't enough. It is quite discouraging for a teacher to see parents in the school only when school reopens in the fall, or after exams, when it is too late to change anything.

#### Lecture Discussion on Education

Ndjamenas INFO TCHAD in French 30 Nov 85 pp 6-9

[Text] Yesterday afternoon in the amphitheater of Ndjamenas's large Faisal Mosque, Mr Mouktar Bachar Mouktar, director general of education, gave a lecture-discussion for officials of the ministry of education, teachers, students, parents of students, and many employees from the ministry. Mr Mouktar has just returned from Djibouti, where he represented Chad at the latest conference of CONFEMEN [Conference of Ministers of National Education of French-Speaking States]. The topic of his lecture-discussion was "organizational and pedagogic problems related to the increase in educational demand." How can Chad cope with overcrowded classes? In his speech, the education official stressed three major points: the current status of



educational demand in Chad; the difficulties that Chad has encountered; and finally, some possible solutions for the current problems facing the Ministry of Education.

According to Mr Bachar Mouktar, the growth in demand for education is a positive factor in terms of the spread of the right to education, in accordance with the wishes of both CONFEMEN and of UNESCO. All of CONFEMEN's member states have expressed their desire to spread primary education, just as UNESCO has always fought against the calamity of illiteracy, and encourages all its member nations to attain the goal of universal primary education. But this quantitative effort also carries with it its own attendant problems, and at the CONFEMEN conference in Djibouti, educational experts discussed this. The problem of numbers is one of the biggest problems facing Chad's teachers now.

Reviewing the history of educational demand in Chad, Mr Mouktar Bachar recalled that until Chad became independent in 1960, gifts of candy or clothing were used to attract certain children of certain population groups to attend boarding schools. For the Muslim population of northern Chad, a language is not only a carrier of history; it is also a vehicle of ideology. This caused them to reject enrollment in school, and then led to the creation of Muslim private schools, like the ones in Algeria or Senegal. Today we are witnessing a change in ways of thinking, for there is a very strong desire to learn in both a person's native language and in the official languages as well, he observed.

Since 1965, Chad has been facing a surging demand for education. The numbers enrolled in school rose from 143,602 students in 1965 to 365,000 students in 1985. The number of classes increased from 3,000 in 1965 to 4,900 in 1985. In elementary schools, there were 1,387 teachers in 1965, while in 1985 there were 4,628. With an illiteracy rate of over 85 percent, everyone today expects to go to school, to learn to read; everyone wants more schools, and therefore more teachers. And in addition, people are not happy with the old school system inherited from colonial days, which only takes children starting at a certain age, which makes students repeat grades or transfer, which denies admission to 'sixieme' [approximate equivalent of sixth grade] to some students, and puts a good number of graduates with baccalaureate degrees and others who spent over 15 years of their life there out in the streets without any real qualifications," he remarked.

One question arises, then. Should Chad continue with this educational system which only prepares students for civil service and administrative jobs--which does not teach either the child of the herder to milk a cow, or give the farmer's child any agricultural skills? Everywhere in the member states of CONFEMEN, people are trying to get their populations out of illiteracy, to give them access to science and technology, to change their ways of existing and thinking. Everywhere, the spread of primary education is perceived not only as the best guarantee for the democratization of education, but also



as an important factor in the campaign against illiteracy, said the education official. In Chad, just as everywhere else, they have found a more and more pressing demand for education, but this educational demand does create a certain number of difficulties, he continued. These problems are of a financial, infrastructural, administrative, and pedagogic nature.

Our country, faced with war, drought, famine, and the crisis in the world economy, has seen its possibilities shrink, and is now finding it impossible to provide the funds required to educate its children, for our problem first of all is one of survival. In terms of infrastructure, the classroom equipment (school desks, chairs, cupboards, desks, etc.) is inadequate or even nonexistent. To this we must add administrative and pedagogic difficulties. Textbooks have become more and more expensive, and are beyond the reach of both the state and the parents. There is a shortage of educational materials as a whole. There are not enough teachers to meet the demand. And there is also the problem of their initial and ongoing training, and of their pedagogic and administrative supervision. Educational programs are overburdened, encyclopedic, ill-adapted to the environment's realities. So, not only does the school system not prepare the students for an active working life, but also, because of this combination of factors, there are overcrowded classes with instruction based on outdated methods, and practically nonexistent educational support systems. The consequence is a growing deterioration in the students' achievement levels, and increasing decay in the school system itself.

"What Are the Solutions?"

The director general of education and welfare sought and proposed some solutions. Considering our current difficulties, the speaker, with the audience's support, called for improved management of the existing resources (financial, human, and equipment), in addition to a definition of new goals for education. But how can the budget allocated by the state be used rationally, as we are now at a critical threshold? Some states are asking for an increase in their educational funding. Should Chad do the same? The participants answered yes. For if in other countries--Belgium, to cite one example--a teacher has 14 or a maximum of 18 students per class, and is paid to do virtually nothing, here more funding is becoming vital. It is also essential to set better priorities for an improved distribution of the budget allocated in order of educational priorities. We must also try to cut the costs of construction and school furnishings by making use of local resources.

In his speech, the education official also cited the need to seek nonbudgetary solutions through the APE and village communities. The Ministry of Education can also involve the ONG and banks. Companies can be asked to set up schools, banks can be invited to lend money for a school playground; a school cooperative can be set up to develop an athletic field; or products can be sold.

In short, schools must be transformed into a unit of production and given the necessary resources. To illustrate this point, he mentioned the case of Mali, where students take theoretical courses in the morning, and later in the day, get "hands-on" experience.

Proposals for educational improvements were also made, to integrate schools with their environment; reforms in curricula, content, and methods of instruction, bringing about educational reforms, changes in vacation schedules, daily schedules, etc. Everyone wants to adapt the schools to meet everyday needs and realities, so that they will be able to train productive and creative people filled with a spirit of initiative, capable of adapting to a rapidly changing world.

7679

CSO: 3419/159

MOZAMBIQUE

MAPUTO MILITARY COMMAND GETS NEWLY TRAINED POLITICAL COMMISSARS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] With the training of new political commissars in Armed Forces companies, the military command of Maputo Province has been reinforced, since yesterday, from the standpoint of cadres. They consist of 29 members who, after 6 months of intensive politico-military training, ended their studies yesterday afternoon at the FRELIMO Party's Central School, located in the Matola area of the city of Maputo. Presiding over the closing ceremony was the military commander of Maputo Province, Maj Gen Atanasio Salvador Mutumuke.

The holding of this event, which constituted a first experience for this military command, is considered very important, because the cadres emerging from it will reinforce the political work among the Armed Forces and the population, in various parts of Maputo Province.

Taking the floor, Maj Gen Salvador Mutumuke briefly cited the new responsibilities that have now been created for the new political commissars, stressing that the knowledge acquired at that center must serve to improve the political work in the various areas affected by enemy action in Maputo.

He warned the newly trained men to be prepared to advance into any part of the province where their action would prove most necessary; something which will occur soon, he claimed.

He remarked: "It is important now to know how to apply all the instruction received here, at the site where you will work; especially at this time when the battle against the armed bandits in our province is being intensified."

Courses were given to those commissars by officers of the Armed Forces who offered them information in Portuguese, political economy, geography, and the history of Mozambique and of Africa, among other specific subjects required for this type of training.

Party Gained More Members

During the course, all of the participants were candidates for membership in the FRELIMO Party, because the vast majority are young men, who were also candidates for membership in the Organization of Mozambican Youth [OJM].

Also yesterday, at that function, all the members of both the party and the OJM received the respective membership cards.

In messages which the political commissars submitted on the occasion of the closing, there were expressions, on various occasions, of gratitude for having been selected to increase their knowledge for the improved exercise of their activities.

The message submitted by the young commissars read: "We feel politically and morally prepared to do our work. Now, we have a knowledge of the province's politico-social situation."

In addition to their theoretical training, the participants in that course engaged in volunteer work drives, accumulating 4,350.00 meticals to aid the population suffering from the effects of the armed bandits' criminal action.

2909

CSO: 3442/104

MOZAMBIQUE

CONTINUING POLITICAL, MILITARY DETERIORATION OF REGIME SEEN

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 24 Dec 85 p 18

[Text] The seizure of Caia, in Sofala Province, announced in a RENAMO [Mozambican National Resistance] communique a few days ago, signals the rebels' progress throughout the central area of Mozambique. Previously, other major localities in that province and in Manica and Zambezia Provinces, namely, Vila Machado, Sena, and Tacuane, as well as those of Moma and Monapo, in Nampula Province, had been occupied by Afonso Dhlakama's guerrilla fighters.

According to reports obtained from the RENAMO agency, the guerrillas are still present in nearly all the localities occupied during the past few weeks. Nevertheless, it is to be expected (we add) that they have meanwhile left Moma, because it is a coastal area in which they could be surrounded by government forces, without a chance to withdraw.

Caia had been defended by regular army troops and those from the Zimbabwean expeditionary corps. The town is a crucial point for the Mozambique highway and railroad systems, and also the site of the line of cable carrying electric power from the Cabora-Bassa dam. However, the seizure of Caia by the rebels will not have any major consequences in the latter respect, because over 300 poles for transmission from the dam, located on Mozambican territory, have been destroyed.

According to the account given by the reporter Godwin Matatu, to the London OBSERVER, which has expressed hostility toward the resistance, Zambezia's entire economy is now at a standstill.

The Exodus to the Neighboring Countries

The worsening of the military situation prompted President Samora Machel to travel to the central and northern parts of the country, on a trip that is still under way. By his presence, Machel is attempting to stop the demoralization of the government troops and the foreign combatants (over 10,000 Zimbabweans, nearly 6,000 Tanzanians, and 4,000 Zambians, in addition to the "military advisers" from Eastern countries), who seem to be increasingly less motivated, particularly those from Zimbabwe, who have suffered the largest number of casualties.

In the southern part of the country, the situation is still disturbing for FRELIMO, owing not only to the sabotaging of the land communications routes, but also to the repeated guerrilla invasions in the area surrounding the capital itself where, 3 months ago, saboteurs blew up the powder magazines of the largest arsenal in Mozambique. Districts around Maputo are frequent targets of attacks, the latest of which was made on the police squadron in the Liberdade district, killing four men.

During raids on those districts, carried out by agents from the Defense and Security Forces, there have been hundreds of arrests; which has been confirmed by official sources in Maputo.

The worsening of FRELIMO's political situation has been associated with an increased exodus to the neighboring countries. According to the high commissioner for refugees, four camps for fugitives from Mozambique, set up in Zimbabwe, house over 18,000 persons. Entries of refugees into the Republic of South Africa, despite the fact that the border is mined and the FRELIMO troops have orders to fire on anyone attempting to cross over, amount to as many as 200 per day. Swaziland has also started to receive a large number of Mozambican refugees. An article by Luis de Magalhaes, published in the Portuguese press, gave a detailed account of the tragic situation in which thousands of refugees find themselves. Many of them refuse to return to Mozambique until the civil war ends.

#### A Military Coup in Sight?

The military and political deterioration of the FRELIMO regime was made evident in a recent debate of the People's Assembly, at which President Samora Machel delivered an ambiguous speech, complaining that "the proliferation of the black market, corruption, deviations, extreme leftism, mechanical thinking, lack of discipline, apathy, conformism, sabotage, and bureaucracy are leading Mozambicans to defeatism."

The highlight of that debate (which prompted the security agents to force the reporters present to leave the assembly hall) was lent by the violent discussion which took place between the minister of foreign affairs, Joaquim Chissano, on the one hand, and Sergio Vieira and Gen Sebastiao Mabote, minister of security and chief of staff of the Armed Forces, respectively, on the other. Before leaving the hall, the reporters could still hear the defense minister and regional director of FRELIMO in Cabo Delgado, Alberto Chipande, admitting that "the population has no confidence in the government."

The behavior of those party leaders in the People's Assembly has given rise to rumors that are circulating primarily among Western diplomatic mission members, relating specifically to the possibility of a military coup in Mozambique. It is well known that "orthodox" Communist ministers of Portuguese origin, such as Sergio Vieira and Jacinto Veloso, have been insulted without hesitation by members of the Armed Forces top brass, who claim that they had a "service record" dating before independence and the establishment of the single party system.



Among those circles, however, there is precluded the possibility of a military coup headed by Gen Sevastiao Mabote, unless he carries it out at the behest of Samora Machel himself, to whom he has shown signs of total submission and even obsequiousness. Gen Domingos Fondo, who is not a politician and to whom military merits are attributed, seems to have far more chances as a possible leader of a military coup for the purpose of changing the present state of affairs.

RENAMO: 'In the Strong Position That We Hold...'

Among the same circles, the supposedly secret attempts by FRELIMO, directed by the former "boss" of the Political Police, Jacinto Veloso, to establish contacts with individuals dissociated from the party who are deemed capable of acting as dissuaders of the resistance, have not gone by unnoticed.

Those individuals belong to small political groups which, from the outset, refused to accept the FRELIMO dictatorship, but which have no entrenchment in the country; or else they are two or three defectors from RENAMO, likewise unknown to the Mozambican people.

Jacinto Veloso was the principal agent of the efforts in October 1984 which prompted delegations from FRELIMO and RENAMO to sit down at a conference table in Pretoria, under the sponsorship of the Republic of South Africa. But the talks failed because of FRELIMO's categorical refusal to recognize RENAMO on an equal footing, and because RENAMO, in turn, and also categorically, demanded an authentic democratization of Mozambique.

At the present time, insofar as RENAMO is concerned, its position has not undergone any changes. Its delegate to Europe, Jorge Correia, when approached by us on this issue, reaffirmed that there have been no more talks between the two sides since October of last year, and that they can only take place under the following conditions: withdrawal of foreign forces; free, general elections for the presidency of the republic; and approval of a democratic constitution. And he added:

"The strong position that we hold, nearly 2 years after the N'komati Accord, over a year after the failure of the Pretoria talks, and only 3 months after the date on which Samora Machel boasted of having destroyed the resistance upon the seizure of two or three bases in Gorongosa, makes it possible, and requires that we be more intransigent than ever in the defense of the Mozambican people's freedom."

2909

CSO: 3442/111

MOZAMBIQUE

RENAMO SOURCE COMMENTS ON COLLAPSE OF FRELIMO ARMY

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 7 Jan 86 p 17

[Text] According to the latest reports provided by RENAMO [Mozambican National Resistance], in another issue of its bulletin, "The Struggle Continues" (incidentally, an issue which notes progress in all respects), over 5,600 casualties were inflicted on the enemy between April and October of last year. To be interpreted as "enemy" are not only the government troops, but also the neighboring countries which are backing the Machel regime, prominent among which, as is well known, are Tanzania and Zimbabwe; the latter, simultaneously, in the service of Marxist internationalism and the interest of the plutocratic groups bent on the economic colonization of Southern Africa.

Also according to the same source, over 1,500 tons of military equipment were seized by the guerrillas during that period. This figure may not be based entirely on reality, but what is not in doubt (because it has been admitted by the government authorities themselves) is that, in the sabotaging of the Benfica powder magazine alone, which took place on 25 September, FRELIMO lost the same volume of military equipment, including some which was highly sophisticated, all valued at nearly \$400 million. Meanwhile, it is understood that the minister of foreign affairs, Joaquim Chissano, has hastened to Moscow for the purpose of renewing the military assistance agreement, and that new shipments of Soviet weapons have in the meantime been unloaded in the ports of Mozambique.

To be sure, the weapons and ammunition are essential for winning a war, but they are not the only means for winning a way. The weapons are of little use when there is not an army worthy of the name, and armies are of even less use when the soldiers refuse to fight and desert, or when they prefer to be highway robbers instead of combatants.

This is precisely what is happening to the FRELIMO Armed Forces. The statements made a few days ago in the city of Beira by "Major-General" Marcelino dos Santos, leader of Sofala Province and, in particular, the party's "number two" man, disclosed with drastic clarity the serious crisis situation being experienced by those Armed Forces. With the same "agitprop" [agitation and propaganda] vehemence with which he hailed, 10 years ago, "the irreversible

victory of the workers' revolution" and incited to slaughter and plundering, the old Communist leader has now condemned "those who invent excuses for evading the fulfillment of military obligations," and announced that the general mobilization of workers for the battle against RENAMO will soon be ordered, for 3-month periods. Such language certainly speaks more in favor of the rebels' cause than does any war communique.

#### Qadhafi Behind the Scenes?

While the resistance is not equipped to occupy cities or fixed areas of large size, nor to defeat the government forces and their allies in terms of a conventional war, FRELIMO is far less able to harbor hopes of eradicating the guerrilla movement, before the latter causes total subversion. According to Samora Machel, the strategy to be followed now is far more of a political than a military type. For this reason, he persists in the attempts to contrive an unarmed opposition, a new RENAMO, which would be a docile collaborator rather than a courageous combatant, one with which it would be possible to hold dialogue and to feign the creation of a platform of democratic pacification.

It is worthwhile reading what was written in the aforementioned latest issue of the RENAMO bulletin: "To give the West this image of democracy and conciliation, Machel has now agreed to take into his administration, within a short time (early 1986), the ringleaders of MONAMO [Mozambique Nationalist Movement], FUMO [Mozambique United Front], and FRESAMO [Mozambique Protection Front]. At the proper time, FRELIMO will provide the necessary maneuvers, such as the holding of new negotiations involving RENAMO, at which it will create the suitable conditions for the failure of the dialogue with the guerrillas. At the same time, "agreements" will be made with FUMO, MONAMO, and FRESAMO members whom no one knows. In this way, FRELIMO will attempt to prove that "It is impossible to negotiate with the guerrillas, because they are mere bandits; but FRELIMO has already achieved openness and conciliation with the opposition, thereby proving its democracy."

The same source adds: "In this situation, we are not surprised by the reports that the 'opposition members' in Lisbon, who are going about in the aforementioned small puppet groups, have been giving reports to SNASP [National People's Security Service] since 1980, and that, joining delegations, some have even gone to Maputo recently. According to information from a monthly publication on Africa printed in Lisbon, which has been confirmed by other sources, there have already been several contacts between Maximo Dias, head of MONAMO, and the Embassy of the People's Republic of Maputo [sic] in Lisbon, where Mr Dias delivered a letter for Samora Machel, in which he says that he considers him 'the only person capable of uniting all Mozambican nationalists.' In this strange Maputo-puppet rapprochement it would not be surprising to find the hand of Lucas Pires, after the former CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] leader's visit to Machel."

Another odd report coming from the same source is that Mu'ammarr Qadhafi, the Libyan dictator who is as friendly with Samora Machel as he is a protector

of the "25 April Popular Forces," and of all the terrorist organizations, is now willing to finance this FRELIMO business deal indirectly, by directly financing the MONAMO movement with \$12 million; for which purpose the leader of that movement, Maximo Diaz, is reported to have already held meetings with Qadhafi's representatives in Lisbon.

The money could purchase weapons. The complicity with FRELIMO on the part of movements such as MONAMO or FRESAMO could help Samora Machel in an attempt to convince the United States that democracy is now alive in Mozambique. But, in view of what Marcelino dos Santos shouted a few days ago in the city of Beira, the Maputo government will continue to lack an army sufficiently motivated to continue fighting the guerrillas and not to end up joining them.

2909

CSO: 3442/111

MOZAMBIQUE

AFONSO DHLAKAMA DELIVERS NEW YEAR MESSAGE

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 7 Jan 86 p 17

[Text] "I congratulate the glorious combatants, and bow to the unforgettable memory of these and the anonymous citizens who have fallen on battlefields, in reeducation camps, in political prisons, and in dungeons of the regime; victims of the war and the savage laws, of whipping, beating with sticks, and of shooting, imposed by the FRELIMO dictatorship." This statement was made by the head of Mozambican National Resistance [RENAMO], Afonso Dhlakama, in a message addressed to all Mozambicans, on the occasion of the arrival of the New Year.

And the RENAMO leader adds:

"During this year of 1985, we had to battle against the violation of the national sovereignty by foreign occupation forces; with the violation of our territorial integrity, we witnessed the indiscriminate massacres and bombing of the population, the poisoning of the people's water wells and the heightening of the repression and the violation of the most fundamental human and citizens' rights both by FRELIMO and by the foreign forces. Famine, nakedness, and poverty are a constant mark of life all over our nation, in flagrant contrast to the FRELIMO leaders and their entourage.

"Our people have been subjected to all these sacrifices in order to build a just, free society, without tribalism or racism, with respect for the cultural values and the rights of the individual and the citizen. On behalf of these values, we are fighting and we shall continue to fight, even today, with a FRELIMO that has been beaten in all parts of the country, and with a moribund government which is only governing its capital."

And, in conclusion, the RENAMO leader writes:

"May the New Year of 1986 be a year for consolidation of the politico-military victories achieved by the Mozambican people, represented by RENAMO; a people humiliated, mistreated, and exploited by over a decade of disastrous Communist dictatorial government. So, I wish all Mozambicans, regardless of their political or religious beliefs, that the year 1986 may be a year of national peace and harmony, in a free, independent society."

2909

CSO: 3442/111



MOZAMBIQUE

COOPERATION WITH FRANCE TO BE EXPANDED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Dec 85 p 8

[Text] On Saturday, the talks that have been taking place between delegations from Mozambique and France in connection with the implementation of the decisions from the second session of the French-Mozambican Mixed Commission, held in Maputo this year, concluded.

The delegations from the two countries, headed by Maurice Labi, director of development facilities in the French Ministry of External Relations, and Fernando Sumbana Junior, director in our country's Ministry of Foreign Trade, respectively, reviewed the projects and decisions emanating from the second session of the French-Mozambican Mixed Commission, and identified the activities to be carried out during the 2-year period 1986-87.

In the cultural area, both sides acknowledged the need to reinforce the cooperative activities, by executing a work program, prominent in which is the French participation in the restoration of the former French consulate on Ilha de Mocambique, the study of the creation of a French-Mozambican association, and the preparation of the respective bylaws.

An exchange of artistic groups was also decided upon in this area. It is planned, in this connection, to have the State Song and Dance Company take a trip to France during 1986. It is also planned to have French artistic groups come to our country.

In the cinema realm, it was decided to hold a French film week in Maputo in July of next year. It should be recalled that, this year, the audience in the capital city had an opportunity to attend a series of French films shown at the French Cinema Circle, organized jointly by the National Cinema Institute and the French Embassy in our country.

The delegations also agreed to carry out cooperative activities in the areas of education, agriculture, transportation, telecommunications, merchant marine, fishing and health. In the educational field, particular emphasis will be given to the project for French language instruction, which will include the granting of study scholarships for courses in applied linguistics, in Paris, and for the training of teachers of French.



As a contribution to combat famine in our country, projects will be implemented in the area of agriculture, particularly those associated with rural development. Throughout the talks, there were also discussions of the methods of ensuring and materializing the French technical assistance program.

At the conclusion of the work, both delegations signed a final communique, in which they expressed their deep satisfaction with the manner in which the work took place; it will certainly help to implement the decisions of the Mixed Commission, and, consequently, will help to reinforce the friendly, cooperative relations between the two countries.

One reads in the aforementioned communique that, "The French side expressed its deep appreciation of the situation being experienced in Mozambique, which is a result of the armed acts of destabilization, nurtured from abroad by the enemies of human rights."

One may also read in the communique that, "The Mozambican side underscored the importance of the cooperation with France to Mozambique's economic and social development." Also members of the French delegation attending the talks, including leading officials, were Alain Juillard, cultural attache for scientific and technical cooperation at the French Embassy in Maputo, and the director of the French Central Bank agency, also in Maputo.

The next session of the French-Mozambican Mixed Commission will take place in Paris, during 1987.

2909

CSO: 3442/105

MOZAMBIQUE

FRENCH GROUP TO INCREASE ASSISTANCE IN MARKETING

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Dec 85 p 8

[Text] The non-governmental French organization known as the Research and Investigation Center for African and Asian Countries (CRIA) may increase its assistance to agricultural marketing in Cabo Delgado; although it considers the ideal to be the creation and backing, in the future, of small projects which produce material goods locally for barter in the marketing, according to a recent statement made in Pemba to the information agency by the head of the organization, Brigitte, Lachartre, at the conclusion of a working visit to that province.

Brigitte Lachartre met in the provincial capital of Cabo Delgado with the director of the province, Army Gen Alberto Chipande, and with other party and state officials, to debate matters relating to the material backing that CRIA provides, particularly to the districts of Mueda and Ibo, for the barter with agricultural products in the marketing process.

The head of CRIA traveled to Mueda, where she attended the marketing in the village of Imbuo, claiming at the end of the visit that she was quite impressed by the work and, especially, by the results that are being achieved. But she thinks that the amount of material goods sent is still insufficient, namely, textiles, clothing, capulana [a type of fabric], and production implements, in comparison with the volume of surplus agricultural production in existence.

Brigitte Lachartre remarked: "I was in Mueda with the administrator, where I received a generous reception from the population of the village of Imbuo. To me, this was an occasion for observing how the population brought the corn and cassava to barter for various products. I noticed that the lack of commodities is really a serious situation. It was also important to me to see that, in fact, it is necessary to continue the assistance, bringing more capulana, and other goods which the population needs on a daily basis."

On this occasion, the head of CRIA revealed that she was attempting to promote the making of a film in Cabo Delgado that would illustrate this reality concerning the agricultural marketing and the difficulties being confronted. As she reported, this film would be used later to inform the public in France and

other countries which aid the marketing regarding the need for continuing this type of assistance to Mozambique.

When asked by a reporter whether this position meant that CRIA would send more material goods for a long period of time to Cabo Delgado, to aid the agricultural marketing, Brigitte Lachartre stated categorically that it did, "until local conditions have been created for the production of material goods to be used for marketing."

She said: "I had meetings with the director and other home trade officials. We came to study the continuation of this assistance, primarily for production, right here in the province, of soap, as well as aid to fishing, and the extraction of salt in small local industries. Soap is one of the important products for barter, and we know that there is copra. Now, we need to observe the technical condition of the equipment, and other raw materials, and we shall, of course, necessarily be considering this."

What CRIA Is

CRIA is a non-governmental French organization which has development projects in various African countries and with the liberation movements, particularly with the ANC and SWAPO, working with refugees. According to the head of the organization, the country in which the most and best work is being carried out significantly at present is Mozambique.

Brigitte Lachartre announced that her organization took part in the emergency aid to Mozambique to save the population from the catastrophic results of the drought and the war, sending food products and clothing. In the southern part of the country, it has a project for technical assistance to the cotton sector and those producing meat and cashew nuts.

In Cabo Delgado Province, there are prospects for increasing other areas for aid to agricultural marketing in the regions where large production occurs, namely, Macomia, and certain areas in the northern part of the province.

For all this investment, CRIA is financed by various French organizations in Canada and Ireland. It also has a share of the financing made available by the European Economic Community, and it is with this money that the material goods with which it assists the various countries are purchased.

2909

CSO: 3442/104

MOZAMBIQUE

FEATURES OF NEWLY PASSED LABOR BILL DESCRIBED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 16 Dec 85 p 8

[Text] The 14th Session of the People's Assembly, making eight amendments, passed the Labor Law, a major legal instrument which addresses the workers' interests and enhances the conquests attained during the past 10 years in the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The changes in the initial text submitted, which only serve to improve it, have contributed to the perfection of what, at the outset, was already considered a conquest for our country's working classes, and a culmination of the experiences of the entire Mozambican people's life, work and struggle.

The passage of this law was preceded by thorough discussions held among the participants (deputies and guests), divided into six working groups, and made it possible for all sectors of national life on the most varied echelons to accrue the results of a careful, analytical reading, thereby allowing for the gathering of suggestions leading to the introduction of the amendments, which were also approved.

Perhaps the only shortcoming to be cited in the bill was the absence of an exclusive chapter on public administration, which was noted by all the working groups; and the Assembly voted for the approval and enforcement of the Statute on Public Servants as promptly as possible, concurrently with the going into effect of the Labor Law.

The Labor Law goes into effect 6 months after its passage; which will allow it to be studied, analyzed and assimilated both by employers and by the working class.

The Labor Law establishes the following principles, among others:

Dignifying the protection of work as a right and an obligation of the citizens, with work constituting a criterion for the distribution of the national wealth;

Workers' participation in the planning, execution and control of activities in work centers;

Clearcut definition of the rights and obligations of workers and employing entities;

Pay for work based on the quality and quantity produced;

Right to assistance, in the event of disability and in old age;

Occupational education and training for the benefit of the working classes in general, and the youth in particular;

Respect for and observance of socialist legality.

The Labor Bill contains 175 articles, arranged in 18 chapters, the latter including 32 sections.

The Organization of Mozambican Workers (OTM) submitted at the 14th Session of the People's Assembly, which ended on Saturday in Maputo, a message of congratulation for the Labor Law passed on the same day by that supreme organ of our state.

The message, presented on behalf of all of our country's workers, was read by Jose Correa Ganancio, the OTM's assistant secretary general.

The message hails the effort undertaken by various sectors to make the Labor Law a reality in our country today.

It notes that the latter's implementation will convert it into a valuable tool in the defense of the interests of Mozambican workers and for increased production and productivity.

The document calls attention to the fact that all workers will have to heighten their vigilance regarding divisionist maneuvers aimed at denigrating the spirit of the Labor Law that has now been passed.

The Mozambican workers expressed their willingness to cooperate with the sectors involved in enforcing the law, through the auspices of the OTM.

The passage of the Labor Law received particular attention from the OTM, which sent the Maputo Railroad Club's musical band to the hall where the work of the 14th Session of the People's Assembly was under way, to hail that important event in a festive manner.

2909

CSO: 3442/109



MOZAMBIQUE

PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS STUDY COOPERATION

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Dec 85 p 8

[Text] The provincial governors of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, and City of Maputo have been meeting since yesterday morning in the nation's capital for their fourth working session, to make an evaluation of the activities carried out, as well as to plan activities for next year in the context of the southern zone cooperation agreement. Heading the delegations are the respective governors, namely, Jose Moiane, of Maputo; Aurelio Manave, of Gaza; Jose Pascoal Zandamela, of Inhambane; and the chairman of the Executive Council of the City of Maputo, Alberto Massavanhane.

Speaking at the opening session for the work, the governor of Gaza, Aurelio Manave, in his capacity as head of the southern zone agreement, said that, during the meeting, an assessment must be made of what each province and the city of Maputo have achieved, so as to better plan the activities to be carried out next year.

Moreover, Aurelio Manave stressed that the session was taking place at a special time, when our Armed Forces have won consecutive victories in the battle against the armed bandits, and when the People's Assembly has made major decisions to solve the problems that the country is confronting.

Before the opening session for the work, in his capacity as host, the chairman of the City of Maputo Executive Council, Alberto Massavanhane, greeted the participating delegations, while at the same time noting that the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane have played a preeminent role in supplying the capital's population.

During the meeting, a report was submitted on the activities carried out by the group for coordinating the agreement, noting that the concluding of the agreement among the country's southern provinces is a positive response to the Mozambican people's battle against famine and the armed bandits, and a major contribution to the construction of socialism in the country.

Furthermore, the document submitted during the opening session emphasizes that, despite the difficulties which still prevail, the exchange of views has increased, in both quantity and quality, regarding implementation of the

decisions from the Fourth Congress, simultaneously with an intensification of the commercial exchanges among the southern provinces.

The report states that, during the interval between the two sessions, obvious efforts have been expended by each province, aimed at implementing the decisions made at the last meeting, held in Inhambane, in the context of the regional cooperation agreement.

Thus, the coordinating group cites in its document the need for the involvement, not only of the agencies of the state apparatus, but also of the state enterprises and other subordinate units, in the process of commercial exchange among the provinces.

According to the report submitted at the meeting, this action is aimed essentially at improving the group's working methods, as well as lending greater dynamism and efficiency to the supervision of tasks performed, and to be performed for the development of the cooperative relations among the country's southern provinces.

The participants were divided into working groups to study and discuss the report on the activities carried out by the coordinating group for the southern zone cooperation agreement.

This morning, visits have been planned for the provincial and city of Maputo delegates to the green zones and to some industrial units in the nation's capital.

2909

CSO: 3442/105

MOZAMBIQUE

PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS VISIT MAPUTO GREEN ZONES

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Dec 85 p 8

[Text] With the visits paid to the 16 June and Maguiguane-2 Agricultural Cooperatives, the hog-breeding facilities and the cooperative training centers, as well as some industrial units in the nation's capital, the work of the fourth session was continued yesterday among the provincial governors of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane and the City of Maputo, in the context of the agreement on cooperation in the southern zone. The purpose of the visits paid by those leaders is to exchange views in the area of agricultural production.

During that trip, the visiting delegations were informed on the production processes as well as the difficulties confronting the cooperatives. Nevertheless, the visiting delegations expressed satisfaction with the work being done in the city of Maputo agricultural cooperatives, while at the same time promising to pass on the experience gained in their provinces.

At a meeting held with the cooperative members at the training center, the governor of Gaza Province, Aurelio Manave, stressed the importance of agricultural production on the outskirts of the capital city, claiming that it had contributed to the battle against famine. Moreover, Aurelio Manave called upon the cooperative members of the city of Maputo to raise production; also reporting on the action that is being taken in the provinces of the southern part of the country, aimed at supplying the capital's population.

On this occasion, one of the members of the 16 June Cooperative expressed concern over the lack of transportation to remove the products, noting that, nevertheless, they have succeeded in filling the markets in the capital city.

Meanwhile it was planned to end the work of the fourth session of the provincial governors of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, and the City of Maputo, held in the context of the southern zone cooperation agreement, last night.

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CSO: 3442/104

MOZAMBIQUE

PEMBA GREEN ZONES INCREASE PRODUCTION

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Dec 85 p 8

[Text] During the last season, the agricultural production on the city of Pemba's green belt achieved record amounts of various products, primarily tomatoes. The production is considered the corollary of the development and improved organization during the past 2 years, although the producers are still submerged in difficulties, owing to the lack of equipment.

The green zones of the city of Pemba have features different from those of most of the country's provincial capitals; first, because of the fact that they are located long distances from the city, of between 20 and 20 kilometers; and, second, because their production includes all types of products, ranging from green vegetables to grains, namely, rice, which is produced in large quantities in the low-lying areas, as well as corn and sorghum.

The largest individual areas belong to private owners, and range between 10 and 150 hectares. However, overall, the largest area, though there are not yet exact data, belongs to the family farmers who, on the average, hold from 2 to 3 hectares for the production of grains, and nearly half a hectare for green vegetables.

The organization of the Green Zones Office still lacks systematization and information on the situation and growth of the activity itself.

However, it is known that, last year, there was the largest production ever, considering the flow of producers or carriers to the markets, bringing the most diverse products.

According to that official, confirmed by some private farmers, there was no capacity for consuming tomatoes, and many people are resorting to the production of syrup and homemade sweets, which are still being consumed now.

The producers, especially those engaged in garden produce growing, are facing serious difficulties owing to the lack of pumps and engines to draw water from the dams built by the Irrigation and Small Dams Management Unit, as well as other equipment for irrigation. Transportation is still the enigma which in many instances forces the producers to sell their products on the farms,

to prevent their spoiling or losing quality, as has occurred on occasion. Locally, there are few or nearly no prospects for a solution to this situation.

#### Next Season

According to the green zones director, there are possibilities of contacting a specialized agency to carry out the demarcation of land, so as to afford better control, mainly in the family sector. Furthermore, MECANAGRO is scheduled to support the cultivation of 1,500 hectares for the private sector, 500 of which are in Metugi, and 100 in Mize.

There is currently a center for multiplying the small species of animals, namely, rabbits and ducks. In this way, it is planned, next year, to have some animals sold to individuals interested in developing the breeding in the green zones.

Insofar as seed is concerned, the green zones director, Luis Capane, said that contact has already been made with Boror, and assurance has been given that there is in the city of Pemba all the seed necessary, in sufficient amounts, for what has been planned.

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CSO: 3442/105



MOZAMBIQUE

MORE SECURITY EXISTS ON NAMPULA-NACALA ROAD

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Dec 85 p 5

[Text] Until 1100 hours, gigantic trucks, buses and cars for touring had already driven along the polygon, the usual site of departure of columns going to Nacala, which is nearly 15 kilometers from the city of Nampula. It was the last day of October, and people were ready to travel.

The drivers of the vehicles and other travelers who were hitchhiking, unable to bear the heat caused by the sun's rays projected from the clear sky, took shelter in the meager shade of bushes on both sides of the road. Some were even seated or lying down in the shade of large-sized vehicles; always anxious to hear the voice of the commander ordering the immediate advancement of the column, consisting of over 5 dozen vehicles.

The anxiety was greater for the mothers, who remained in the bodies of the vehicles, because if they were in the shade, they would have trouble climbing into the trucks when it was time to leave. There was no alternative for them, although at that time they hated the intense rays of the sun.

Among the travelers there was some conversation, but it dealt mainly with changes of schedule, since the start of the system of traveling in a column, and the status of security along the route between Nampula and Macala, during the past 6 months. I approached a group of drivers who spend their lives traveling in the columns. At one point in the dialogue, one of them recalled the schedule that the columns have kept from the beginning of the system up until the present:

"During the second quarter of 1983, when we began traveling in columns, we started from here at 0800 hours. Later, we started leaving between 0900 and 1000 hours; and during the past 2 months, we have never left before 1130 hours."

Another intervened: "But there have been safe conditions lately too. The bandits can no longer 'bother' us, because our troops are permanently installed in all the dangerous areas."

A third, in turn, said that he had even heard tell of cars driving alone from Namaialo to Nacala, without a military escort; and they drive there in Muiravale without any problems.

To tell the truth, when I heard this latter remark I was not convinced, because Muiravale (an uninhabited area nearly 20 kilometers from Monapo) is considered the most dangerous on the route between Nampula and Nacala. It was the site where dozens of people were killed and at least 15 vehicles of official entities and private ones were destroyed as a result of the acts committed by armed bandits, particularly during the first half of 1985.

The dialogue had to be interrupted, because at that very moment the traveling population broke up, occupying seats in the vehicles that would carry them. Without agreeing with what I had just heard, I also boarded the AGRICOM [Agricultural Products Marketing Company] Scania truck, loaded with bags of peanuts up to the cab level.

It was exactly noon when the column began the journey, and the sun was shining even more intensely, producing dreadful heat. But the 50-60 kilometers per hour, at which the vehicles were traveling reduced the sun's intensity. On top of the bags, it was pleasant to watch the vehicles moving, forming a large cordon rolling along the tarred road.

The first place where the column stopped was in Nacavala, 50 kilometers from Nampula. The population residing in the vicinity of the road brought some products to sell, including peanuts, beans, fresh cassava, bananas and some black wood sculptures. Although the stop was only for 5 minutes, some people jumped out of the vehicles and managed to buy some products.

In Namialo, the truck driver invited me to take a seat in the cab, left empty by a girl who had gotten off there. There were three of us in the cab, besides him. Before we reached Monapo, two attack trucks came in the opposite direction, and the driver then started talking:

"Look! Those vehicles are coming from Nacala, and they are not even carrying one soldier to escort them."

Another traveler broke in, vigorously claiming: "Yes, now there is no confusion between Namialo and Nacala; our troops are installed in all the dangerous areas."

Now, there was reason to agree that this was true. After the column had gone beyond Monapo, another vehicle arrived, loaded with rail equipment, from the brigade to improve the Nacala railroad line. A few minutes later, the column of vehicles passed Muiravale, where there were troops from the Armed Forces of Mozambique at the side of the road, waving approvingly as the vehicles went by. There, vestiges of destruction still remain. At the same time, there was no "confusion" in that area.

But what is the reason for so much suspense?

The circulation of columns to Nacala is extremely important to the regional economy. It makes possible the movement of various merchandise from the port of Nacala to supply the city of Nampula and other districts in the province, as well as Cabo Delgado.

It is also by means of them that agricultural products purchased in the marketing campaigns are removed from the districts of Monapo, Muecate, Meconta, Mossuril, Ilha de Mocambique, Memba and Nacala-a-Velha.

Furthermore, the columns to Nacala move some raw materials which are processed in both native and foreign industries, in addition to allowing for the travel of passengers.

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CSO: 3442/104

MOZAMBIQUE

UNANGO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISE OVERCOMES MAIZE HARVEST OBSTACLES

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Dec 85 p 8

[Text] Regardless of the terrorist activities, and despite the fact that they are isolated in a distant province, also struggling with the lack of means of production, the workers of Niassa have once again been an example of determination and desire for accomplishment. They did not wait for outside assistance, and remained attached to the land, counting on their own forces and available facilities, producing more than had been planned, and contributing substantially to the battle against famine. This is the essence of the report that our correspondent in Lichinga, Bernardo Alifa, sent us.

During the 1984-85 agricultural campaign, the Unango Agricultural Enterprise produced nearly 3,000 tons of various products, on an area of 2,000 hectares. Of that number, 2,800 tons were comprised of maize, representing a yield of 4.5 tons per hectare, in proportion to the area that this crop occupied.

These results are considered positive, if we consider the countless difficulties surmounted throughout the campaign, marked by the lack of fuel, constant breakdowns in the machinery and further aggravation from the insecurity in the area, due to the armed bandits' activities.

Vasco Mulauze, chief of that enterprise's technical department, in an interview with our newspaper, remarked that, with the results accrued in maize growing, his enterprise exceeded to a large extent the goal for marketing this grain. "The plan called for the marketing of 1,000 tons of maize but, owing to the surprising results obtained at the end of the campaign, we shall sell 1,900 tons of this grain to AGRICOM [Agricultural Products Marketing Company]."

In addition to supplying AGRICOM, the Unango Agricultural Enterprise has already sold over 120 tons of maize to the different commercial and hotel establishments in the town of Lichinga.

It should be noted that all the products which that enterprise marketed have already been removed to the AGRICOM warehouses in Lichinga.

Commenting on the 1985-86 agricultural campaign, the subject of our interview said that his enterprise would cover 720 hectares, which will be occupied by maize, beans, soybeans and green vegetables.

#### Small Projects

In the area of small projects, the Unango Agricultural Enterprise is engaged in bee-keeping, with 43 hives at present, of which number 35 are already occupied.

To ensure the proper operation of this activity, that enterprise has four bee-keepers.

It is also known that there are prospects during the next 3 years for the creation of a bee-keepers' center in Unango. During a preliminary phase, in order to materialize this project, bee-keepers' associations and groups are being formed.

He remarked: "Meanwhile, as a means of counting on our own forces to solve the problems, the enterprise has two dams, one of which is inoperative, owing to the destruction which occurred during the last agricultural campaign, due to excess water. The remaining dam has a capacity of 40,000 cubic meters, and irrigates 5 hectares."

#### Improved Housing for Workers

Over 80 improved dwellings for workers have already been built at the Unango Agricultural Enterprise.

The construction of these dwellings is aimed not only at improving the workers' living conditions, but also, essentially, at settling the labor next to the enterprise.

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CSO: 3442/105



MOZAMBIQUE

MANICA CONSTRUCTION, WATERWORKS DIRECTOR ON SECTOR'S PROBLEMS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Dec 85 p 3

[Text] Between the shortages of facilities and materials currently being experienced in the province and the acts of sabotage by the armed bandits, a great deal is being done and is yet to be done by the Provincial Directorate of Construction and Waterworks in Manica, to find local solutions for the purpose of resolving everyday problems and immediately repairing everything damaged by the enemy's action. "To make the armed bandits realize that their actions are not weakening or frightening us; we feel that we have more strength for working when they attack us," claimed Antonio Mario Mendes, provincial director of construction and waterworks of Manica, in a recent interview with our newspaper.

In the interview, that official made an analysis of each branch of the sector which he heads, taking as a reference point the FRELIMO Party's Fourth Congress, held at the beginning of 1983.

It is from this standpoint that Mario Mendez disclosed to us that the underground water supply branch is the one which developed most during this period of time because, as he remarked, "It managed to accomplish a great deal with the few resources at its disposal."

The subject of our interview said: "This branch began to improve after the year that the congress itself took place. Up until then, it had not made any borings nor had it engaged in prospecting for underground water. But, thanks to the work on the recovery of drills, we have made nearly 24 borings per year, and more or less the same number of wells."

For this reason, as he noted, Manica Province will benefit from external financing, specifically from OXFAM (an American aid organization) which will place at the sector's disposal as early as this year a light vehicle and another heavy one; and, in 1986, a light and a heavy vehicle, a drill truck, and a hitch for a tractor, among other equipment, in addition to fuel.

Mario Mendes claimed: "We have always been seeking solutions," adding that, "If you travel around the vicinity of the city, you will surely notice some windmills operating. They were not purchased. We recovered them. We even

went so far as to invent manual pumps. However, we have not continued this work, because of the lack of equipment. This is all for the purpose of trying to minimize the water supply problem in the peripheral areas."

But why only in the peripheral areas, and not in the districts as well? we inquired. "We have done some sporadic work in the districts, but only in those located near the town of Chimoio, and even then only when we have been requested to do so; because we have meager facilities for going long distances. The drill itself, in order to be moved, has to be carried or hitched; and the only equipment that the waterworks sector has for this purpose is a tractor which has also been used to carry technicians who are giving assistance to the pumps on the outskirts of the city," replied our interviewee.

#### Provincial Roads Enterprise To Be Created In 1986

The roads sector in Manica Province has operated only to carry out current maintenance on the roads, specifically undertaking the weeding, elimination of holes, resurfacing of footpaths, painting on pavement (horizontal and vertical signals) and digging of paths, "always using local solutions," as Mario Mendes comments.

The same official cited the state of deterioration shown by the province's roads at present, declaring that, "Their period of durability has now ended and they should be resurfaced. Since there is no resurfacing, and now that the traffic from Zimbabwe to Sofala and vice versa has increased, the roads need more care on our part; and this has forced us to make greater efforts, because if the situation continues in this way, in 3 years' time the investment to be made will have doubled."

It is for this reason that there is now a project in Manica to create, next year, a road enterprise to engage exclusively in the maintenance and small-scale construction of roads. Also according to Mario Mende, that enterprise has been designed to operate with various work brigades.

#### Different Alternatives for the Lack of Construction Materials

The provincial director of construction and waterworks also announced in the interview that he granted us that, in the construction branch per se, wire nails, waste from MOGAS (lime), and paving and roof tiles of mud are being used as alternatives for the lack of nails, cement, and lusalite plates. This is meant to illustrate the search for different alternatives for the lack of construction materials with which the sector is struggling.

For example, it is by making use of those alternatives that seven dwellings are being built for the workers from the Provincial Directorate of Construction and Waterworks of Manica.

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CSO: 3442/104

MOZAMBIQUE

BANDITRY, BLACK MARKETEERING SEEN PROLIFERATING

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 28 Dec 85 pp 1, 20

[Text] Maputo--In Mozambique, the end of this year is being typified by a movement critical of the government, proclaimed among its own members. The initiative originated with President Samora Machel, who stated aloud what all the people had been saying in hushed tones.

The government has taken note of the slowness in the construction of the state; because, 10 years after independence, a fratricidal war, with its feature of banditry among the methods, strongly supported by South Africa (as proven by the notorious documents seized in Gorongosa), is leaving victims almost everywhere, massacring and terrorizing defenseless people, and destroying the framework of the transportation system that had been crossing the country with the supplies essential to the population's life.

Pressured by the war, the regime has had to meet the most urgent needs, with its military, leaving the effort to built up Armed Forces suited for a modern state damaged.

Black Market

There has not yet been any success in putting an end to the social and armed banditry, and "speculation" based on the black market for products and foreign currency is proliferating, in a rise that seems to be impossible to halt, unless there is the courage to adopt imperative measures in the economic and financial areas. Among the leaders, there are some who would opt for essential measures and some who prefer to stress repression of the speculators who are proliferating like mushrooms, but who are contributing to the market supply.

In fact, the dollar is being purchased at the official exchange rate of 40-41 meticals, whereas it fluctuates between 1,700 and 2,000 on the black market. The rand is officially worth 15 meticals, and on the black market, nearly 560. However, the prices of the products on the markets open to the public, products which are showing up in some abundance, change on the basis of the black exchange circuit.

For example, in Maputo's leading market, tomatoes cost about 500 meticals (2,000 Portuguese escudos, in official terms); mango, an abundant fruit during this season, costs between 150 and 300; and watermelon costs 250 meticals per kilogram. On the other hand, it should be noted that the average wage does not far exceed 5,000 meticals, and that much of the population's earnings is based only on Decree 4/80, in other words, totaling 2,100 meticals per month.

Moreover, there is an official supply system and a network of cooperatives charging low prices; but the volumes of products on sale are obviously insufficient. A few examples: Every person is entitled to 1 kilogram of sugar per month (18 meticals); from 2.5 to 3 kilograms of rice (13.50); half a bar of soap (17.50 meticals), for a maximum of three persons; and fish, generally mackerel shad (50 meticals), half a kilogram per person.

As for the rest (if it is non-existent in the cooperatives and is in very short supply), it must be sought in the parallel circuits, where the prices are exorbitant and incompatible with the official true situation. We would not be straying far from the facts (statistics are lacking in this sector) if we were to say that over 50 percent of the Mozambican economy, with particular emphasis on trade, evades the state's control.

#### To Buy a Kilogram of Mangos Per Day

At the 14th Session of the National People's Assembly [ANP], the minister of security, Sergio Vieira, reportedly observed: "There is emerging in the country a parasitic class, one of middlemen, who are netting fabulous profits. This amassment of wealth is being made to the detriment of the producer, the consumer, and the public. It is a small group, which can purchase a car for 7,000 contos, and offer 10,000 for a house. Now a minister of the republic cannot even manage to buy a kilogram of mangos per day. It is a small group that is monopolizing the cigarettes which show up...and they no longer sell a cigarette, but are selling a 'puff' of a cigarette; a small group which controls beer production...and beer has disappeared from the market. The problems that we are confronting in the state apparatus are all partially associated with the fact that the public servant and the policeman are paid 5, 6, or 7 contos, and hence someone can readily corrupt them with 20 contos or more. The speculator, in turn, is amassing wealth in a gross manner. A truck is paid for in two or three trips."

#### Criticism at the ANP

At the recent session of the National People's Assembly, the 14th to be held in Maputo, the criticism was overwhelming. Joaquim Chissano, minister of foreign affairs, ventured the hypothesis that private persons should have access to their own houses, as a means of preventing the deterioration of the property supply. He upheld decontrol of the transportation system which is obviously inadequate to meet the population's requirements.

Graca Machel, minister of education, reportedly declared: "I am a member of the government, and I realize that there are many things that we are not

accomplishing. But if a member of the population should ask me, in detail, why we are not doing them, I would probably be unable to explain, even though I belong to the government...."

Valeriano Ferrao, ambassador to the UN, added: "The instructions that the honorable president has just given are extremely important, but they may have come too late. In May of this year, the Council of Ministers made a group of decisions regarding the country's economic features, in which the decontrol of prices was implemented."

Valeriano Ferrao also requested that information be provided on the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; negotiations "which have profound implications for our lives and our country."

Sergio Vieira reportedly emphasized: "I am a minister, Mr President, and I have never rendered accounts to the People's Assembly. I was never invited by an Assembly commission to submit accounts; which perhaps would have been difficult for me, and would perhaps have embarrassed me. However, I think that this would have been essential and necessary to make our work actually directed by the People's Assembly, which is the supreme organ of the state's authority."

The People's Assembly is convoked and chaired by the head of state; it meets ordinarily twice a year, and extraordinarily when it is deemed fitting. However, voices have arisen from various sides calling for a more active presence of the National People's Assembly in the life of the country.

And there is no dearth of individuals who think that, next year, they will be considerable innovations in Mozambican political activity.

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CSO: 3442/109



MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

BRITISH MILITARY ACADEMY GRADUATES--On Friday, our country's vice minister of defense, Armando Panguene, attended, as one of the guests of honor, the graduation ceremony for the new cadets at the British Royal Military Academy, in Sandhurst. Among the graduates were two Mozambicans, who were trained in the context of the cooperative relations between that academy and the Mozambican Defense Ministry. This was the first time that this military center in the United Kingdom had trained Mozambicans. The two graduates are Lt Joao Luis Vitorino and 2d Lt Gabriel Mabunda. At the ceremony, Panguene was accompanied by the vice commander of one of the three units comprising that academy, Colonel Blackford. In addition to training British officers, the Sandhurst Military Academy also trains future officers of certain Arab and African countries, such as Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Dec 85 p 8] 2909

VETERINARY COOPERATION WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA--Yesterday, in Maputo, an agreement for cooperation between the Superior Schools of Veterinary Medicine of Brno and Kosice, in Czechoslovakia, and the Veterinary School of Eduardo Mondlane University, was signed. The documents were initialed by Rector Fernando Ganhao and the member of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Prof Dr Otto J. Vrtiak. As was pointed out on the occasion of the signing, the agreement will be in effect from 1986 to 1988, lending continuity to the cooperative relations that already exist between the two countries, particularly in the area of education. Next year, five veterinary instructors will come to our country. Also planned is the arrival of four specialists who, during their stay in our country, will give intensive courses in this field of science. Moreover, two Mozambican instructors will receive doctorates in veterinary science during 1986, at one of the higher educational institutions of Czechoslovakia. It should be noted that, as we were told, the cooperation between Mozambique and Czechoslovakia is most developed in the veterinary field. The delegation from the Czechoslovakian institutions of higher education had been making a working visit to our country, which culminated in the signing of this cooperative agreement. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Dec 85 p 8] 2909

MELOCO'S NEW ADMINISTRATOR--The replacement for the first secretary and administrator of the locality of Meloco, in the district of Montepuez, Hilario Date, met with the population of the Titiala communal village. In attendance

was Raside Nampuita, head of the locality, who officiated at the ceremony to introduce the new first secretary and administrator of the locality of Meloco. Raside Nampuita urged the population of Titiala to become involved in production for the 1985-86 agricultural campaign. Every resident will have to open a farm growing cotton, corn, sorghum and rice, to combat famine and nakedness. The residents submitted to the new first secretary and administrator of the locality the problem of the lack of hoes, and bean and sunflower seed. [Text]  
[Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Dec 85 p 4] 2909

CSO: 3442/104/105

NAMIBIA

RUDE PRAVO INTERVIEW WITH SWAPO'S NUJOMA

AU231243 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 21 Jan 86 p 6

[Interview given by Sam Nujoma, SWAPO chairman, to Jana Horska in Luanda: "For the Freedom of Namibia's People"; date not given; first passage is RUDE PRAVO introduction]

[Text] Sam Nujoma, chairman of the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), granted an interview to Jana Horska, RUDE PRAVO correspondent in Angola. The interview, which was granted in Luanda, states:

[Horska] Comrade Chairman, how do you assess the current situation in southern Africa?

[Nujoma] The decision taken by the Reagan government to allocate millions of dollars to bandits from the UNITA organization in Angola creates an extremely critical political-military situation in our area. The American reactionary circles are striving to transform the conflict in southern Africa--which is the consequence of the existence of an apartheid state--into a confrontation between East and West.

A campaign is now taking place in the United States to give \$200-300 million to UNITA, and also to force the American Chevron Gulf Oil company to end its operations in Angola and thus deprive Angola of the incomes from crude oil extraction. UNITA is nothing but a helper of the apartheid army. So that, in fact, the money for the UNITA will be money for South Africa, to enable it to continue its aggression against Angola and against other countries, such as Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. This money comes at a time when the economic and financial situation in South Africa has seriously deteriorated. The so-called policy of constructive cooperation with the racists which the current U.S. Government is pursuing with regard to South Africa is, in reality, also destructive. It strengthens and encourages the Pretoria regime to continue its unappeasable policy against Namibia's independence and against the front states, particularly Angola. That is why it is important to unmask these ominous maneuvers of the American imperialists. It is important that the American people exert pressure on the Reagan government to make it stop these malevolent attempts, aimed at undermining the progressive and peace-loving Angolan state.

Washington also continues its extortionist policy of making conditions which are helping South Africa maintain the illegal occupation of Namibia under the pretext of the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. Washington is ignoring the opinion of the world public that there is no connection between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and Namibia's independence. These are merely practices of procrastination, carried out by Washington and Pretoria in order to prolong the suffering of our people and in order to ruthlessly deprive our country of its manpower and natural resources.

[Horska] What is the significance of political events in the Republic of South Africa for Namibia's liberation?

[Nujoma] For the last 16 months, the people of South Africa, led by the American National Congress, have practically kept the apartheid regime in a state of siege. The fact that the oppressed people's masses in South Africa have been capable of defying the oppression, which has claimed more than 1,000 patriots' lives, shows that the revolutionary process in South Africa is irreversible. The foundations of the economy of apartheid have been shaken. The currency, the rand, has reached its lowest level. Part of the foreign capital is seeping out of the country. Some capitalists have started closing down their plants.

The consequences of these events in South Africa for Namibia are not quite obvious yet. The regime continues its brutal and illegal occupation of our country. It is constantly coming out with new attempts to install its puppets, as for instance when the so-called provisional government was being set up in Windhoek on 17 June 1985. I must stress that the people of South Africa and Namibia are fighting a common enemy. It can be said that, in a way, our fight is interlinked. The armed fight for Namibia's liberation and the people's resistance in South Africa will force the apartheid regime to increase its defense expenditures; and the more it spends, the weaker its financial position will be.

It is obvious that the regime lacks sufficient human and material resources, as well as a social and moral base for successfully resisting the revolutionary pressure for long, both on the Namibian and on the South African Front. From this one can deduce that it will be forced, willy-nilly, to give up Namibia under the pressure of the national liberation forces on both fronts.

[Horska] Which political platform does SWAPO regard as realistic and practicable in a sensible short time, for justly and peacefully resolving the Namibian problem?

[Nujoma] As regard SWAPO, for the past 7 years we have been calling for a ceasefire between the two sides fighting in Namibia--the forces of the SWAPO and the South African occupation army. This must be immediately followed by the implementation of the Security Council's resolution No 435/1978, without any changes and without an artificial creation of such problems as the policy of unification or so-called impartiality. We consider the realization of this resolution the only way in which Namibia can achieve independence by

peaceful means. We have approved of resolution No 435, and we still feel bound by it. The overwhelming majority of Namibian people, both SWAPO members and those who do not belong to it, support this resolution and demand that it be immediately carried out, without amendments or supplements. The international public also supports this resolution in its entirety.

The resolution includes the demand for free, just, and democratic elections in Namibia under UN supervision and control. In this way the people of Namibia would for the first time be able to make use of their rights and to select their leaders, who would prepare the Constitution in harmony with the wishes and hopes of the majority of our, currently suffering, people.

During the last decade, Namibia's people have lived through one attempt after another, undertaken by the racist Republic of South Africa against their will in order to foist puppet regimes on them; for instance,

--There was the establishment of the "Vorster Advisory Council" at the beginning of the seventies; it consisted of tribal chieftains and its aim was to set up a bantustan in Namibia and to enforce the policy of apartheid;

--Later, in September 1975, the tribal chieftains, people commissioned by the Republic of South Africa, and political mercenaries assembled in Windhoek to set up the, now no longer existing, so-called constitutional Turnhalle Conference. This again was carried out on ethnic foundations for the purpose of creating a bantustan in Namibia, on the basis of the policy of "divide and rule."

--In the year 1979, when the puppets assembled again, a so-called National Assembly was created.

--In December 1980 a puppet Ministers' Council was formed;

--In the year 1983, the establishment of a "State Council" was announced (but the council collapsed even before it was established);

--And on 17 June 1985 a puppet Provisional Government was proclaimed.

In all these attempts, South Africa strove to present its puppets to the world as so-called representatives of the Namibian people. However, our people always rejected these puppets; they will continue rejecting them, so long as their rights to elect their own leaders and to determine their own future are not restored.

Only the implementation of Resolution No 435 can lead to Namibia's independence by peaceful means. Were the joint actions of the liberation battle in Namibia and South Africa to be complemented by international sanctions against the racist Republic of South Africa, this would quite certainly accelerate the realization of Resolution No 435, or of another acceptable political platform by means of which Namibia could achieve true freedom and national independence. As long as no serious negotiations take place which



could lead to a peaceful solution and the realization of the UN plan, the war for national liberation will continue to go on and to strengthen.

[Horska] How do you assess the significance of international solidarity with the fight of the Namibian people?

[Nujoma] The SWAPO always held international solidarity in great esteem, as an important factor contributing to the progress of our just fight and enabling us to achieve our final victory more quickly. The solidarity of the OAU, and particularly of the front states, always established favorable moral and political conditions for our fight, which was also supported by other progressive parts of mankind.

The all-round material and solidarity support granted us by the socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, and the Nonaligned Movement--of which SWAPO is a member with full rights--has always been a deep source of inspiration for our fighting people; and SWAPO continues to count on their selfless assistance to our just cause. We also appreciate the help granted by Czechoslovakia in the upbringing of our younger generation.

Such countries as Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Holland, and recently also Italy and France, have granted our people humanitarian assistance. The nongovernmental organizations in the capitalist world, including the United States, are also willing to help us.

Until our people achieve the inevitable victory, the fight for national liberation will be strengthened on all fronts--political, diplomatic, as well as military.

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CSO: 3400/1020

NAMIBIA

SWAPO EXPECTED TO BEGIN OFFENSIVE 'AT ANY MOMENT'

MB031742 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1459 GMT 3 Feb 86

[Text] Windhoek, Feb 3, SAPA--SWAPO insurgents have yet to begin their annual rainy season offensive, but they were expected to leave their bases in southern Angola for SWA/Namibia "at any moment," according to a report quoting military intelligence sources in Windhoek today.

A senior officer said the insurgents would have to leave their three advance bases in southern Angola within the next few days if they hoped to achieve anything with their infiltration effort.

Two of the advance bases were in the region of the Cubango River and the other in central-southern Angola.

Another senior military intelligence officer said an intensified reconnaissance action by the security forces had shown that preparations by SWAPO insurgents were near completion for the infiltration.

"But they are running out of time," he added.

The rains in southern Angola and northern SWA/Namibia were considerably later this year than in previous seasons.

Rivers in southern Angola were in full flood, but the vegetation in the infiltration area still provided inadequate cover from detection from the air.

The intelligence officer said the insurgents were expected to initiate their infiltration campaign as promised.

Military sources earlier said SWAPO's armed wing was expected to begin infiltration of SWA/Namibia from December 1 last year, but the effort has not yet materialised.

A SWA Territory Force spokesman said the security forces in SWA/Namibia would meet the infiltrators with the resources at their command.

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CSO: 3400/1020

NAMIBIA

PROSPECTS FOR INDEPENDENCE SETTLEMENT DISCUSSED

MB221713 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1646 GMT 22 Jan 86

[By Johann van Heerden]

[Text] Windhoek, Jan 22, SAPA--As public debate continues in the United States on aid for Angola's UNITA rebel movement, indications have emerged in Windhoek that the latest diplomatic effort by the U.S. has failed to advance the quest for a settlement of the SWA/Namibian dispute.

"The information we have is there is really no new idea from the Americans," SWAPO's secretary for publicity and information, Mr Hidipo Hamutenya, said in a statement from the organization's headquarters in Luanda.

Mounting evidence suggests that the Reagan administration is planning to go ahead with the granting of military aid to UNITA, amounting to about 15 million dollars (about \$35 million).

"My impression is...that the decision may already have been taken," a U.S. Senate source was quoted as saying this week.

According to reports from Washington, the UNITA leader, Dr Jonas Savimbi, is expected to arrive in the U.S. capital next week for a 10-day visit to generate support for U.S. to UNITA.

Two weeks ago, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa, Dr Chester Crocker, reportedly informed the Angolan president, Mr Jose Eduardo dos Santos, that unless the MPLA accommodated Dr Savimbi in the Luanda government the U.S. would go ahead with the proposed aid package for UNITA.

"Washington is merely pressing for a second linkage, that is, to try to get the Angolans to accommodate UNITA as a condition" for the U.S. to withhold aid from UNITA, Mr Hamutenya said after the U.S. envoy's visit to Luanda where he held separate talks with the MPLA and SWAPO.

President dos Santos reportedly responded that if the U.S. went ahead with aid to UNITA, the MPLA government would interpret the gesture as "a declaration of war (by the U.S.) on Angola."

The MPLA would have no option but to ask for more military aid and assistance from the international community, "particularly for its Soviet and Cuban friends and other socialist countries," the Angolan president reportedly said.

U.S. officials said the Soviet Union has poured more than two billion dollars (about R4.7 billion) in military aid into Angola.

Washington has no diplomatic ties with Luanda but ironically American-controlled companies have extensive oil interests in Angola's Cabinda enclave which produces most of Angola's foreign earnings.

According to diplomatic sources, U.S. foreign policy on Angola is aimed at achieving national reconciliation between the warring parties in the country, which would make superfluous the presence of an estimated 30,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola and pave the way for U.S. recognition of Angola, and lead to SWA/Namibian independence.

Against that background, any escalation in the Angolan conflict between FAPLA government forces--with Cuban back-up--and UNITA rebel fighters--supported by South Africa--has the implication that SWA/Namibian independence is receding further into the future.

SWA/Namibian transitional cabinet members Mr Andreas Shipanga and Mr Fanuel Kozonguizi said in a statement after meeting Dr Crocker in Cape Town this month they had expressed dissatisfaction over delays in independence negotiations for Africa's last dependency.

Dr Crocker had not disclosed any new information about a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, SWA/Namibia's neighbor in the north.

"He doesn't seem to have moved the MPLA forward," Mr Shipanga said.

In the absence of an internationally supervised independence process in SWA/Namibia, plans were reported in Windhoek to renew efforts this year to persuade SWAPO to relinquish its armed struggle and to join the territory's transitional government.

Preparatory work for such a development would be done at a conference in Lusaka to be attended by the territory's political parties.

"Real progress towards independence can be made by encouraging all parties to join in the process of national reconciliation," Mr Kozonguizi said.

He emphasised that the transitional government wanted all foreign forces removed from southern Africa.

Against that, SWAPO's stance is that the presence of Cuban military personnel in Angola is extraneous to SWA/Namibian independence and linkage of the two issues is rejected.

SWAPO has been fighting nearly 20 years of guerrilla warfare for the independence of SWA/Namibia and SWAPO spokesmen have said any cessation of hostilities should be strictly in terms of a formal ceasefire as envisaged in UN Resolution 435, and should mark the beginning of implementation of the UN's independence plan for SWA/Namibia.

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NAMIBIA

BRIEFS

SWAPO MEMBERS KILLED IN 1986--Windhoek, Jan 20, SAPA--Security forces in northern SWA/Namibia have shot and killed 25 SWAPO insurgents in various skirmishes to date this year, the SWA Territory Force said in Windhoek today. The security forces also lost a member of the SWA police's counter-insurgency unit, Special Constable Fillipus Simon, who died in a landmine blast. The SWATF said in a statement that an electricity generator has been damaged in a sabotage attempt by SWAPO insurgents at a school of the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo Kavango Church in central Ovambo on Saturday night. The SWATF said an army patrol was sent to the school after it had received information that insurgents were planning to blow up the power plant. A staff member of the school declined help from the soldiers and a few hours later the generator was sabotaged with explosives. In another incident, the SWAFT said, SWAPO insurgents sabotaged 12 telephone poles between Ondangua and Oshkango in northern SWA/Namibia on Friday night. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1852 GMT 20 Jan 86 MB] /6662

RSA JOURNALISTS REFUSED ENTRY PERMITS--Windhoek, Jan 27, SAPA--A CAPE TIMES reporter, Mr Tony Weaver, and a photographer, Miss Elizabeth Fish, were refused permits to enter Kaokoland in northern SWA/Namibia, according to a news report in Windhoek today. The two journalists said they wanted to travel to Opuwa to attend a game-poaching trial last week. In terms of the SWA/Namibian security districts proclamation, non-residents require permits to enter certain areas in the territory. A police spokesman, Col Hennie Odendaal, said the police did not have to furnish reasons for refusing permits. Mr Weaver and Miss Fish could reapply for permits to the commissioner of police, Lt-Gen Dolf Gouws, if they were unhappy with the refusal, Col Odendaal said. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1326 GMT 27 Jan 86 MB] /6662

SWANU ON 'PROGRESSIVE FRONT'--Windhoek, Jan 28, SAPA--A left-wing SWA National Union (SWANU) group has begun an initiative to include the political party of the Ovambo administration chairman, Mr Peter Kalangula, in a broad alliance against the SWA/Namibian transitional government. According to a news report today, SWANU's secretary-general, Mr Verkuil Rukoro, said his party felt the time had come for anti-government parties in the territory to be mobilised into a progressive front. SWANU had sounded out SWAPO's leader, Mr Sam Nujoma, before approaching Mr Kalangula, Mr Rukoro said. Mr Nujoma

had approved of the move. Further negotiations will take place in early March, he added. Mr Kalangula's administration is the largest of the ethnic authorities in SWA/Namibia, but he came to power without being elected and it is not known to what extent he is supported by the Ovambo-speaking people. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1415 GMT 28 Jan 86 MB] /6662

DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL CHALLENGED--Windhoek--The South African Government proclamation which gives security agencies in Namibia the power to detain without trial, is being challenged in the supreme court in Windhoek. A top legal team, headed by South African advocate Mr Ian Farlam SC [Senior Counsel], is arguing that the security legislation contravenes the declaration of fundamental rights issued by Windhoek's present Multi-party Conference (MPC) Government. Mr Farlam and his team are appearing for Mr Joh Akweenda, a resident of Owambo, who is attempting to obtain an order of release from the court for two of his relatives, Mr Absalom Linus and Mr Andreas Immanuel. The men were taken into custody in August and September by the security police and have so far not appeared in court. They are being held under Proclamation AG9, the legislation being challenged by the legal team. The declaration of fundamental rights issued by the MPC Government provides for freedom of life, person and property. [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 30 Jan 86 p 6 MB] /6662

CSO: 3400/1020

SENEGAL

DAKAR-MARINE UNDERTAKING RECOVERY, DIVERSIFICATION PLAN

Dakar Mayor's Visit

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 30 Nov-1 Dec 85 p 12-13

[Article by Marie Louise Benga: "An Under-Utilized Industrial Tool"]

[Excerpts] Mamadou Diop was the guest of Dakar-Marine on 6 November. The mayor of Dakar and his group visited the ship repair and industrial facilities of the plant, which is huge both in its infrastructures and activities. The visit was also an opportunity for the commune authorities to better understand this enterprise, which, despite all its assets, has still experienced some difficulties.

Dakar-Marine. Most Senegalese only know the name of this company. Composed of important ship repair facilities and industrial operations, Dakar-Marine is among the greatest projects in our country, both on the technical and business levels. It also represents a significant source of foreign exchange through its activities.

This little known giant began its operations in 1980. It was established on the basis of installations of the old French Navy Arsenal and the private ACRN (Ateliers et Chantiers de Reparation Navale). Equipped with an extensive technical base with modern workshops, Dakar-Marine has one of the largest drydock facilities: a floating dock that can handle ships of 60,000 tpl [metric tons light], a 5,000 square meters boiler workshop, 1,000 meters of repair wharves, systems of compressed air, sea water and fresh water, and three large cranes (50 tons, 40 tons and 15 tons).

However, Dakar-Marine is not only technical installations. It is also skilled personnel whose services rival those of the biggest ship repair yards. It provides high-quality services in ship construction of steel and wood, careening, machining, sheet metal work, precision mechanics, etc. The purpose in its establishment was to provide, in view of the shipping activity of the time and the fact that Dakar port is at the crossroads of major sea routes, technical services appropriate for the various types of ships linking Dakar to the European and American countries.

However, all these assets were not sufficient to fulfill all the hopes attached to this project. The company has experienced some serious problems during these last 4 years of operation. First, Dakar-Marine quickly ran up against the crisis that affected all the world's ship repair yards. With sea traffic in constant decline for several years, the shipowners have reacted. They are no longer investing much in maintaining their ships, we were told by Papa Toure, the company's technical director. They now send their ships to the yards only when necessary. However, in the case of Dakar-Marine, there was more involved in the yard's economic difficulties. Poor management of the company contributed to its decline: the administrative structures had become more and more heavy, with a plethora of personnel. This robbed Dakar-Marine of much of its dynamism. In 1984, total operation losses were about 3.5 billion CFA francs.

In order to complete its recovery program, the company is benefiting from the help of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) and the World Bank through structural adjustment loans. And to achieve maximum profitability of its installations, Dakar-Marine has oriented its activities on new bases. Thus, the company's action is concentrating on two fronts: prospecting for international customers, of course, but also paying attention to the local market. Today, Dakar-Marine has committed itself to regaining the business of fishing boats operating in the area and providing them with a multitude of quality services at competitive prices. It is also seeking subcontracting work in the context of the big operations of enterprises such as ICS [Chemical Industries of Senegal] and SENELEC.

Dakar-Marine has great possibilities in the field of industrial works, particularly boiler-making, piping, electricity, and machining, its business director, Mr Magueres, said. Indeed, the major Senegalese industries are finding great difficulty in insuring maintenance of their installations. Often they are even compelled to appeal to services outside Senegal for repair and maintenance of their equipment. Thus, Dakar-Marine carried out this year about 50,000 hours of industrial works in the various companies of the area.

On the international level, despite the slowdown in ship traffic, Dakar-Marine has registered a slight increase. The various efforts by the company have enabled it to fill its order book for the last quarter of the year.

The business director confirmed to us that the yard is currently working at full load, and the prospects for 1986 appear encouraging.

The breakthrough by Dakar-Marine on the international scene is certainly due to the yard's strategic location, but it has been dynamized above all by the quality of service by its technical personnel. Dakar-Marine has a labor force of proven technical skill, able to compete internationally. In fact, the company has its own vocational training center responsible for improving the technical abilities of the personnel. The center has made it possible to progressively replace to a large degree the expatriate help that had been needed during the start-up phase.

However, as a result of the scope of Dakar-Marine's financial difficulties and

the reduced needs for training, the Training and Improvement Center is offering its services to Senegalese enterprises and others in the subregion in order to maintain its level of activity.

Since its establishment in 1979 it has trained more than 273 outside people from various African countries (Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, Gabon, etc.). And despite the high cost of training, it expects to give 92,000 hours of course training in 1986.

The Dakar-Marine vocational training center is equipped with a great deal of modern equipment and experienced instructors with extensive experience in the industrial field.

As stated by the director of training, Boubacar Kane, the objective of the training center is to put at the disposal of enterprises an efficient tool for vocational training in the most varied specialties.

#### Recovery of Dakar-Marine

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 30 Nov-1 Dec 85 pp 12-13

[Interview of Tijane Sylla, chairman of the board of Dakar-Marine, by Moustapha S. Diagne; date, place not specified]

[Text] With the restructuring and recovery of Dakar-Marine, an era has come to an end. The planners of our development have returned to more modest units that are more viable in an economic context under crisis.

Constant efforts by the Government and a realistic policy of adjustment have enabled Dakar-Marine to remain an important pole in the development of our country. Despite an unprecedented drop in ship traffic and an oil crisis that obstructed many efforts, Dakar-Marine has remained an important unit in our development projects. Inheritor of a very valuable tradition, this project was at the start one of the spearheads of our industrial redeployment. Before the ICS and the SEIB, it was the first major project carried out by the Senegalese Government, as recalled by Tijane Sylla, chairman of the board of Dakar-Marine. In an interview for us he reviewed the correction measures that have been taken to right the ship. After a detailed examination of the company's situation, Tijane Sylla told us that his enterprise is preparing to overcome the challenges of the economic crisis and the drop in the ship traffic market.

The total of infrastructures in the revised project has come to 17 billion francs. This investment will certainly serve to benefit the new policy in management of the industrial wealth and in Dakar-Marine's new deployment policy.

Dakar-Marine thus remains a hope for Senegalese industry. It is one of the rare companies that has been able to face the demands of the crisis.

LE SOLEIL: Dakar-Marine is a key unit in the Senegalese industrial arsenal.



It was the first big industrial project carried out. Could you tell us how it came about?

Tijane Sylla: The initial Dakar-Marine project was the result of the desire to profit from the excellent geographical situation of our capital. At the time of the closing of the Suez Canal, the combination of an unprecedented increase in ship traffic on our coasts, and a technical shortage of shipyards in Africa, were the factors that favored the emergence of Dakar-Marine. We had to take that opportunity to provide a ship repair service, which later became a construction yard.

At that time, the commercial traffic was not what it is today. In the interim, the oil crisis that produced a drop in the oil products transport business caused the designers of the project to redimension it. Thus, recognizing the current realities, Dakar-Marine, while remaining a tool in service of the open sea, turned to more modest ambitions.

Question: Dakar-Marine was not such a new development. Did not the project follow an already established tradition?

Answer: Indeed, Dakar-Marine is to a degree the combination of two yards. We inherited from the French DCAN (Ship Construction Department) a "drydock" that can handle a boat 189 meters long and 23 meters wide, and repair workshops. The legacy we received from the ACRN was a boat lifter. To that, we added a floating dock, a 5,000 square meters boiler workshop and related installations. It is this whole complex that today constitutes Dakar-Marine. It should be noted, however, that the size and capacity of the floating dock were revised when the project was redimensioned. Originally, two floating docks were planned: one of 300,000 tons that was to be complemented by an additional of 500,000 tons. However, the change in the economic situation and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which worsened the crisis in shipbuilding, caused us to be satisfied with one dock of 60,000 tons.

Between the time of the optimistic forecasts and the actual going into operation of the dock, there passed a decade marked by revision of many features of the initial project.

Question: During Dakar-Marine's existence since 1981, all has not been rosy. Have not other negative factors added to an already difficult environment?

Answer: When Dakar-Marine was established, the predictions of the plan provisions were not achieved. In addition to an unfavorable environment, management problems aggravated the company's position. The superstructure became heavier. And the absence of dynamism in the management resulted in accumulated production losses that reached 3.5 billion in 1984.

Following the visit by the accounting inspection commission in 1984, an interministerial working group was formed to propose a recovery plan for Dakar-Marine. This working group submitted its report in May 1984, a month before my appointment.

Question: A recovery plan was developed by this working group and put into effect. What is the plan?

Answer: Implementation of the recovery plan began on 1 June 1985. It includes two very important parts. An improvement of management by lightening the structure and reducing burdens. The second part involves a reshaping of the strategy in light of the limitations of the environment.

In regard to the latter point, it is a matter of redirecting the installed industrial potential toward the domestic market, while responding to the needs of the international market for ship repair. We intend in future to place the tool of Dakar-Marine at the disposal of the fishing boats and the industries of the country. We want to diversify our activities and our customers to overcome the crisis affecting the ship repair sector.

Question: What is the composition of your customers?

Answer: Dakar-Marine's customers are mainly foreign merchant ships. The Russian and French fleets provide 37 percent of our customers. African military navies provide about 1 percent. It should be noted that this project mainly handles foreign civilian clients, overall almost 64 percent of our customers in 1983-1984.

Question: In referring to your recovery plan, you mentioned diversification of your customers. How do you plan to proceed in this?

Answer: Our objective is to target two types of customers: fishing boats and industries. In this respect, there are interesting prospects for balancing Dakar-Marine's work plan. For there has been intensive development of fishing activities in Senegal and surrounding countries. Dakar-Marine will thus have the opportunity to serve a domestic clientele. This may provide a guarantee on the activity level.

Question: Our potential competitors are Abidjan, Las Palmas and Cape Verde. However, it should be noted that Dakar-Marine's competitive advantage is in its industrial potential, particularly its floating dock. The second advantage is that, in comparison with shipyards such as those in Abidjan and Cape Verde, we have a tradition to offer and a capital of experience in ship repair. Our personnel are specially trained, and composed mainly of skilled workers who came from the French dockyards. We often say that Dakar-Marine's most important capital is its personnel.

Question: Do you have the support of the workers in your recovery effort?

Answer: Absolutely. The personnel have shown great maturity and a remarkable spirit of enterprise. We have made a cutback, of which the workers realized the necessity, accepting that it was the only solution to save the enterprise.

They participated, in an open and frank atmosphere, in analyzing our difficulties and have proposed improvement measures that the management has

willingly implemented. In fact, most of these measures were already included in the recovery plan.

Question: Are further reductions included in your recovery plan?

Answer: No, There will be no further reductions. We are currently expecting a great mobilization by the workers for the yard's recovery.

Question: In the future, will you be able to meet the specific needs of your customers?

Answer: It will certainly not be easy to modify our production system to respond to the needs for availability, flexibility and competitive price of the fishing boat and industrial customers. However, we hope that in the near future it will be possible to solve all these problems. With reorganization of our facility, within a very short period we will be able to repair small boats, while still meeting the needs of the open sea type. Our working facility will ultimately be useful both for the foreign ships and for the national boats and industries.

Question: In the structural adjustment plan, a number of loans are planned to restore the Senegalese economy. It appears that you will benefit from them. Is that true?

Answer: Indeed, we plan to use part of the structural adjustment loans of the CCCE and World Bank to meet our debt to our suppliers, whom we ask to have confidence in us.

Question: When will there be a recovery in ship repair?

Answer: the recovery is not expected until about 1990. It is still a long way off, and there is not much for the enterprises. Only those that have taken correction measures will be able to survive till the day of recovery. Dakar-Marine is thus preparing itself.

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CS0: 3419/168

ZAIRE

#### AZAP VIEWS SIGNIFICANCE OF MOBUTU'S VISIT TO RWANDA

AB271511 Kinshasa AZAP in French 0952 GMT 27 Jan 86

[AZAP commentary: "From Yaounde to Kigali--The Accomplishment of the Lagos Plan"]

[Text] Kinshasa, 27 Jan (AZAP)--He has just returned from Yaounde where he participated in the second conference of heads of state and governments of the Economic Community of Central African States [CEEAC]; now MPR founding chairman Mobutu Sese Seko today begins an official visit to Rwanda. In Kigali, the head of state and his host will intensify the talks they began in the Cameroonian capital on issues of common interest and will not fail--it is usually the case--to focus their attention on current African and world issues.

The development of the African continent, through the organization of regional and subregional forums of consultation, constitutes one of the major preoccupations of African leaders. Rwanda and Zaire are both members of the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL) and of the new CEEAC. The CEPGL can boast of being operational for several years now, whereas the CEEAC, on the other hand, will only go into operation this year. In fact, at the end of the Yaounde summit, the conference charged the Secretariat General of that organization to undertake a program of action aimed at increasing intercommunity trade; undertake studies and establish a clearing house for member-states, as well as studies on the development of transport and communications infrastructures.

The final communique did not fail to stress the need for member-states to honor their previous commitments, which led to the effective takeoff of the community. As far as Zaire is concerned, the entry into action of the CEEAC constitutes a source of moral satisfaction for its leader who has never stopped envisaging and encouraging the establishment of such economic groupings in Africa, so that African countries can together wage a joint and effective war against underdevelopment.

Since it is true that in unity lies strength, Zaire had done all that is in its power to contribute to the birth of CEEAC, which has become a reality.

Like in previous years, it spared no effort or means--despite its domestic economic problems--to make the CEPGL a viable organization whose performance responds to the member-countries' aspirations.

As can be seen, Marshal Mobutu's presence in Yaounde, like the visit he is making today to Kigali, both form part of the leader's efforts to contribute his share to the achievement of African economic unity through regional and subregional organizations. From Yaounde to Kigali, the perspectives for the accomplishment of the Lagos plan remain the same.

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CSO: 3400/1019



ZAIRE

FIRST STATE COMMISSIONER RECEIVES YUGOSLAV ENVOY

AB291545 Kinshasa Domestic Service in French 1130 GMT 29 Jan 86

[Text] The Yugoslav Government is ready to participate in the implementation of Zaire's 5-year development plan in the sectors of road construction, energy, and communication. Some projects to be carried out by Yugoslavia were examined this morning at the Council Building during an audience granted by First State Commissioner Kengo wa Dondo to the new SFRY ambassador to Zaire, Zanko Milutinovic. Among the projects which are of interest to the Yugoslav Government are, as the ambassador told our reporter, [words indistinct].

[Begin Milutinovic recording] The relations between our two countries are very good, but there is still the possibility to increase our cooperation. We examined the possibility for some of our companies to participate in road construction and communication projects in Zaire which have been identified as priority areas under the 5-year development plan. We have much experience in these sectors here in Africa. We also looked into the possibility of participating in the construction of a hydroelectric dam at Mobaye. We also discussed political relations and in this area, too, we could make the effort to increase this political cooperation. [End recording]

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CSO: 3400/1019

ZAIRE

# PROSECUTION ASKS 2-YEAR TERMS FOR OPPOSITION MEMBERS

AB101801 Paris AFP in English 1722 GMT 10 Jan 86

[Text] Kinshasa, Jan 10 (AFP)--The public prosecutor today called for two-year prison terms for two members of a banned opposition group, reducing the (?charges preferred) against them from sedition to "offending the head of state."

The two former parliamentarians, Tshisekedi wa Mulumba and Kanana Tshongo, face the charges in connection with published statements last October in which they denounced a "campaign of intimidation" they said was being orchestrated against them.

The defendants, members of the outlawed Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), had originally been charged with sedition when they were arrested in October. The charge carries penalties of 10 to 15 years' imprisonment.

Mr Tshisekedi and Mr Kanana refused to take part in today's initial hearing, delayed twice previously, saying the foreign lawyers they had engaged were not present. But they remained in the courtroom.

Four foreign lawyers had been due to attend the hearing along with their Zairian colleague Dipumba Ntika--Robert Goffin and Armand Dhomdt of Belgium, Seick Mustapha, president of the Dakar Bar Association, and an unidentified French lawyer.

Mr Dipumba left the courtroom after the two defendants announced they would not take part in proceedings.

The two accused told reporters in October they feared a campaign of harassment had been unleashed against them by the administration of President Mobutu Sese Seko. They charged that members of Zaire's Special Presidential Brigade beat party members with belts at a meeting and ransacked a house.

Thirteen leading members of the UDPS, all members of parliament, were arrested and jailed soon after the creation of the party in 1982 in opposition to the principle of Zaire as a one-party state. They were given a presidential amnesty in May 1983, but placed under house arrest later in the year. Six members were recanted and were pardoned in July 1984 and the rest were amnestied last June.

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CSO: 3400/1019

ZAIRE

#### NEW PAN-AFRICAN NEWSPAPER LAUNCHED

AB281552 Kinshasa Domestic Service in French 1130 GMT 28 Jan 86

[Excerpts] A passport is a very useful and practical document. As all good travelers know, it helps to travel throughout the world and cross countries' borders, which have nowadays become more and more difficult to cross and more and more difficult to violate. A passport abolishes political, linguistic, economic, and even racial borders. In fact, this is PASSPORT AFRICAINE'S official objective.

PASSPORT AFRICAINE, which defines itself as an independent newspaper, is a pan-African semimonthly dealing with political, economic, diplomatic, technical, social and cultural issues. The newspaper is called PASSPORT AFRICAINE because, as is written in its editorial, the African continent in order to fully play the historic role it is expected to play, must unite regardless of the different states, most of which the paper remarks, reflect its weakness more than its strength. Moreover, the paper adds that Africa should forget about the borders which were arbitrarily established by the colonial powers and which have divided peoples who were thus removed from the current history.

In order to make things clearer concerning the newspaper's pan-African objectives, the editorialist asserts that the semimonthly wants to blacklist the linguistic barriers inherited from the colonial period and which have divided the African peoples into French-speaking, English-speaking, Portuguese-speaking, and Arabic-speaking peoples.

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CSO: 3400/1019

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

YOUTH OFFICIAL RECEIVES SWAPO REPRESENTATIVE--Kinshasa, 25 Jan (AZAP)--On Saturday, Citizen Sampassa Milombe, state commissioner for the party's youth wing, received in audience Wakolele Nguno, chief representative of SWAPO in Central Africa. They discussed the development in the situation currently prevailing in southern Africa and in Namibia, a country occupied by the South African regime against the will of the Namibian people and world opinion. The two officials used the opportunity to examine the state of the relations of cooperation between the youth wing of the MPR and SWAPO's youth league, relations which have been described as good but which need to be strengthened, because during this year 1986, which has been declared the international year for peace by the United Nations, all children of the African Continent must close their ranks in order to ensure a true peace in Africa, Mr Wakolele pointed out. Speaking on the situation in his country, the SWAPO chief representative in Central Africa said that it was still tense because the Pretoria government has increased its oppressive measures against the Namibian people. However, he was optimistic about the certain victory by SWAPO in its struggle to free Namibia. Citizen Kaumba Kahosa, national leader of the JMPR [Youth of the Popular Movement of the Revolution] and in charge of external relations, attended this audience. [Text] [Kinshasa AZAP in French 1629 GMT 25 Jan 86 AB] /6662

AUSTRIAN-ZAIRE TIES--Kinshasa, 22 Jan (AZAP/PANA)--Mr Rudolf Kirschlager, president of the Republic of Austria, has indicated that his country is happy with the positive development of links between his country and Zaire, it was learned on Monday at the Zairian Embassy in Austria. The Austrian head of state made this statement during the audience he recently granted Citizen Bintou-Tshiabola, Zairian ambassador to Vienna, who paid him a farewell visit on completion of his assignment in Vienna. The Austrian president also asked Ambassador Bintou-Tshiabola to convey his friendly greetings to his counterpart, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, his family, and the people of Zaire as a whole, on the occasion of the New Year. Earlier, Ambassador Bintou-Tshiabola expressed happiness at the positive results and the excellent relations which link Zaire and Austria, before he touched on the two agreements signed during his mandate in 1985, namely: the trade agreement and the industrial and technical cooperation agreement. According to the ambassador, these agreements fall in line with the major guidelines of the Zairian 1986-1990 5-years plan whose main priorities remain the rehabilitation of the basic development infrastructures for the sectors of health, communication, energy, and telecommunication. [Text] [Dakar PANA in French 1139 GMT 22 Jan 86 AB] /6662

ENVOY TO GREECE PRESENTS CREDENTIALS--Kinshasa, 14 Jan (AZAP)--Citizen Bomolo Lokota, Zaire's new ambassador to Greece, recently presented his letters of credence to the president of the Hellenic Republic, Christos Sartzetakis, according to a cable from the Zairean Embassy in Athens sent to AZAP on Tuesday. [Excerpt] [Kinshasa AZAP in French 1315 GMT 14 Jan 86 AB] /6662

FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION VISIT--The delegation of the French National Assembly, which arrived in Zaire on 12 January 1986, leaves Kinshasa shortly at 1300 for Paris after a fruitful 8-day visit to our country. The end of this official visit was marked this morning at the Palace of Nations by a joint communique between the two sides led respectively by Jacques Fleury for France and Citizen Kisanga Kobongelo, first parliamentarian secretary, for Zaire. Concerning the cultural and human importance of the relations existing between the two states through the French language, the two sides stressed the importance France attaches to the French-speaking world and Zaire's position in this world. As for the deterioration of the economic situation of the developing countries and African countries in particular, the Zairian side informed the French side that this situation is due to the permanent lack of necessary financial resources (?caused) by the continued reimbursement of their debts during a very difficult world economic crisis. Finally the French parliamentary delegation expressed its sincere gratitude to the MPR founding chairman and president of the republic, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, his Legislative Council, and to the Zairian people, for the warm and friendly reception accorded it during its visit to Zaire. [Text] [Kinshasa Domestic Service in French 1130 GMT 19 Jan 86 AB] /6662

UGANDAN LEADER'S WORKING VISIT--The policies of good neighborliness and African solidarity pursued by Zaire was once again highlighted this week with the friendly and working visit by the Ugandan head of state to our country. It is known that for some time now, Uganda has been seeking peace and security seriously threatened by domestic clashes which prevent this country to serenely continue its development program. Despite difficult political negotiations under the auspices of the Kenyan head of state, Daniel Arap Moi, in order to implement the reconciliation agreements signed in Nairobi, peace and security are still threatened in Uganda. During his visit to Kinshasa, President Tito Okello specified that he was expecting a contribution toward achieving peace in his country from Zaire and mainly from the MPR founding chairman and president of the republic. This statement clearly shows the consideration that the Ugandan head of state has for the leader of the Zairian genuine revolution's leader, whose great pacification and unification work in Zaire has aroused admiration from everyone. [Text] [Kinshasa Domestic Service in French 1130 GMT 19 Jan 86 AB] /6662

MATADI RADIO RESUMES BROADCASTS--The regional office of the Zairian Radio and Television Broadcasting System (OZRT) of Bas-Zaire, broadcasting from Matadi and which resumed operation on medium waves on Sunday, after a break in transmission of about 2 months, announced on Monday evening that the station will reorganize its programming as of Tuesday. This reorganization is undertaken to enable Bas-Zaire listeners to tune in some of the national radio programs. However, this change does not affect the programs of the Matadi radio station. [Text] [Kinshasa AZAP in French 1748 GMT 21 Jan 86 AB] /6662



UTA TO MANAGE NATIONAL AIRLINE--Kinshasa, Feb 2 (AFP)--The French airline UTA has won a six-year contract to manage Zaire's national flag-carrier Air Zaire, which reliable sources said is 40 million dollars in the red, the company's new Administrator-General Joel de Cernon said here Saturday. UTA, which reliable sources said won the contract from the Zaire Government in the face of opposition from Belgium's Sabena Airline, is paying the wages of 15 members of its own staff it is transferring to Air Zaire, but is not injecting any finance into the company, Mr De Cernon said. Geyoro Te Kule, the former Zairian director-general of Air Zaire, is staying on as chairman of the board. The Air Zaire fleet consists of one DC-10, four Fokker aircraft of which only one is airworthy, three Boeing 737s, one of which is a wreck, and two ancient DC-3s whose engines fail to meet anti-pollution standards in the United States. A second DC-10 was sold last year for 25 million dollars but the money went to the state treasury and not to Air Zaire. Mr De Cernon said the plan was to sell the remaining aircraft to a bank and then lease it back in order to obtain new funds. The country's only long-distance international route is a twice-weekly service to Brussels, but Mr De Cernon said a link with somewhere else in Europe could be opened. [Excerpt] [Paris AFP in English 1643 GMT 2 Feb 86 AB] /6662

NEW SUDANESE AMBASSADOR--Kinshasa, 27 Jan (AZAP)--Citizen Mpinga Kasenda, first deputy chairman of the Permanent Bureau of the Central Committee, last Friday explained to Mr Omar el Magid, the new Sudanese ambassador to Zaire who paid him a courtesy visit, the organization of the Popular Movement of the Revolution, the party-state, as well as the functioning of the Central Committee. The Sudanese diplomat, who presented his credentials 2 months ago to the head of state, is now having contacts with senior party cadres in Kinshasa. [Text] [Kinshasa AZAP in French 0815 GMT 27 Jan 86 AB] /6662

SOVIET LABOR DELEGATION--Kinshasa, 27 Jan (AZAP)--The delegation of the Soviet Textiles and Light Industry Workers Union (SOTIL) led by Mr Lev Poproukailo, chairman of the Republican Committee of the Workers Union of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, which has been on a working visit with the Zairian National Workers Union for a few days now, returned to Kinshasa on Sunday evening after a 48-hour stay in Bas-Zaïre. The Soviet delegation, which was accompanied by Citizen Kalala Kayisha, assistant secretary general in charge of labor economy, and Citizen Dipesa Ngomba, national secretary of the department of [words omitted], (?visited) the Inga hydroelectric (?dam); the Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko Bridge in Matadi; the headquarters of the Union of Cooperatives of Bas-Fleuve, Ucobaf; and the CASOP dispensary in Kinzaumuete. It later went to Boma, where it admired the tourist attractions of this ancient town, particularly Zaire's first cathedral, the first military camp, and the [word indistinct] of Stanley the explorer. On the way back, it visited the Kisantu botanical garden known for its famous plant varieties. [Text] [Kinshasa AZAP in French 1112 GMT 27 Jan 86 AB] /6662

CAR SOLDIERS COMPLETE MILITARY TRAINING--Kinshasa, 28 Jan (AZAP/PANA)--Fifty-five CAR warrant officers, corporals, and soldiers have just completed their 6-month military training in Zaire. Presenting the end of training certificates to these soldiers, CAR army minister Lucien Guillaume Djengbot

thanked President Mobutu for having accepted this task with candidness and expressed the CAR army's admiration for and confidence in the Zairian Armed Forces. Lieutenant General Likulia Bolongo, Zairian secretary of state for national defense and territorial security, for his part assured the CAR statesman of Zaire's willing disposition regarding the intensification of cooperation between the two armies. The CAR army minister and the 55 soldiers left Kinshasa on Friday afternoon for Bangui, it was learned. [Text] [Kinshasa AZAP in French 0931 GMT 28 Jan 86 AB] /6662

ZAIRE, CONGO SOCIAL WELFARE AGREEMENT--Zaire and Congo presently feel very much concerned over the issue of migrant workers. The countries have already initiated a series of meetings to discuss the matter. These discussions have begun with the signing of an agreement on social welfare; the next step will be to find ways and means to implement this agreement. This is why an international seminar was held in [name indistinct], Congo, on the training of social workers from Zaire and Congo. This seminar which lasted 6 days, ended this weekend and the deliberations were centered on the problems of migrant workers and the exchange of workers between Zaire and Congo. [Excerpt] [Kinshasa Domestic Service in French 1130 GMT 27 Jan 86 AB]/6662

CSO: 3400/1019

SOUTH AFRICA

PIK BOTHA LOOKS AT CONSEQUENCES OF SANCTIONS

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 4 No 4, 1985 pp 12, 14, 17, 18

[Article by Roelof "Pik" Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs: "The Sacking of the South"]

[Text]

No other country is faced with problems as complex, as sensitive, as emotional or as potentially dangerous as those confronting the diverse South African leadership. And yet we are expected to come up with a solution overnight. The Commonwealth gives us six months to produce results, the adequacy of which it will determine, and the prospect of further punitive sanctions is held in the offing if we do not provide satisfaction. How many member states of the Commonwealth could themselves comply with the demands that that organisation makes of South Africa? What if South Africa should agree to all their demands on condition that each and every Commonwealth country does the same?

Internal considerations have always provided the predominant reasons for reform in South Africa. Positive international involvements have helped this process. The same cannot, however, be said of punitive actions. Indeed such actions have aggravated our problems in promoting reform.

Consider what we have already achieved. No informed observer will doubt that the prime motivation has been domestic.

We have publicly rejected:

- ☐ Political domination by any one community of any other;
- ☐ The exclusion of any community from the political decision-making process;
- ☐ Injustice or inequality in the opportunities available for any community;
- ☐ Racial discrimination and impairment of human dignity.

And we have already repealed or amended legislation which is not reconcilable with these ideals, or given notice of intention to repeal or amend such legislation. We have launched investigations of other legislation or practices which might seem to us to be out of keeping with these principles.

A few areas where reform, providing for the removal of discrimination, has taken place in recent years or is underway are described on the next page. The list is not exhaustive nor in any specific order. I mention these points merely to indicate that we have not been dilatory in carrying our reform programme forward.

In addition we have now also produced a political programme which:

- ☐ Provides for a united South Africa, a common citizenship for all South Africans, black and white, coloured and Asian, living within our borders and a system of universal franchise within the structures chosen by South Africans jointly;
- ☐ Provides for the full political participation in government in respect of matters of national concern of all our communities;
- ☐ Accepts in other words the principle of power sharing in government in respect of matters of national concern subject only to the principle of the protection of the rights and interests of minorities through group autonomy;
- ☐ Recognises that white domination will disappear in accordance with the principle that no one community should dominate any other;
- ☐ Provides for the creation of the structures required to give effect to these principles through negotia-

tion with the leaders of all the communities of this country;

- ☐ Spells out that the government will not prescribe who may represent the other communities or what the agenda will be for the negotiations.

In short, the door is wide open, for the first time in our history, to the achievement through negotiation of a constitutional future in South Africa which could satisfy the political aspirations of all the country's communities.

I believe we have a policy and programme which spells out clearly our intention to end inequality between South Africa's ethnic groups. Most of the issues which the international community has raised with us from time to time have been addressed in principle, even to the extent of undertaking to release from prison those who are prepared to renounce violence.

There is still much to be done and it will be done, but having clearly stated our objectives, we are now focusing our attention on providing impetus to the negotiation process. This is the key to the solution of our problems and it is the impact on this process of the international action against South Africa which causes serious concern.

The situation in South Africa at the moment is sensitive and delicate. The circumstances could hardly be less conducive to the process of negotiation. Any future constitutional system here must be the product of negotiation between our communities.

We have said that we seek an agreed, not an imposed, system of constitutional government, and we shall not achieve such a system if we cannot further stimulate the process of negotiation. As it is, black leaders across the political spectrum are reluctant to come forward and participate publicly in the negotiations. To do so would place their lives, their families and their possessions at risk.

Any action which pushes up the temperature, or undermines or threatens our economy, or further polarises opinion within the country, or serves as an encouragement to any faction or group in its opposition to others, further undermines the climate for negotiation. It is against this background that one must judge the actions of the Commonwealth and the industrialised countries. However well-intentioned they might be, the measures they have imposed against South Africa, and their threats of further action, will be interpreted as action against the government or as support for opposing groups. This is divisive. It is not the way to encourage dialogue within South Africa.

I might add that even visits of church groups, academics and others are proving problematic. Some are ostensibly on fact-finding missions, others are less well-intentioned but all are seen as supportive of one or other faction in this country, or simply as anti-government. This is not constructive in present circumstances. Certainly it is no encouragement to the less moderate black leadership to embark on negotiations.

South Africans of all ethnic origins know what is required of them. They know that they have to meet across the table, develop trust and confidence in each other and resolve their differences by means of dialogue and communication. This is not therefore the time for the world to be promoting greater divisions within the country. It should be promoting reconciliation.

In the circumstances in which we find ourselves, the security authorities are obliged to resort to methods which they dislike as much as our friends abroad. Detention without trial is one such device. We believe we have a viable, civilised alternative to violence in this country. Those who go out of their way to frustrate our attempts to promote negotiation between our communities, and promote disruption, boycotts, disorder instead, should be prevented from doing so.

Legitimate opposition is one thing, disruptive action which parallels the actions of the advocates of violence is another. I hope that as the negotiation process gains momentum, there will be an increasing acceptance of this process as the answer to our problems, and that detention without trial will become more and more irrelevant.

The confrontation between our security forces and the instigators of violence is unfortunately a feature of any violent situation. The objective of the security forces is the maintenance of order, but violence leads to confrontation in the course of which scenes are played out which are grist to the mill of television crews. Brutality should not be countenanced. Judicial and other machinery exists which has been mandated to investigate each and every allegation of unacceptable action on the part of our security forces.

Nonetheless, the international media is having a field day in South Africa at the moment, given the nature of the disturbances in the black towns, and the savage methods employed by radicals to coerce moderate blacks into rejecting negotiations and joining their ranks. The coverage overseas has been shockingly negative, but we simply have to try to contain the

violence which is being deliberately instigated. I cannot conceive of more adverse circumstances, given also the pressure from abroad, in which to get the negotiating process moving forward more rapidly.

The recently announced limitation on television and camera crews in the districts in which security measures apply is not intended to prevent the world from knowing what is happening in this country. On the contrary, accredited journalists are able to work in the areas concerned and to report on events there.

The mere presence of TV cameras has served as a stimulus for violence which has led to the loss of lives and the destruction of property.

There have been numerous, well-documented instances where violent actions have commenced only after a sufficient number of television crews have arrived. A distorted picture of South Africa has been portrayed abroad: tunnel vision would be an appropriate way to describe the scenes shown. Overseas viewers get a picture of a country going up in flames, which is exactly the perception which the instigators of violence desire overseas viewers to obtain.

The over-concentration of, if not the obsession with violence by visual media to the virtual exclusion of anything else has, in the view of the government, encouraged and generated further violence. It is the government's duty to stem the violence in order to protect lives and property.

In many Western countries there is a great deal of pressure for economic sanctions against South Africa. The morality, motivation and objectives of such sanctions are ostensibly two-fold: to coerce the South African Government into applying reformist policies; and to do this by what are purportedly peaceful means of suasion.

In sum, economic sanctions are said to be "a peaceful alternative to violence" which are capable of forcing the South African Government to change its policies.

This view is based upon two fundamental fallacies. In the first instance, there is the unfounded belief that South Africa will change because of foreign pressure. This is fallacious because, as we have already demonstrated, South Africa is changing. South Africa is changing because the government is responsive to domestic needs. We have changed because we are conscious of what is right and what is wrong. What we simply cannot accept is that persons who rule over many of the most oppressed and downtrodden people on this earth should prescribe to us what is right. After all, it is the actions of tyrants, not their abstract prescriptions, that determine the lot of their peoples.

Secondly, we are faced with the fallacy that economic sanctions are peaceful instruments of policy. Not only peaceful – but also precise. They supposedly affect only the South African Government. No one else gets hurt. Everyone else will somehow benefit.

The facts reveal the magnitude of this lie. Sad to say that truth will not always prevail. Be that as it may, the facts bear repeating.

Firstly, while there is no doubt that all peoples of South Africa, black, coloured, Asian and white would suffer, it is not generally realised that the consequences will, in the first instance, affect the whole southern African region.

The reason is simple. In many respects South Africa is the mainstay of the entire region. Services and assistance provided by South Africa are often the most important stabilising factor in the subcontinent.

About 350 000 foreign blacks are *legally* employed in the Republic. (This figure excludes workers from the independent states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.)

These men come from all over southern Africa.

About half of their total earnings is remitted every year. Several of the neighbouring countries derive a substantial proportion of their national income from these remittances. In fact, in 1983 they accounted for more than 50 per cent of Lesotho's gross national product.

African families are traditionally large. If it is assumed that each of these 350 000 *legal* workers support six people at home, it means that nearly two million women and children in southern Africa depend on their menfolk's earnings in South Africa.

Foreign blacks working and living *illegally* in South Africa far exceed the number of *legal* guest workers. Their number is estimated at 1.2 million. These men are unable to find jobs in their own countries.

These *illegal* workers also come from all over the region, but mostly from Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

Many of them also remit funds and support families in their countries of origin providing a livelihood to possibly millions of women and children.

The benefits accruing to the neighbouring countries go far beyond quantifiable earnings and contributions to gross national product. Employment of both *legal* and *illegal* workers in South Africa relieves the pressure on their labour markets to an enormous extent. This, in turn, promotes social and political stability in the countries concerned.



Owing to worldwide recessionary conditions, unemployment in South Africa has assumed serious proportions, particularly among blacks.

If employment opportunities were to be reduced further by extraneous forces such as sanctions, the government would be obliged to give preference to the needs of its own citizens in the labour market. This would not be "retaliation", as has been alleged. After all, charity begins at home, even in international exchanges.

Public sector borrowing is a prime target of the sanctions lobby. In debate with the latter, I have invariably come up against the view that such forms of sanctions can be selectively targeted against the South African Government alone. Once again, our enemies either do not know the facts or they will not admit to knowing them.

The South African Government *per se* is a relatively small international borrower. The two largest public sector borrowers on overseas capital markets are the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) and South African Transport Services (SATS). The infrastructure and services of both these utilities are indispensable for the economic well-being of a substantial part of Southern Africa.

The loans raised by Escom are used to build large new power stations to meet the power needs *not only of South Africa but also of several neighbouring states*. Escom at present supplies 100 per cent of the electricity used in Lesotho, 79 per cent in Swaziland and approximately 52 per cent in Botswana, as well as 60 per cent of the power used in Maputo, capital of Mozambique.

SATS is the undisputed leader in railroading in Africa. It not only runs 24 500 route kilometres of railways (or 25 per cent of Africa's total) but its unrivalled expertise is based on a century of experience of African conditions.

South Africa's railways and harbours have long served as a lifeline for most countries in southern Africa. At least 45 per cent of the combined total imports and exports of Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Zaire are carried to and from South African ports by SATS. Virtually *all* imports and exports by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are routed through South Africa.

The South African postal and telecommunications administration also borrows large amounts on international capital markets for development programmes – for the benefit of both South Africa and neighbouring states.

All Lesotho's and Swaziland's international telecommunications traffic and some of Botswana's is routed through South Africa. Eleven telegraph lines

have been extended to Swaziland through the South African system to link that country directly with the United Kingdom. The South African Post Office has established a new microwave system to handle the increasing number of calls to and from Botswana which are routed through South Africa.

South Africa is a substantial supplier of credit to Africa. This credit is provided by both the public and private sectors and amounts to some R1,6 billion (TBVC excluded) at present.

South Africa and the so-called BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) are members of the Southern African Customs Union, the only such union on the African continent. The agreement provides for the free flow of goods among the member states, which levy the same tariffs on goods imported from outside the common customs area.

All major ports of entry are in South Africa, which collects the customs duties which are then distributed among the member states.

Customs revenues received by these states have increased in proportion to the growth of the South African economy. The greater the flow of imports into southern Africa, notably South Africa, the higher the amounts accruing to the BLS countries. If the South African economy were to be damaged by sanctions to the extent that the flow of imports were substantially diminished, *this most important source of revenue of the BLS countries would be eroded*, with serious consequences for the economies of these countries.

If the rand's value should be depressed by sanctions or for reasons other than economic, as has been happening during the past few months, Lesotho and Swaziland, like South Africa, would have to find extra funds to pay back their foreign loans. A depreciation of the rand also makes their imports more expensive and erodes the value of their foreign reserves held in rand. All this represents an additional burden on the vulnerable economies of these two countries.

Extensive trade relations between South Africa and the rest of Africa have been built up over the years. In 1983 South African exports to Africa amounted to R1 800 million.

South Africa supplies the lion's share of imports by Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana – either direct or through South African agents of foreign producers.

If sanctions were to be effective, they would undermine South Africa's capacity to supply Southern Africa with vital imports, especially intermediate and consumer goods. Admittedly, alternative sources of supply could be found elsewhere, but these substitutes would be more expensive. Payment for these imports would also tax the frail economies of these

countries to the utmost (most suffer from chronic shortages of foreign exchange). Longer delivery times would compound the problem.

Many neighbouring states rely on South Africa for their supplies of fuel and petroleum products. If an effective oil embargo were to be imposed on South Africa, this could lead to a sudden and catastrophic cut-off of supplies to a number of neighbouring states.

The trouble with economic data is that we lose sight of people. In the bluntest of terms, sanctions are all about jobs, welfare and livelihood. Nowhere is this more true than in Africa. We all know about starvation in Ethiopia. Some know about starvation in Chad. How many know that:

- ☐ Almost half of Africa is on the United Nation's emergency food aid list?
- ☐ An estimated five million children will die of starvation on our continent this year?
- ☐ Africa's population has increased by 10 per cent over the last decade – while food production has decreased by the same amount?

That is the background against which the sanctions debate takes place. That is the real problem. Those who advocate sanctions must say what responsibility – if any – they accept for adding to this misery. Will they feed those for whom we may no longer be able to provide?

## Some areas of reform

<b>Constitutional</b>	Asians and coloureds represented in Parliament, as well as Asians and coloureds holding ministerial and deputy ministerial positions in government	<b>Sport Labour</b>	Opened to all races Modern, sophisticated trade union system opened to all races Job reservation removed
<b>Public amenities</b>	Many desegregated – hotels, restaurants, parks, trains, buses	<b>Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act Immorality Act</b>	Repealed Offensive racial provisions repealed
<b>Property rights for blacks</b>	Accepted, as well as permanency of black communities in urban areas	<b>Immigration</b>	Provisions providing for white immigration only to be repealed
<b>Local government</b>	Full participation of all communities	<b>Influx control and pass laws</b>	President's Council's recommendation for phasing out, under sympathetic consideration for action during the next parliamentary session
<b>Education</b>	Parity for all population groups is the declared objective and action to this end is under way	<b>Forced resettlement</b>	Discontinued.

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CSO: 3400/997

SOUTH AFRICA

UNISA PROFESSOR EXPLAINS RECONCILIATION, REPENTANCE

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 4 No 4, 1985 pp 61-65

[Article by Professor David J. Bosch, Dean of the Faculty of Theology at UNISA [University of S. Africa]: "Reconciliation -- An Afrikaner Speaks"]

[Text]

More than ever before the Afrikaner is in the dock, not only here in South Africa but around the globe. He is held responsible for the most brutal oppression and the most pernicious political system ever devised by the human mind.

It is further argued that the Afrikaner *church* has been playing a crucial role in shaping and upholding this system. How then could I, who happen to be both an Afrikaner and a Christian, dare argue on this theme?

Who and what are the Afrikaners? What do they perceive themselves to be? We are a small white tribe, in the extreme southern tip of a vast black continent, cut off from the mother country almost two centuries ago, threatened with extinction from two sides, the British and the blacks, determined to maintain and defend our identity. The majority of Afrikaners are convinced that – for at least a century and a half – they have been engaged in a battle for survival and that this battle is today being fought more fiercely than ever before. They have lost much of their self-confidence in recent years. They are far less certain about the outcome of the battle than they used to be; in fact, despondency is the dominant emotion in many Afrikaner circles.

This does not mean, however, that they are close to surrender. What is developing, rather, is a kind of "Masada complex". When eventually the Romans conquered Masada at awesome cost they found that hardly a single Jew had remained alive. This – if I am not mistaken – is what some people are preparing the Afrikaners for today, particularly Afrikaner children.

The challenge presented to our children in essence seems to be: "Are you prepared to *die* for South Africa?", rather than "Are you prepared to *live* for South Africa"?

It should be understandable – even if not pardonable – why Afrikaners for such a long time, in the first stage of our national history, could only think of ourselves and our own survival but hardly of the interests of others. During the next stage we convinced ourselves that it was our divine calling to uphold and safeguard the separate identities of other groups as well; in order to implement this we appointed ourselves their guardians and set out to restructure the entire fabric of the South African society. To what has all this led? Let me quote from Willem Nicol's monthly column in *Beeld* (27 August 1985).

"It has now become clear that our designs of recent decades did not work out, but have, rather, just aggravated South Africa's problems. We have torn apart families, uprooted communities, made discriminating laws and enforced them with harshness. We have made millions of people into enemies. We have estranged our coloured fellow-believers, with whom we should have experienced the most intimate unity. Why did our fine-sounding designs have such a negative result? Because group selfishness has been one of the main motives which urged us on and blinded us. Why did we persist so long with our impracticable and unjust designs? Because we believed that enforced racial segregation was consistent with the Christian gospel; we sometimes

even went so far as to think that our faith demanded racial separation. We have hurt millions of people, hurt them deeply . . . The gulf of misapprehensions, fear and hatred between White and Black has reached alarming dimensions . . .”

If Willem Nicol is correct in his analysis, if all that he says, is true, what then is the point in talking about reconciliation? Is this not a classical case of an exercise in futility? I want to say immediately that this is a very real possibility, and one of which we constantly have to be aware. If I may be so bold (or foolish?) as to write about reconciliation, I want to do it by means of putting forward 12 theses and commenting briefly on each of them.

**1 Cheap reconciliation is the deadly enemy of the church.** Almost fifty years ago Dietrich Bonhoeffer taught us that cheap *grace* was the deadly enemy of the church. I want to suggest that the same is true of cheap *reconciliation*.

What then is “cheap reconciliation”? It is, as the phrase suggests, reconciliation that costs us very little, that can be obtained at a minimum of expense. It is a papering over of deep-seated differences. It is arguing that, after all, we are one in Christ (are we not?) and that, therefore, our existing differences do not really matter. Or it sees our being reconciled to one another only in spiritual categories, not in those of everyday life. Or it is suggesting that, if only we are really reconciled to Christ we shall, almost automatically, also be reconciled to one another. I remember some years ago, sitting in a group where these things were being discussed. A white pastor said, “All we need is to be truly born again, then all our problems will get solved”. To this a black pastor responded, “Brother, my greatest frustrations come from born-again Christians”!

Cheap reconciliation means meeting in the hope that we shall not clash too much, that we’ll be “soft” on each other, that at the end we’ll go home unscathed, breathe a sigh of relief and return to “normal”. Cheap reconciliation suggests that meeting like this is a softer option than confronting each other in the “real” world outside.

Cheap reconciliation manifests itself in other forms as well. It is practised where one party wholeheartedly admits that they are wrong and the other party right, but nothing changes. It is also in evidence where one party attempts to ingratiate itself with the other party by constantly fawning on it. This happens at both ends of the spectrum: blacks buttering up whites, whites seeking favour with blacks. In both instances we have servility at the expense of honesty and of real change.

Cheap reconciliation means tearing faith and justice asunder, driving a wedge between the vertical and the horizontal. It suggests that we can have peace with God without having justice in our mutual relationships.

In summary, then, cheap reconciliation means applying a little bit of goodwill and decency to the South African society, but that is like trying to heal a festering sore with sticking plaster or treating cancer with aspirins.

**2 All of us are prisoners of history and are, as such, challenged to become prisoners of hope.** We have in this country a terrible legacy of faction fighting: black against white, Afrikaner against English, black against black, Afrikaner against Afrikaner, and so on. All this has driven us into so many different camps, or rather strongholds. We have built sky-high walls around us . . . and, almost imperceptibly our strongholds have been transformed into prisons. Ez’kiah Mphahlele sums it up well when he says, “In South Africa we look at each other through a key-hole, blacks and whites”. That is so very true if you are in a prison. Your only avenue of communication is the key-hole. So, squatting before our respective key-holes, we have been squinting at each other.

Through the grace of God some of us then discover that we are in prisons, and we begin wishing those prisons away. “Oh, if only we had *not* been saddled with the legacy of our history! If only it were possible to start all over again!” But that is truly only wishful thinking. We all come out of the terrible South African tempest – black and white, Zulu and Sotho, English and Afrikaans. It is that hurricane which deposited us where we are today. It is that storm that gives our interhuman relations in this country such a peculiar poignancy.

We cannot undo this; indeed, we should not. We cannot shake off our past and start anew at Square One. We take our history with us into our future. A person without history has no identity; he suffers from amnesia. If you do not know who you are, you cannot help others; neither can you if you deny being who you are. I have heard of an American missionary to an African country who used to go around saying: “I always try to forget that I am an American.” The fact that he was constantly repeating this proved, of course, that he never really succeeded in forgetting who he was. Besides, even if *he* did succeed in forgetting, would the Africans ever forget?

History is indeed a prison that locks us in. But it is, paradoxically, also the key that can open that prison for us. Then we move from being prisoners of history to being “prisoners of hope” – this a phrase used by the prophet Zechariah to refer to the Judean captives

in Babylon who are awaiting liberation (Zech. 9:12). Only by taking both the guilt and the grandeur of our history upon us, can we transform that history en route towards our mutual hope. Some people take only the guilt of their history with them; then they resemble that American missionary. Others take only the grandeur of their history with them; then they absolutise it and make it normative also for the future. In neither case do they escape from their prisons.

Let me say it by means of a metaphor—that of a bird in a violent storm. If the wings of that bird are set wrongly, it will be smashed against the cliff. But if the wings are set rightly, the storm itself will lift that bird above the danger of the cliff and it will soar toward the sun. We do not need new wings, then. It is the setting of our wings that matters. *That* has to be made new. God takes us as we are, together with our histories and he “sets” our histories in a new way. Indeed, our histories could have smashed us against the krantzes. But they can also, under God, help us to soar into true freedom. The storm is necessary to carry the bird over the cliff. If there had been no wind, no storm, the bird would never have been carried into the blue.

**3 The biblical concept reconciliation has as its corollaries the concepts repentance and forgiveness.** This means, simply, that we cannot talk about the one without at the same time talking about the other. It is therefore necessary to reflect on the meaning of repentance and forgiveness also since they can help us to give a clearer profile to what reconciliation means.

**4 In ordinary inter-human communication people are usually more aware of the sins of others than of their own sins.** To use a biblical metaphor: I am more aware of the mote in my brother's or sister's eye than of the beam in my own. In a society such as ours, where groups are increasingly polarised and alienated from each other, this phenomenon tends to take on ghastly proportions. In white circles the tendency is to blame everything that went wrong in our country on the blacks, or on communist infiltrators and agitators, or on hooliganism. In black circles the opposite tendency prevails: whites are regarded as the authors of every conceivable evil in society.

“Reconciliation” in such a context would mean, then, that the other party has to agree to *my* point of view, has to be won over to *my* position. But, of course, he usually adopts the same position. And so we both remain unyielding. The fronts harden. We adopt the language of “winners” and “losers” and seem to suggest that the winner should take all.

Even *Christians* are not immune to this interpretation of reconciliation. In fact, we are often even better at this than non-Christians! Those who attended the Lausanne Congress (1974) will remember how the South African group met daily to discuss what we would do once we had returned to South Africa. We were not able to make any headway, however. We were too divided. Each group kept on calling the other group to repentance and change, for each group believed that they were right and the other wrong. Then, one day, Michael Cassidy pointed out that we had been confronting each other with two different but very muscular Christs. And if one group's Christ becomes too muscular, the others either go back into their shells or they make *their* Christ even more muscular. And if Christ becomes muscular, he ceases to be the man of Calvary. The print of the nails disappears behind the flexing of those powerful muscles.

**5 In the context of the Christian faith, by contrast, we judge ourselves before we judge others.**

As Christians we can be critical about others only after we have been critical about ourselves. If we are truly prophetic, in the biblical sense of the word, we would identify with the sin and guilt of those whom we, humanly speaking, would regard as our adversaries. We would hope and pray that they would do the same with *our* sin and guilt but we cannot make our solidarity with their guilt dependent on this kind of reciprocity. We should be prepared to carry the burden of our own guilt *and* of the other; and carrying the burden of their guilt means forgiving it, wholeheartedly. This is the difference between the critic and the prophet. The critic condemns from the outside, the prophet confesses from within. The critic accuses, the prophet weeps. The critic boasts, “Lord, I thank you that I am not like other people”; the prophet beats his breast and cries, “Lord, have mercy on me, a sinner!” The critic remains unscathed; the prophet is ridiculed and ostracised, even persecuted. Criticism is easy, but heretofore also cheap; being prophetic is terribly demanding, and therefore very costly.

**• If we are followers of the One who was crucified we too will have to be cross-bearers.** This is not at all to masochism but simply to the normal Christian life. The Cross is the hallmark of the Christian church. And it is good to remember that it was the scars of Jesus that were to his disciples the proof of his identity: because of his scars they believed (John 20:20). Will it be different with us? Will an unbelieving world identify us as followers of Jesus unless they can recognise his scars in us?



Reconciliation takes place when two opposing forces clash and somebody gets crushed in between. This is what happened to Jesus, for in his body on the Cross he reconciled Jew and Gentile; he demolished the middle wall of partition and thus transformed erstwhile enemies into a single new humanity (Eph. 2:14-17).

Jesus did this not only in his death on the Cross but in his entire ministry. Look at this man as he walks the dusty roads of Palestine and ministers to the crowds! He could also – as we often do – present argument upon argument to show that the people have only themselves to blame, that the Jews only got what they deserved or that the Romans were wicked and cruel. Jesus does not adopt this line, however. He disarms himself. He stands with a bleeding heart before Jew and Roman, black and white. He invites all of them in, even if it might mean that they would exploit him, trample on him and deceive him. He accepts all of them unconditionally.

He is the good Samaritan who risks his life for a Jew who is really supposed to be his archenemy. He is the good Shepherd who puts his own life in jeopardy for every obstinate sheep. He is the Servant who washes the feet even of his traitor. He is the Master who loves the rich young ruler while knowing that the young man would not be prepared to pay the price of discipleship. He is the one who reinstates Peter in his office, even if Peter has denied him in the hour of trial. He is the Master who trusts his disciples sufficiently to send them to the ends of the earth, even while knowing that they have all deserted him and fled in the hour of trial. Ultimately, he is the One who prays for those who crucify him: "Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing".

It is of such a Man that we are called to be disciples. And it is totally out of the question that we shall be his disciples without getting hurt ourselves. Moreover, unless I get hurt, I can't help others who hurt. It is only through wounds that wounds can be healed. Isn't that what the prophet said? "... he was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities; *the punishment that brought us peace was upon him, and by his wounds we are healed*" (Isa. 53:5).

**7 Repentance and conversion always affect those elements in our lives that touch us most deeply, which we are most attached or devoted to, without which – so we believe – we simply cannot exist.**

These elements are not necessarily *bad* things. On the contrary: they may be very, very *good* things. Our faith, however, challenges us to put them in jeopardy, to risk living without them. In the New English Bible

"self-denial" is often rendered "leaving *self* behind": "If anyone wishes to be a follower of mine, he must leave *self* behind" (Matt. 16:24).

Abraham and Paul had to deny themselves; they had to "leave self behind". Paul in particular had to discover that he had it all wrong, that his zeal for God's cause was misplaced, that he was, in fact, acting contrary to God's will and in his blindness persecuting and oppressing God's people. This is why – when he discovered what his practice *really* had entailed – he used such strong language in distancing himself from his past convictions and actions.

How does all this apply to us? Naturally, I cannot speak for my black fellow-Christians: they have to decide for themselves whether this has implications for them and if so, which. I dare not even take it upon myself to say what it means for whites in general and Afrikaners in particular. And I am reminded of the fact that a group always finds repentance more difficult than an individual. At most, I can ask a few questions and make some tentative suggestions as regards this latter group.

The gospel then, I submit, challenges us to be willing to give up our privileges. As a matter of fact, the gospel goes further than that. It challenges us to "leave self behind", that is, to deny ourselves. It reveals to us that, in taking it upon ourselves to regulate the lives of other people in the minutest details, we have overstepped all limits. It urges us to stop all this and put it right *now* regardless of the consequences. We know that, at least as we perceive it, this involves tremendous risks. But the gospel challenges us to do justice now, even if the world comes to an end ... *our* world. We know that only if we accept this and get up and do it, shall we really be free to obey. We remind ourselves of Bonhoeffer's words: Only the one who believes, obeys; only the one who is obedient, believes. We know that God does not ask about the extent of our successes but about the depth of our obedience.

Only if this is the road we walk – only if we truly "leave self behind" – shall we be free to live in a country in which we no longer have any say, live in it and serve in it while we truly experience and enjoy the freedom of the children of God, even if a future South Africa turns out to be one ruled by a corrupt and oppressive Marxist regime and we have to give up all those things to which we have always clung for dear life.

I do not say this out of defeatism. Neither am I suggesting that I would welcome a Marxist regime: I believe the communist system is something abhorrent. So I am not saying anything about the desirability

lity of such a regime. (And, of course, we may, to our utter surprise, get a good regime!) The statement I am making is about *us*, about *white* Christians, *Afrikaner* Christians.

I am suggesting that we should begin thinking about the possible emergence of a situation where *we* become the underdogs. I am submitting that we should be able to continue being Christians even in such circumstances. And I remind you of the fact that the church is surviving today even in Russia and China and Vietnam and Iran. I suggest that the church in the catacombs is church in a truer sense of the word than the church in palaces; it is, for one thing, liberated from the guilt of privilege and from its bad conscience. I am aware that this may involve martyrdom; but martyrdom has always been one of the lesser threats to the church's survival – after all, the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church, as Tertullian phrased it in the third century AD.

**8 Confession of guilt and repentance cannot be imposed by others but is a gift of the Holy Spirit.** This should, in fact, be completely evident. If repentance and restitution approximate even remotely the kind of steps I have intimated in my previous thesis, there is no chance that demands from others will persuade me to take such steps. I'll only take them willingly if God has changed my heart.

I can, however, challenge those who share my privileges to open their hearts, too. I may then be used by God's Spirit as a catalyst. Ideally, then, it should be white Christians who challenge other white Christians, Afrikaners who challenge fellow-Afrikaners to come to the recognition that we all share in the guilt of the sins we have committed, that we should recognise that guilt for what it is, confess it, and take deliberate steps at making restitution.

If, however, the challenge to confess our guilt comes from black South Africans, this might be counter-productive. We might argue that they stand to gain from our confession and this might harden us. Neither should the challenge to Afrikaners come from white English-speaking South African Christians. Afrikaners will simply label them hypocrites, in the light of their own history of oppression and exploitation. Least of all should the challenge come from Christians *outside* South Africa; from their comfortable positions they make demands on us which cost them nothing, and precisely for that reason we will dismiss those demands with contempt. I daresay the main reason Afrikaner Christians have been so slow in confessing their guilt is precisely that others – for whom nothing was at stake – have tried so frequently to bludgeon us into it.

Gradually, however, Afrikaner Christians are beginning to express and confess their guilt, even publicly. They have been doing this for some time already, mostly as individuals or unofficial groups. Now, for the first time, a regional Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk body in its official capacity has done the same. The Presbytery of Stellenbosch, in its recent annual meeting (29 August 1985), released a statement which says, among other things:

- ☐ We recognise that, in the South African society, racial discrimination plays a fundamental role in both structural and personal matters; we confess that this is contrary to the biblical principles of love of one's neighbour and justice.
- ☐ We also acknowledge that the ideal of apartheid did not succeed in creating social justice but has, on the contrary, led to human misery, frustration and injustice.
- ☐ We confess that the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk has often insensitively and uncritically tolerated the negative realities and consequences of apartheid.
- ☐ We therefore hereby declare ourselves prepared
  - a) to assess the apartheid system in all its consequences truly honestly and critically;
  - b) with all other people in our country, to seek prayerfully for a meaningful alternative for our land, and to do whatever we can to alleviate the suffering caused by the system.

At long last, then, the process has begun. Pray God that it will gain momentum! No longer dare we argue that the others also have guilt and that they, too, must confess their guilt and repent. Perhaps they have guilt. But that is of no consequence to us. We dare not make our confession of guilt and repentance subject to or dependent upon, theirs. We dare not even demand forgiveness; we may not withdraw our confession of guilt if the other party fails to forgive us. Confessing our guilt is in itself a supreme blessing and a sign of grace. It opens up the fountains of new life and cleanses us.

**9 Our most terrible guilt is that of which we are unaware.** Jesus' principle parables dealing with forgiveness and mercy were directed not to tax collectors, prostitutes and others clearly identifiable as "sinners" but to those who assumed that they were spiritually healthy and therefore thought that they were not in need of a "doctor" (cf. Mark 2:17). They were oblivious of any guilt they might have; they thought themselves completely innocent. The gospels are crystal clear, however, that this is no excuse. Their imagined innocence does not lessen their guilt but aggravates it.

The Pharisees who believe themselves to be blameless and righteous before God are not, because of this, less guilty, but more. The rich man who is unaware of what he has been doing to the poor Lazarus, is not less culpable because of this, but more culpable. The people in Jesus' last parable in Matthew (25:31-46) who did not minister to the hungry and the naked for the simple reason that they never consciously "saw" those unfortunate victims of society, are not acquitted by Jesus for not being aware of the others' needs; on the contrary, they are pronounced guilty and sent into eternal punishment.

All these are cases not of innocence but of pseudo-innocence. If a pastor today attacks a colleague for referring to injustices in our society and then claims that he is totally unaware of any injustice in South Africa, he is not just ignorant, he is misguided and blind. Not being aware of our guilt may be our most terrible guilt.

**10 God forgives us our debts as we also forgive our debtors.** These words are, of course, from the fifth petition of the Lord's Prayer. I quote them here as they intimately link reconciliation with God to reconciliation with our neighbour. There is *no* dichotomy here.

The one who honestly confesses his guilt knows, categorically and totally, that God forgives him. God's forgiveness is unconditional. He does not forgive us *if* we forgive our debtors. Still, there is a link between the two. We cannot receive God's forgiveness and remain unyielding to our human debtors. Leonardo Boff puts it in the following words: "The lesson is crystal clear: if we ask (God) for unrestricted pardon and receive it without reservation, subject to no conditions, we shall also have to give unrestricted pardon . . . We cannot maintain two attitudes, one toward God and the other toward our neighbour . . . If we have really had the radical experience of forgiveness of our sins and our debts, if we truly have felt the mercy of God at work in our sinful life, then we are also impelled to forgive without limits, without reservations . . . We have no right to God's forgiveness if we do not want to forgive our neighbours".

**11 If we reject the road of reconciliation we are crucifying Christ anew.** Confessing our sins, repenting, forgiving and reconciling are not optional

extras for those who claim to be followers of Jesus Christ. Those outside can afford to go without these, we cannot. If we refuse to walk this road, we are denying our Lord. We are saying, in effect, that what Christ did is of no consequence. The middle wall of partition is as solid as ever. It is as though Christ had never come.

Not to believe in the possibility of reconciliation and not to act as people who have found and embraced one another, who really love one another with an indestructible love, who serve one another, act justly toward one another, actually means reinforcing and buttressing that wall that divides us. The question: "Are you prepared to be reconciled to your brother and sister?" is in essence the same as the question: "Do you believe in the Lord Jesus Christ?"

**12 Reconciliation is not a human possibility but a divine gift.**

At one stage during the Second Vatican Council there was a lot of discussion about the college of bishops being modelled on the community of Jesus' disciples – a body of colleagues with common functions and ideals, people of one mind and purpose, acting with one accord. During one of the breaks a Protestant observer asked a delegate: "You say the college of bishops has to be modelled on the community of disciples. But tell me, when did the disciples constitute a true community? When were they of one mind and one accord?" After a moment's reflection the bishop replied: "They did it once – in Gethsemané, when they all abandoned Jesus and fled".

*That* is the kind of unity of purpose and solidarity in action we human beings are capable of. We can do no better in our own power. Still, in spite of the Gethsemané episode the band of disciples constituted a community of hope in the midst of despair; and so do we, not because of ourselves but because of our Lord who bound us together and enlisted us in the ministry of reconciliation. This ministry – we often say – is one of building bridges. That is true, but only in a secondary sense. Primarily – however, we are not *bridge-builders* but *bridge-crossers*. The Bridge is already there – our Lord, who in his own body of flesh and blood has broken down the enmity which stood like a dividing wall between us. *He* is the Bridge over which we cross to each other, again and again.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BUTHELEZI DISCUSSES CURRENT PROBLEMS, RELATIONSHIP WITH BOTHA

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[Interview with Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu, by Hugh Murray, Leadership editor; date and place not given]

[Text] Murray: How do you characterise the current situation in South Africa?

Buthelezi: We cannot really have dialogue or change in the midst of violence or within a state of emergency, so that is a complication. It seems to me that this is something we cannot resolve unless something dramatic is done. In my private talks with the State President, at the first meeting I had with him last year, I said one of the important things he could do was to release Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Kathrada and the others from jail. This would really convince a lot of people in this country, white and black, that he really means business as far as change is concerned. But it appears that there is nothing he dreads more than releasing them if they are going to join those who are initiating or involved in acts of violence. He says he cannot face the issue of putting them back in jail.

So we have a stalemate. I cannot see myself negotiating a formula for the resolution of our problems while those people are in jail, while there are people at any level - even those in exile - not able to enter the debate.

I would have thought that with Mr Mandela being ill, in addition to the fact that he is getting on in years (in a private conversation I had with the State President he said he is often troubled about keeping in jail people who are getting on in years) it was a good opportunity for Mr Botha to release Mandela without any loss

of face. I don't see how one starts except with the State President. It takes courage to do something bold, such as releasing Mr Mandela. And there are other factors adding to the complexity of the situation. We have this foreign debt and the rescheduling of it. That is a very complex issue. Personally I dread that more than the sanctions. I think it is going to be very crucial for South Africa. I had talks lasting for two hours with Fritz Leutwiler in Berne a few weeks ago and my own deduction is that this, too, has become a political issue. He made it very clear, and it looks to me as if we will be locked into that situation as well.

Murray: Yet Fritz Leutwiler is a man who understands South Africa quite well.

I would have thought he would take a constructive approach.

Buthelezi: That is my impression.

Murray: But you seem to think he is going to come under a lot of pressure to use debt re-scheduling as a political instrument as well.

Buthelezi: He has no choice. The bankers have adopted this attitude and nobody is going to persuade them out of it.

Murray: There have been calls from some that you should be appointed to the Cabinet.

Buthelezi: That is out of the question. That would be political suicide. I don't see how I can serve in the Cabinet while the apartheid system exists. How can I administer apartheid?

Murray: How about your personal relationship with the President? It seems to have gone through stormy weather.

Buthelezi: When the State President took over (previously as Prime Minister) he was an unknown quantity to me. I was honestly despondent because I didn't know him. Since he had built up the Defence Force, I thought he was a man who would rely more on force than on negotiation and talks. When I first met him, on January 22, 1978, I found that unlike his predecessor, at least this man was a human being. We could joke so easily. A conversation with him was easier than a conversation with Mr Vorster.

That gave me some hope. Then he made some utterances which were very profound. He said that the whites of this country must either adapt or die. He went on to say that as a Christian he must also work for people of other race groups. I was so encouraged that I stuck my political neck out and said to my people: "Look, you are dealing with someone different now. Let's give this man a chance. After all he cannot undo the damage of so many generations of segregation or apartheid through the stroke of a pen. Let's see what he is going to do."

Murray: Shortly after, however, you seemed to backtrack on this view.

Buthelezi: I was disappointed when he set up the President's Council. I tried to appeal to him, and he called a meeting in Pretoria where we were supposed to meet. I had already made a statement saying that as far as I was concerned he had tried to placate black people by saying that he was going to set up a black advisory council. We rejected that out of hand because we couldn't possibly have a black advisory council advising an advisory President's Council. It was a ridiculous situation. I refused to attend the meeting in Pretoria. He didn't listen to that. That was about the time I and leaders from other regions of South Africa – the so-called homelands – asked him to discuss with us a statement of intent. He wouldn't discuss this with us. He said he still wanted to visit Soweto,

KwaZulu, Gazankulu and all those regions and would think about it afterwards. He came to KwaZulu in August, 1979 and then, in February, 1980, we were invited to Cape Town ostensibly to discuss this statement of intent. Unfortunately, when we got there we found that he would not recognise us together. He wanted us to go into his office one by one.

When my chance came, I am afraid there was a very unnecessary argument which soured relations between me and Mr Botha. Dr Kooen Hof, who was at the meeting, insisted that the aide memoire I had used in the discussions should not be shown to the press. He said others had agreed not to show their memoranda to the press.

My argument was that I had been vilified by people because I was prepared to meet Mr Botha and was committed to negotiations. I was already paying the price for that: there were people who had ordered my execution because they said I was betraying the cause. I could not negotiate behind the backs of my people, because there was nothing I could discuss which I would not put before my people. The State President (Prime Minister then) lost his temper that day. He was very angry with me and we had nothing to do with one another after that. It was very sad; it was a petty thing.

Then many people worried because in 1983 we confronted each other from different platforms. We confronted each other on the referendum because I tried to appeal to whites please to answer with a "No". He was very angry with me because I warned that if his tricameral parliament was implemented it would heighten the anger of black people and cause violence.

The State President then warned me from the public platform: "Buthelezi, don't try it". I was surprised to hear him say that, because I had no intention of being involved in the initiation of violence myself. But exactly as I predicted, the violence started during the elections among the coloureds and Indians, and we have had it escalating ever since. Of course other factors are relevant. I know that the downturn in the economy has affected the situation, and all sorts of things have come into play.

But the position remained that many black people, even Inkatha members, some of my colleagues, and many whites



were very worried that Mr Botha and I were not speaking to each other. When the protests, the contesting voices, got more strident he then decided to set up a Cabinet Committee. I was invited to participate and refused on principle because I just thought it was just a sop. Without the statement of intent for which we had asked, I didn't see that my participation would be meaningful. We were estranged for four-and-a-half years. Then Dr Anton Rupert sent his son to me and said that he would like to invite me to Fleur du Cap for a weekend, and would I mind if he invited the State President over. He said that they were very concerned about the two of us not speaking. So I sent a letter (which contents have never been disclosed) by courier to Mr Botha, in which I set out the kind of issues that were to be discussed. I thought he might be upset about it. About that time my mother died. I had to reschedule my plans and decline because I was in mourning. But the letter, I was told, was so well received by him that we should meet and not postpone the meeting until the following year. So I infringed my own traditions by going to see him while I was in mourning. I went to this house in Somerset West, and he arrived there with Dr Gerrit Viljoen. We had a two-hour discussion where I more or less merely dotted the "i"s and crossed the "t"s of what I had set out in the letter.

**Murray: What did the letter contain?**

Buthelezi: Though my letter was extremely confidential, I can summarise it by saying that I said that I knew there had been a history of estrangement, even enmity, between the Zulus and the Afrikaners, which started in the time of my ancestor King Dingaan and had continued to the present. I said that we should bury the past and start with a new slate. I thought the history should be forgotten because it sired a lot of mistrust between Afrikaners and Zulus, arising understandably out of that incident at Ungungundhlova where the Piet Retief party was massacred by Dingaan).

I then appealed to the State President. I said that our ideal was one man, one vote in a unitary state. I said that was my idea, that was Inkatha's idea, that was the idea of the ANC, that was the idea of most credible black organisations. But then I said that as I understood the situation,

whites would not swallow that unless it was rammed down their throats with butts of guns. On the other hand, I said that apartheid, however sugar-coated it may be, in whatever form, was not acceptable to black people and he must understand that. Apartheid, in turn, would have to be rammed down our throats with butts of guns. In this situation, therefore, my view was that we should meet to establish a compromise. Both parties – blacks and whites – would have to compromise otherwise we would destroy each other, and the country. It would be a war with no victors, a war without spoils. I then brought up the matter of the Buthelezi Commission which his government rejected, but to which general reaction was very positive. The State President's response was very good. By the way, it is important to note that during this meeting I was accompanied by some of my people, for example Dr Oscar Dhlomo.

Then, in May this year, the State President suddenly invited me to see him on my own. This was very strange; I didn't understand it. But we had now built up a basis for talking again after four-and-a-half years and I wasn't going to destroy it by insisting that I was accompanied. So I went to Cape Town, to Dr Viljoen's office, and we both went to the Tuyn Huys. Again the State President was very affable and very nice indeed. But the reason he had called me was to tell me that there was no way in which he was going to issue a statement of intent. He said he had told Dr Van Zyl Slabbert the same thing. He wanted to tell me himself, in his office, privately. This was, of course, nice – even if I was very sad about it. It showed that he didn't want our relationship to sour up again. Then, among other things, he said that he wanted to come to KwaZulu. He said he realised that we disagreed but the people mustn't suffer because we disagreed politically. He said that, for instance, he would be interested to see for himself what kind of economic projects we had on the ground and during the recess he was going to come up. Of course I agreed that he should come. But in June you will recall that there was an interview he had with London Weekend Television. The Assembly was sitting in Ulaundi at the time. Mr Botha made some extraordinary statements. He said in the interview that he was not prepared to change the present character of South Africa. And he went on to say that there

would never be a unitary government in South Africa, neither a Union nor a Federation. The members of the assembly immediately had a snap debate and said that my invitation to Mr Botha to visit KwaZulu should be withdrawn because people would be confused.

If he talked this language and came here, people would think we accepted there would never be a unitary government. We conveyed that to him. I think that upset the State President because he reacted very angrily by saying that he hoped that the same would apply even when we needed his assistance.

I reacted by saying that he was threatening us with more malnutrition than our children suffered from. But this didn't mean that relationships had soured between us because, on August 9, Mr Chris Heunis came to Umtata. He informed me that he had a message from the State President, which was that Mr Botha was going to make a very important speech on August 15, in Durban. His speech would cover all the areas where I disagreed with him – citizenship, one undivided South Africa, and power sharing. That has not happened at all. So that gives a very good background of why I was not able to go to the meeting on November 29 in Pretoria. I try to be fair-minded in my politics. I try to give the State President credit. I know the very fundamental issue is participation in decision-making at the centre of power – that is a crucial issue. But at the same time he has said that he wants to increase the mobility of black people, he is going to abolish the pass laws, and influx control regulations. I think this is positive. He has abolished the Political Interference Act, he has abolished the Mixed Marriages Act and Section 16 of the Immorality Act. Those things don't address the immediate issue, but for anybody really to say that they are cosmetic, is really not fair. If you are a South African and have lived in this country for 57 years, as I have, and you know the psychology of the Afrikaner, this abolition of the Mixed Marriages Act is a very serious thing.

It goes right to the heart of the problem. Some years ago, the late Mr CR Swart, before he became State President, said:

"We will see to it that coffee and milk are well mixed in this country." Therefore, whether abroad – or here – I differ from many people who say that these things are

cosmetic. He has not taken the final step which he should, but statesmanship is there for the taking by PW Botha. He can be a statesman, the biggest statesman this country has ever seen by taking just one bold step.

**Murray:** From those who are close to the President, I gather he is prepared to consider anything other than one man, one vote in a unitary state. Anything other than that appears to be negotiable, which is why people have been thinking that he is moving towards a federal option.

Would a federation make a difference? Obviously the composition of the federation would be important, whether it was geographical, and so on.

**Buthelezi:** I think all of us are brainwashed by the one man, one vote in a unitary state philosophy. All of us were part of a British colony. Everything around Westminster and the House of Commons seemed to be ordained by God. Some of us grew up knowing that as the only alternative, though we know the system was developed by trial and error in Britain itself. I repeat, it's my option, my first option. But I can't see that we have a right to destroy the country and ourselves for that. The greatest democracy in the Western World, America, is a federal state. Countries such as Germany have a federal system. Mr Heunis made a statement saying that there will never be a classical federation in South Africa. I don't know what he meant. There is no classical federation anywhere in the world. There are classical principles of federation, but there are no two federations, federal formulae that are the same.

**Murray:** Do you think you can move on from here to more concrete and constructive relations with the State President?

**Buthelezi:** I intend to because he is in power. Even at the Convention Alliance that we tried to stimulate with Dr Van Zyl Slabbert we acknowledged the fact

In my own remarks I said that the convention, would be attended by the State President – indeed, it should be called by the head of state. These are the realities. There is an illusion which really has bedevilled the situation in this country. Some people think this government is on the run. In spite of our problems, it isn't. In my assessment after more than 30 years of political life, I would say that they are

not on the run. I would say that PW and his colleagues have not lost the will to rule. There is an illusion about the violence that we are facing, that in fact liberation is just around the corner. I want it to be around the corner. But I know it is not. There is an illusion that because of the violence the State President might be frightened into doing something he doesn't want to do. And I say to people, especially abroad, that this government has not even used a fraction of the awesome powers it commands. If they are put into a corner they will scorch the earth. When people talk glibly about the government being on the run, they really don't know what they are facing. I disagree with Mr PW Botha, but in military terms he is the most powerful man in Africa. President Nyerere said to me that there is no single country or combination of African States that can take on South Africa militarily.

**Murray:** Internationally we have an appalling image. Domestically a lot has to be done to satisfy black aspirations. If these are satisfied, will the western world give the government the credit it will have earned, or do you think the goal posts will again be moved by the West?

**Buthelezi:** The Americans and the British really hold the key positions. If the State President did something immediately, I would think he would get the support of the United States and Britain – and perhaps the EEC countries.

**Murray:** Do you think that the support would be sufficient to stop the movement towards sanctions in its tracks?

**Buthelezi:** I think it would because after all is said and done, we know that some countries are supporting sanctions knowing what the cost to themselves is as well.

**Murray:** What about our neighbouring states?

**Buthelezi:** If the neighbouring states suffer they shouldn't expect to be salvaged by other countries. The Americans have said as much. It will be devastating for all of us. I really dread to see it. We as black people are going to suffer here. But quite clearly the black people in the territories outside South Africa will suffer even more than we do.

**Murray:** If I am to believe Mr Oliver Tambo, the ANC is gaining increasing recognition, certainly from Western businessmen. He appears, also, to be on the verge of starting formal talks with the State Department of the United States. That presumably will give the ANC a fair degree of respectability which they haven't had up to now, and perhaps it would lead on to talks with Mrs Thatcher. What is the role of the ANC, internally and externally, in your view? Is the ANC an important reality with which we are going to have to come to grips?

**Buthelezi:** It is an important reality. I don't think I would say that the problems of this country will be resolved without them. I was a member of the ANC myself, and over the years, quite contrary to the attitude you see today, I always had most cordial relationships with Mr Tambo. We have met as brothers and embraced each other in Africa, in Lagos, in Malawi, in Kenya, Europe, Sweden, London, in many parts of the world.

People take exception that I call upon the external mission of the ANC – but that in fact is what they are. This is nothing of which to be ashamed. They were established by Chief Albert Luthuli as the external mission. Mr Tambo was sanctioned by the movement, by Chief Luthuli, to establish an external mission to conduct international diplomacy for the movement here, to support the struggle at home. Later they decided to opt for violence. Personally, my attitude all the time was that I don't blame them for adopting that position. While I disagree with their decision to opt for violence, I cannot blame them for that because I was not in that position. But while I don't question their right to opt for violence, I think many people have caused the lines to blur between what was the ANC under people like Chief Luthuli, and the external mission, the ANC as it operates abroad. People shouldn't talk merely because my brothers and I are estranged. My position was never an issue. The reason I am here is partly a decision that was taken at a high level by Mr Mandela himself, Chief Luthuli, Tambo, Joe Mathoma and others. I was actually told it was a vote I owed the nation and the cause to Mr Mhlabatini and take up my position as Chief. By virtue of my position I will support the Buthelezi claim and not the Zulu claim.

they felt that I would be crucial in the struggle.

The very first cadres of the ANC that came to this country came to me at Mhlabatini precisely because I was one of them. I was shadowed by the security police after I was expelled from Fort Hare in 1950. At one point I was even interrogated. My position was very precarious, and even as Chief, for five years Pretoria would not recognise me as fully in my father's position because of my political views and political stand.

**Murray:** Are you in fear of your life?

**Buthelezi:** No. I know that as a Christian there is life hereafter, that I will one day be born into a new life and I know that that can come any hour. I know that there were two young men who have been here for months who were continually taking pictures and recording my habits. I know this, and I am not worried about it. I have other evidence that people have already decided to eliminate me. The concern of my police is that I am not security conscious at all.

One cannot be careless, but at the same time even a man like President Kennedy was killed. People more guarded than I am are killed.

**Murray:** If Nelson Mandela were released, Mr Tambo is reported to have said that he would stand down as leader of the ANC. History has shown that that kind of thing doesn't always work. The founder of Swapo, Herman Toivo ja Tovo came out and Sam Nujoma hasn't stepped down, nor will he. What would your feelings be on Mandela as leader of the ANC?

**Buthelezi:** Over the years I have had the most cordial relationship with Mr Mandela. He was friend and a colleague in the ANC. I could never go to Johannesburg without going to his house, when he was married to his first wife, and after he married Winnie. I would always go to his house in Orlando for tea. He also wound up the estate of my father-in-law. Mandela used to play draughts at the Bantu Mens Social Centre in Johannesburg with my father-in-law. To me he is a very dear brother. When my cousin the King of the Zulus, King Cyprian, died he wrote me a letter I treasure even now because we used to come with the King to his house. So we are very close to each other. I have no problems about him. I

don't see myself as a future head of state or State President. I am just doing a job that is there to do. But for people then to say that what I am doing is a stop-gap job would be a mistake too. I believe personally that when South Africa is liberated we will continue in a democratic tradition. I am prepared to serve under Mandela if the people of South Africa decide so. But I don't accept that the people are going to seize power and impose themselves over the rest of us. That I don't believe.

**Murray:** Can we still have a country which is going to be acceptable to all races – or have things gone too far?

**Buthelezi:** I think we can, because our people have become cash-dependent. Even here in the rural areas people are cash-dependent, they depend on their wages. If you cordoned off Soweto for a week or two, people would die because they have become cash-dependent. They depend on this cash and their pay packets and we have learned through the experience of Africa that it would be foolish to conduct our struggle in such a way that we destroy the foundations for the future. I think it would be very, very foolish indeed. If we cast our eyes across to our brother President Machel we see the enormous problems he has; awesome problems. I think that anyone who lives in Southern Africa who wants a repeat performance of that would be very foolish indeed. I still think we can still pursue the path of reconciliation. I believe this country needs a policy of reconciliation.

**Murray:** You are a Bill of Rights man, not so?

**Buthelezi:** I am a Bill of Rights man. I have said so. The Buthelezi Commission recorded the principle of one man, one vote in Natal. At the same time we recommended a minority veto which we are prepared to endorse.

**Murray:** You have been a great opponent of disinvestment or of sanctions. Is there anything that might persuade you to change your mind?

**Buthelezi:** It is not just me who is against sanctions. My people have not given me a mandate to advocate disinvestment. Sanctions failed in Zimbabwe, and I say that this country, in spite of its problems, has an economy which is really well

developed – a self sufficient economy. If the Zimbabweans could last for as long as they lasted, what will be the situation here? If anyone said that as a non-violent method we need to apply sanctions over a period of time and guaranteed results, I would say OK, let's have them. But I can't recommend that people should suffer futilely. Some people have said – I have heard the Bishop (Tutu) saying it – that black people have suffered for a very long time and they don't mind suffering a little more. I say it is very good if one is not one of those who is going to suffer a little more. I have asked people whether they are prepared to suffer. They respond that they are even prepared to die, but not futilely.

**Murray:** There has been violence in your own area and you have come under fire on the question of violence at the University and the way it was dealt with. Some people even blame you for it. Could you comment on this?

**Buthelezi:** I think it is an important issue because it is used internationally to denigrate me as a man who is speaking from both sides of his mouth – as if I talk non-violence yet practise violence. Some try to impose ideologies on others, for instance, at the University. I am a descendant of the man Zulu. His blood flows in my veins. For people to say that there is a "no-go" area for me in KwaZulu, is really terrible.

This is really playing with fire, particularly as the King of the Zulus was also affected. You can't create a "no-go" area, for the King of the Zulus or for me. In any event, a full commission of inquiry exonerates us. The university incident was a tragedy. But there was also Lamontville. There the UDF chairman tried to create that place as a "no-go" area for me. First of all he persuaded the papers to print that if I went there I would be killed. That left me no choice. I wouldn't survive politically if I listened to him. He even went to the Supreme Court to get an interdict to stop me! Of course the Supreme Court threw it out of court because it was nonsense. That kind of politics is not democratic. You have to sell your point of view, and give people a

choice. But to maim people, to kill them, to burn them and incinerate them in their cars, is not democratic and that has been done by the UDF.

**Murray:** How do you see the UDF?

**Buthelezi:** The UDF, of course, is a front for the ANC. There is no doubt about that whatsoever. I had no problem with them when they emerged. I even issued a statement in which I welcomed them. But before it ever crossed my mind they then issued a statement saying that they would welcome an affiliation with any organisation except Inkatha. The UDF did that and I was flummoxed because this had not entered my mind. They are the ones who have adopted that attitude. But I don't see how they are going to wish me away because I won't disappear, that's for sure. Inkatha won't disappear either.

**Murray:** Would you talk to Tambo now?

**Buthelezi:** He owes me a letter. I wrote him a long letter. If he sent a telegram today to say meet me in Lusaka or, meet me in London, I would go. I would drop everything and go to see him. And I am doing so from a position of strength.

**Murray:** Where are you politically, where do you put yourself?

**Buthelezi:** I am not liberal left. The UDF wishes to make the country ungovernable. UDF members are being trained to kill, to kill me and members of Inkatha. But Inkatha must react. We have a right to defend what we are doing and we don't interfere with what other people are doing. We have the same right, we reserve the same right to do what we are doing, and if we are disturbed we are prepared to die defending that. When it comes to that, I believe in an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.

I would think that in any country, any leader with the kind of massive constituency I have who rejects the constitution of the country would be a radical. When people say that I am a moderate, it is only because I don't advocate violence.

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SOUTH AFRICA

10 UNIBO STAFF MEMBERS DECLARED ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

MB281830 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1646 GMT 28 Jan 86

[Text] Mafikeng, Jan 28, SAPA--Ten staff members of the University of Bophuthatswana [UNIBO] have been declared illegal immigrants.

Reacting to reports in a Sunday newspaper that as many as 50 lecturers were affected, the vice chancellor UNIBO, Prof J.M.W. Makhene said only ten staff members were involved--of these five were lecturers, the rest from administration.

Prof Makhene added that they had approached him appealing that their cases be reconsidered. He had referred them to the interior minister.

According to Prof Makhene, 36 students would not be readmitted, following the government's orders.

He said it was difficult to replace these staff at the campus, because of the tense situation created by the government's action following disturbances at the campus in October last year.

However, he said, something would be done to reassure the remaining staff that as long as they contravened no internal security acts they would still be employed.

The expulsion orders follow disturbances at the university last year, when the government alleged that staff participated in illegal meetings, endangering the state security.

Asked whether the university would still admit students from South Africa, Prof Makhene said they would.

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SOUTH AFRICA

VIOLENCE IN KRUGERSDORP TOWNSHIP DISCUSSED

MB291838 London BBC World Service in English 1515 GMT 29 Jan 86

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] In South Africa, there have been clashes today between police and black demonstrators in the town of Krugersdorp, west of Johannesburg. The trouble has its origins in the ending yesterday of the school boycott by black students. On the line to Johannesburg, Julian (Borge) asked Thomas Mazwai what had happened.

[Begin recording] [Mazwai] About 1,500 to 2,000 residents of Munsieville, a township in Krugersdorp, marched on the local station demanding the withdrawal of the security forces from the township. This demand for the withdrawal of the security forces stems from an incident yesterday where the security forces made students get into buses that are being boycotted by the community. Now, these students were going to school and because their township is far away from their school, they have to use public transport. Now, according to the police, these students were marching through the town of Krugersdorp and they were thus put in the buses, but the community is objecting to the use of [changes thought] to the students being put into buses because this busline is being boycotted by the community. It is now, the boycott is now, in its 4th week and the parents were obviously infuriated that the police are now using pupils to try and break the 4-week-long bus boycott in the township. And then this morning they marched on the police station and then they were...[changes thought] on their way to the police station they met a contingent of police and in the confrontation that followed one was shot dead and five others were seriously injured.

[(Borge)] What is the bus boycott all about?

[Mazwai] The community of Krugersdorp is involved in both a bus boycott and a consumer boycott. The (?unusual demands) have been made and these are the release of all political prisoners, the withdrawal of the South African Defence Force from the Township, and in this case they have demanded that Mrs Winnie Mandela must be allowed to stay in her house in Soweto, and there are also other political demands, but they have been made by the community time and again.

[(Borge)] What methods were the police using to get the students on the buses?

[Mazwai] The students were forced into the buses. Now, when somebody who is fully armed and (?has got the reputation) of not hesitating to use force, requests you, and I use the word request in inverted quotes, to get into a bus, you get into that bus jolly quickly because if you refuse you know what to expect. [End recording]

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SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK SCHOOLS IN CAPE, BOLAND REMAIN 'UNSETTLED'

MB292002 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1957 GMT 29 Jan 86

[Text] Cape Town, Jan 29, SAPA--Black schools in the peninsula and Boland remain unsettled two days after yesterday's unofficial back-to-school and attendances at secondary schools are low.

Pupils are meeting at schools to discuss the issue of final exams not written because of the boycott last year. Pupils, parents and teachers are to decide on a date for fresh exams following a decision by the Parents' Action Committee [PAC], SRC's [Student Representative Councils] and principals at the weekend.

The exam question is expected to be high on the agenda when a PAC delegation meets with Department of Education and Training [DET] officials in Cape Town tomorrow to discuss pupils' demands and grievances.

The DET's regional circuit inspector in the western Cape, Mr. P.J. Scheepers, said attendance figures were fluctuating and it was still too soon to know what was influencing the low turnout at secondary schools.

He said the examination issue was far more serious in the western Cape than in Soweto, where attendances after yesterday's delayed return to school have been described by the DET as reasonable.

Western Cape pupils started boycotting in July and lost virtually a whole year's tuition while fewer school-hours were lost in Soweto, where the class boycott only took hold in October, Mr Scheepers said.

At five schools which each caters for about 1,000 pupils each, the average attendance figure for yesterday was 260 which rose to 300 today.

At Worcester a school for 600 pupils saw 130 yesterday and 400 today while at another school which had more than 700 pupils last year, yesterday 87 turned up and this fell to 72 today.

Higher primary schools' attendance ranged from 37 percent to 80 percent based on last year's rolls, he said. Attendance at lower primary schools, where there was no boycott last year, was "fairly good."

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

NEW TEACHERS COLLEGE FOR BLACKS--Cape Town, Jan 27, SAPA--Cape Town is to get its first teachers' training college for black people probably next year. The new college is part of a programme to build ten new black training colleges in the urban areas both to stimulate the recruitment of teachers and to improve the qualifications of existing teachers. The deputy minister of education and development aid, Mr Sam de Beer, said yesterday: "Cape Town is very high up on the list and I think most probably next year Cape Town will also get one. "This will improve the situation because it makes it more accessible for the locals to go to these training colleges and we hope this will also improve our facilities as far as the training of teachers is concerned." At present, black student teachers have to go to the Cape College near Fort Beaufort and Mr de Beer admitted "this was very inconvenient". The department had drawn up a five-year plan to build ten teacher training colleges in the urban residential areas. Last year, training colleges were opened in Kimberley and Bloemfontein and during 1986 new training colleges were being built in Port Elizabeth and on the East Rand, Mr de Beer said. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1721 GMT 27 Jan 86 MB] /6662

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SOUTH AFRICA

OFFICIALS DISCUSS PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING RSC'S

MB281836 Johannesburg Television Service in Afrikaans 1700 GMT 28 Jan 86

[Text] Good progress is being made with preparations for the introduction of the first regional services councils [RSC's]. The first council of the greater Bloemfontein area could be introduced on 1 April.

[Begin video] [Correspondent Riaan Nel] During the parliamentary session in Cape Town last year when legislation on RSC's was approved the general expectation was that the first RSC would be introduced on 1 January this year. The process of negotiation prescribed by legislation took longer than anticipated. Negotiations must take place with the local authorities of all race groups within a specified time before any final decision can be made. RSC's concerned with water and electricity services to a specific area, such as the Cape Peninsula for example, will consist of members of all race groups and will operate within the third level of government. The members of the executive committees concerned with local authorities in the four provinces aid in interviews that they were satisfied with progress being made.

[Roelf Dreyer, member of the executive committee, MEC, for Orange Free State] The first RSC will naturally be established in Bloemfontein and the administrator of the Orange Free State has had discussion with all the municipalities concerned with the aim of establishing the boundaries. There is still much to be done but the first RSC could be introduced by 1 April.

[Frank Martin, MEC for Natal, in English] Well, we have done a great deal of consulting among the local authorities concerned in the greater Durban area and that is where we want to start the first one. We have done that with the white local authorities and the Indian local authorities. We still have to do it with KwaZulu.

[John Griffiths, MEC for Transvaal] The Transvaal is progressing fairly well. In the Pretoria area from Bronkhorstspuit to Brits, all the necessary requirements have been met, discussions were conducted with all concerned in the area, and consensus has been reached on the area itself, on functions and also on a constituency.

[Nel] The expectation is that the first RSC will be introduced by September or October in the Transvaal. In the Cape Province, the area known as Cape Town and surroundings will be given first priority. The demarcation board has been asked to advertise the area which will include the divisional councils of Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Paarl, and the Swartland. An RSC for the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area is under negotiation. There is still uncertainty about the date for the introduction of the first council in the province.

[Piet Loubser, MEC for Cape Province] It is difficult to set a date for the introduction. There are still some legal points to be finalized but I believe it is important that one devotes time to making correct decisions. The first RSC may be introduced in the middle half of 1986.

[Nel] The introduction of RSC's means that the future of institutions such as the development boards, divisional councils, and the peri-urban boards will have to be carefully considered. Indications are that these institutions will be scrapped. Investigations in this connection are already in an advanced stage and final decision are expected to be made to government by the Coordinating Council for Local Authorities.

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SOUTH AFRICA

ALLISTER SPARKS COMMENTS ON BOTHA SPEECH

MB311709 London BBC World Service in English 1309 GMT 31 Jan 86

[From the "24 hours" program presented by David Lay]

[Text] First, to mark the new session of the South African parliament in Cape Town, that key address today by President Botha.

[Begin recording] [Botha] We have outgrown the outdated colonial system of paternalism as well as the outdated concept of apartheid [applause]. The peoples of the Republic of South Africa (?fall in) one nation, but our nation is a nation of minorities. [End recording]

To examine the significance of those remarks, to assess how they will be judged by the majority blacks at home and the international bankers in the world outside, I talked a short while ago to Allister Sparks for his interpretation of the president's terms for considering the release of the jailed black nationalist leader Nelson Mandela.

[Sparks] Well, on the face of it, it looks quite bizarre. I can't imagine that it's a public relations exercise, it's so weird I can't see who it is even designed to impress and to such an extent that I wonder whether perhaps there's more to it than meets the eye and the question I find I'm asking myself is why was Captain Wynand du Toit thrown into this. He is the South African soldier who was captured in Cabinda Province last year and one can't help but note that Dr Chester Crocker, the American assistant secretary of state for Africa, was in Luanda just a few days ago and after his return, the Reagan administration seemed to change its policy on aid to Dr Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA movement and the question I'm asking myself is: Has some kind of deal been done involving Capt du Toit's release, as it was perhaps negotiated by Dr Crocker? Did Mr Botha hear about this? And is this in fact a ploy to find a pretext for releasing Mr Mandela? We have no way of knowing that but it was brought in late, it was an addendum to the speech, it was delivered hurriedly to the press a matter of moments before he reached the end of his formal speech and we had this addendum distributed among us. It was clearly an afterthought and a very strange one.

[Lay] But, surely, to try and bring in Soviet dissidents as part of a wider package deal, that is going to be very, very complicated whatever Dr Chester Crocker may have been able to do between Luanda and Pretoria.

[Sparks] Yes, except that President Botha has painted himself into a corner on Nelson Mandela and he may simply be throwing in Sakharov and Shcharonskiy to make the thing a little less obvious at this point and if Capt du Toit is indeed released, he may say well, you know, at least part of my condition has been met and now I'm going to be very magnanimous in releasing him. I'm not saying that is going to happen. I'm saying that these are the questions that leap to mind because it is such an extraordinary thing.

[Lay] Well, let's now move on to the broader area of political reform and draw in at this point Martin Clout. Now, Martin, has President Botha today proposed anything of substance. He said we've outgrown the outdated concept of apartheid, but has he been any more specific about an alternative system, what to put in its place?

[Clout] Well, I don't really think so. I think the problem is that one has to see the fine print of everything that he has really proposed. A lot of the aspects he announced today have really been signalled in advance. For example, the abolition of the passbook system and the universal identity document that he talked about have been talked about in the past and really I don't think that's going to be anything very new and in a sense really the problem that Botha faces is who is he going to talk to? Whom is he going to make links with in the black community? That is at the heart of his problem. He has announced a new multiracial national statutory council and the question is: Who is going to actually sit on this council? That is new, but how is he going to make the links to make somebody come and talk to him?

[Lay] Well, Allister Sparks, are there blacks who are ready to come forward or does its course depend really on whom President Botha invites?

[Sparks] Yes, he can only invite those who are willing to come along. I can not see any blacks with political credibility taking part in this. I cannot see Chief Gatshe Buthelezi taking part in it. I think he will turn back to the old guard of community councillors and other discredited collaborators as they are called in the townships. But what is perhaps different about the new national statutory council is that in the context in which President Botha presented it, it (?just seems) to be a way of (?getting) at least a token black into some kind of institution connection with the central government. Here again, President Botha has painted himself into a corner. He has said never in his life, never in anybody's life, would there be a fourth chamber for blacks. Now he's saying that maybe the President's Council itself can be amended to include blacks in the meantime he's going to set up this national statutory council. So, it does look like a way of creating again a pretext for including at least a token African presence in the central government. Very token, very meaningless at this stage to everybody except of course in the context of the governing National Party's policy.

Within the context of the that, it becomes a breach in doctrine and in that context it has a certain amount of importance.

[Lay] Well, Martin Clout here has been on the phone to Lusaka, in Zambia. He has been talking to the ANC. What do they have to say, Martin, about these proposals?

[Clout] Well, they were not really prepared to make a major response to the proposals at this stage. They said they were studying them carefully, but when I put to them the conditions that they had for the release of Nelson Mandela, they said that really they were astonished by this. They said how on earth can the Angolans and the Soviets come into what is purely a South African matter and really they were rather surprised by the whole announcement.

[Lay] Now, how Allister Sparks to you assess the effectiveness of President Botha's address today? He's got the Commonwealth Commission coming in a few weeks' time to South Africa. Has he bought himself a little time, do you think?

[Sparks] I would say that inevitably one has got to compare this speech with the Rubicon speech which was delivered to his party congress in Durban last August and that had a disastrous impact internationally and particularly on financial and business institutions and caused the crash on the rand currency. It was an appalling display of arrogance and aggression. By comparison, this was polished. The tone was much better. It was a more professional presentation. I don't think it had anything of substance in the content, but at least it sounded a lot better and I think to that extent it will make some impression on foreign observers, perhaps on the bankers. I think it will make no impression whatsoever on the blacks within the country who are looking for content. They are not impressed by the fine words. But abroad perhaps, it will make at least not as bad an impression as the August speech.

[Lay] Would you share that view, Martin Clout? You've been talking to businessmen in the city of London here, who have been dealing with South Africa?

[Clout] Yes, indeed. The impression that I got from them was really that the speech was broadly in line with what they anticipated and what they expected and the first reaction in the currency market was really one of just a static response. There was no, not a (?blip) in the rand. As Allister Sparks mentioned, the rand fell devastatingly after the last speech and now it has really just stayed stable. So I think that it has been a calm reaction and in that sense I think it is really quite a positive reaction from the foreign exchanges.

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CSO: 3400/1008



SOUTH AFRICA

PANEL DISCUSSES IMPLICATIONS OF BOTHA SPEECH

MB311812 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1746 GMT 31 Jan 86

[Text] Johannesburg, Jan 31, SAPA--Were Washington and Moscow behind Mr P.W. Botha's suggestion that Nelson Mandela's freedom might be negotiated in exchange for the release of Angolan-held Captain Wynand du Toit and Soviet dissidents Andrey Sakharov and Antoliy Shchiransky?

Or was the proposal, made by the state president to the opening of parliament, a hastily composed compromise wrung from a cabinet in disagreement when it was decreed that something had to be said about Mandela?

Or was it perhaps just a headline-grabbing attempt to win admirers overseas?

A panel discussion at a Johannesburg hotel this evening hosted by the UCT [University of Cape Town] Graduate School of Business Association looked at all these options, but could not agree on the answer.

Professor John Barratt, executive director of the SA Institute of International Affairs, thought it likely to be "a very conscious attempt to get a headline. His (Mr Botha's) advisers must have realised this question would receive dramatic attention."

Prof Barrat said, however, the state president might well have discussed the idea with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Dr Chester Crocker during his recent visit.

He doubted, however, that the Soviet Union would want to be seen to be involved in negotiations with South Africa, and discounted a suggestion from the floor that Soviet supremo [as received] Mr Mikhail Gorbachev might have been involved.

Mr Raymond Parsons, chief executive of the Association of Chambers of Commerce of SA, noted that the Mandela suggestion had been a last-minute to the original text issued of Mr Botha's speech.

He thought there had probably been a great deal of disagreement about what should be said about Mandela. "But something had to be said and this seems to be the poor late compromise. It does not come out as very realistic."

Mr Douglas Gibson, Transvaal leader of the Progressive Federal Party, said he could not subscribe to the theory that there had been any dramatic disagreement in the cabinet on what should be said. "What P.W. says, goes."

He wondered if the proviso that Mandela should renounce violence before being released had now been dropped, or whether his release was now being made more difficult through being linked with the release of three others.

Mr Roland Host, the National Party's Transvaal organising secretary, declined to speculate on the reasoning behind the proposal, but said initial reaction at party headquarters from supporters had been that they would be happy to see Mandela allowed to leave the country under such an agreement.

On the speech as a whole, the panelists agreed it was a vast improvement on the "Rubicon" speech, though they did not feel it would have much impact overseas and were doubtful about its impact inside the country, particularly among blacks.

Mr Parsons said he felt Mr Botha had "safely crossed the Rubicon." Apartheid was going, and the acid test would now be on the speed with which his words were translated into deeds, particularly as far as black reaction was concerned.

The speech appeared to be a first step towards establishing a framework under which stability might be possible. "If he can get the politics right, then we can get the economic rights, and then this country will see an economic boom like never before," he added.

Mr Barratt was hesitant about the concept of a National Statutory Council unless meaningful black leadership was willing to participate--and there were no indications that this was likely.

He was disappointed that Mr Botha had not been more clear and categorical about the removal of influx control and the pass laws, and feared overseas critics would jump on the many loopholes in the speech.

Mr Gibson said "Rubicon" was a decided improvement on the original, but Mr Botha would have to demonstrate he meant what he said. The National Statutory Council appeared to be very similar to the native advisory council established in Smuts' time, and he noted that black leaders who currently would not negotiate with Mr Botha in private were now being asked to deal with him in public.

Mr Host said promises made to party congresses were now to be implemented. "Change is what we all want, but we must go through normal democratic processes."

But he warned that it was still National Party policy that the Group Areas Act, separate voters' rolls, and similar legislation should remain. "Even the state president cannot change that," he said.

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SOUTH AFRICA

STATE ATTORNEY REPLIES TO CHARGES AGAINST POLICE

MB311945 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1731 GMT 31 Jan 86

[Text] Port Elizabeth, Jan 31, SAPA--The state attorney's office in Port Elizabeth has lodged 71 replying affidavits and [word indistinct] with the registrar of the supreme court here following the order by Mr Justice Eksteen last September restraining the police from assaulting detainees in prisons in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage.

The order was made following an urgent application brought by Dr Wendy Orr, then a Port Elizabeth District surgeon, and 44 others. Another 93 supporting affidavits have since been filed.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gerrie van Rooyen, liaison officer for the police in the eastern Cape, confirmed today that the replying affidavits, by members of the police force and other witnesses, had been lodged.

The affidavits, which will be placed before the supreme court on Tuesday, cover more than 700 pages.

In her affidavit, Dr Orr said she believed there was an extensive pattern of police abuse on emergency detainees who were being "systematically" assaulted and abused.

She said detainees were being "brutally assaulted" while under interrogation, and complaints were being made "on a vast scale".

Because the police were acting under emergency regulations and apparently believed they enjoyed immunity, some of them were "quite unrestrained" in abusing detainees, Dr Orr, who leaves Port Elizabeth soon to take up a post in Johannesburg, said.

The applicants for the order included relations of detainees, as well as the Right Rev Bruce Evans, the Anglican Bishop of Port Elizabeth, the Rev George Irvine, head of the Methodist Church in the Eastern Cape, and two clergymen who were former detainees.

The order declared that no member of the police enjoyed immunity in terms of the emergency regulations against civil or criminal proceedings from any willful assault perpetrated on a detainee held under the regulations.

The prisons department was instructed by the judge to read out the order to prisoners at the jails concerned.

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CSO: 3400/1008

SOUTH AFRICA

WEEKLY MAIL CARRIES 'APARTHEID BAROMETER'

MB030426 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 31 Jan-6 Feb 86 p 4

["Apartheid Barometer"]

[Text] State of Emergency [SofE] Detentions (July 22 - January 23)

Number of people detained so far:	7,581
Number released:	7,230
Number still held on Jan 23:	351
Number still held on Jan 16:	341
Number detained Jan 16-23:	33

Unrest Deaths (South African Institute of Race Relations figures)

February 1984 - January 28, 1986:	1,205
September 1984 - Jan 28, 1986:	1,177
January 1, 1985 - Jan 28, 1986:	1,028
July 21, 1985 (SofE) - Jan 2, 1986:	694
Nov 2 (press clampdown)-Jan 29, 1986:	349
Jan 1, 1986 - Jan 28, 1986:	149

The unrest death rate so far for January 1986 is the second highest of any month for nearly two years.

Of the 149 people killed so far this month, 52 died in faction fighting in Natal and 19 in clashes between Moutse residents and Kwandebele vigilantes.

Influx Control Enforcement

(Race Relations 1984 survey)

Arrests and prosecutions

1981:	160,000
1982:	206,002
1983:	262,904 (161,443 by police and 101,461 by development board police)
1984:	163,862 (135,752 men and 28,110 women)



Total (1981-1984): 142,063

Arrests of Africans for trespassing: 104,607

Of the 273,577 Africans who appeared in Commissioner's Courts in 1983, mostly for pass offences, only 2,357 (less than one percent) had legal representation.

In a paper submitted to the Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty, Professor Michael Savage of the University of Cape Town claimed that more than 17,000,000 Africans had been arrested or prosecuted under the pass laws since the beginning of the century.

#### Banned Books, Publications and Objects

(Jan 17 - 24)

Political trials in South Africa--judicial instruments of repression May 1985 (SATIS London); Stir Vol 1, No 3 (Stir Vlaeberg)--the Publications Appeal Board set aside a committee decision that these publications were not undesirable; Review No 4 (unstated).

#### Unbanned:

Namibia--The Last Colony (Longman Grip Ltd., UK--unbanned for possession).

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SOUTH AFRICA

EDITOR EXAMINES ANC'S DECISION TO EXTEND ARMED STRUGGLE

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 4 No 4, 1985 pp 30, 33

[Article by Hugh Murray: "To Die Separately or Live Together"]

[Text]

"The (other) campaign that must continue to escalate is the one of extending the theatre of war into the white residential areas . . . It is high time now that we (the ANC) put paid to the notion that the struggle will remain confined to the black areas. We who have started confronting the enemy in all directions must make plans of extending our activities into the white areas. The regime's police and soldiers who have been massacring our people in millions over the years still return to their homes and spend comfortable nights in the warmth of their beds.

These angels of death have always regarded our townships as foreign countries away from theirs, where they can commit untold crimes and return to the calmness of their residential areas. That myth must now be shattered. They must be haunted by the mass offensive. We must attack them at their homes and holiday resorts just as we have been attacking black boot-lickers at their homes. This must now happen to their white colleagues.

All along it has only been the black mothers who have been mourning. Now the time has come that all of us must mourn.

White families must also wear black costumes." As it is intended to, this message will strike fear into the hearts of many. It was part of an ANC propaganda broadcast on Addis Ababa's Radio Freedom - in English - on October 7 this year, and was published in the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts.

And it raises some very real questions about how to deal with the ANC in future.

Three months ago, a group of South African businessmen talked to certain executives of the ANC - including the movement's president, Mr Oliver

Tambo - in Zambia. Those who attended the meeting, including this journalist, were by and large impressed with the tenor of discussions. Consensus among those present, and many others, was that the talks had been worthwhile, if only because the participants had come to a better understanding of one another.

One of the most important points made during those talks was, in my view, the ANC rebuttal of reports that it planned, as a deliberate strategy, to move the "armed struggle" into the white areas of South Africa. The explanation, offered by the movement's impressive communications chief, Thabo Mbeki, was that an intensification of the military struggle was necessary, and that as a result of this it was inevitable that civilians would die. At no point, he argued, had the ANC said it would attack civilians, and they had been badly misrepresented on this point. Indeed, Mbeki bemoaned the fact that the world's media were not prepared to redress this wrong interpretation of policy.

So what does the broadcast mean - that the ANC plans only to attack people connected with the Defence Force or Police? If so, the morality of that strategy will be lost on many.

Early in December, I read the BBC transcript of Oliver Tambo's Radio Freedom address dated September 7, 1985 - six days before the Mfuwe meeting. Said Tambo in a recorded message: "We cannot and should not allow a situation of relative peace and tranquillity to obtain in the white areas of the country while black townships are in flames. We must take the struggle into the white areas of South Africa and there attack the apartheid regime and its forces of repression . . ."

Another item from the October 7 transcription makes compelling, if alarming, reading:

"The privileged white community is armed to the teeth. Those weapons are also meant to mow down our people . . . Those weapons in white hands have to be transferred also. We have to use all means available to get them. In this regard we call on our compatriots who are working as domestic servants to take a leading role. They know where their employers keep their weapons and they are the ones who can devise plans of transferring the ownership of these weapons.

There are also weapons in the regime's police stations and barracks. Those weapons must be removed from the hands of these trigger-happy murderers. We can even buy some of these weapons from some of the employees if possible. We must also make a clarion call to those of our people who find themselves wearing the murderers' uniforms to use their positions to arm the nation. They can also start forming some small underground cells right inside the regime's barracks and find methods of smuggling weapons out of the armouries, risky as their position may be."

All stirring, deadly stuff – if you happen to be at the end of your tether with apartheid, unemployment and a heap of other troubles caused, in your perception, by the system.

From talking to many people in the ANC, I understand these are the traditional messages rammed home by its communist activists, more than its nationalist leaders. How successful these broadcasts are, one hesitates to guess. But it would be surprising if the transmissions were not jammed by the South Africans.

There is something quite chilling about seeing this kind of propaganda in print or hearing it on the radio. Perhaps this is something to which more people need to be exposed – though certainly not on the basis of selective quotation, the method employed here for the sake of this argument.

There is a wider picture that can only be seen and interpreted properly if continuous access to people and information is allowed. And while I carry no brief for the Nationalist government, one can see that the public stance of the ANC places it in a dilemma. On the one hand, the message is seditious, treasonous, but emotive enough to goad some into action. On the other, it is so repugnant to anyone who cherishes civilised values, that general access to the South African media could turn the ANC into its own worst enemy.

Paradoxically, it convinces me even further of the need for talks with the ANC. One must concede at

once that this is a risky business, and many of the government's reasons for not negotiating with the ANC remain persuasive.

The problem is that we may fail to come to terms with important realities if we simply rely on propaganda broadcasts and the like in making an assessment of people and political groupings. On this basis, very few would be acceptable. This is the public face of the ANC, though the quotations I have chosen to use hardly do credit to the wider issues surrounding the movement . . . I am not saying that privately they are *very* different. But *some* ANC leaders like Tambo, Mbeki and Mac Maharaj, have shown themselves willing to debate the issues quietly and constructively. And while I believe the time for further talks will not be appropriate unless they can be pursued quietly, out of the glare of the media spotlight, it is important that the debate around the ANC and its legitimacy as a movement continues.

A recent Human Sciences Research Council report puts ANC support among urban blacks at about 50 per cent. Is it conceivable that, at this stage, such a volume of people would back the strategy urged in the broadcasts? I doubt it. But the danger should not be ignored.

The black nationalists who comprise the bulk of ANC membership appear to be at loggerheads, philosophically, with the component from the South African Communist Party. The movement is united against apartheid, but one wonders what else. There can be little doubt that the black nationalists have no desire to inherit similar problems to the movements which "liberated" Mozambique or Angola. At least this is what they have told me in a number of discussions.

Privately, they also admit that they have few of the skills needed to run such a finely balanced economy as South Africa's without damaging it, perhaps irreparably. By contrast, the communists would be happy to take the country by any means, and in any condition.

The ANC talks optimistically of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa. One wonders how its unity would fare, however, if it became a legitimate political party and had to draw up an election manifesto. After all, many senior members of the ANC concede that the Freedom Charter is an obsolete instrument, long overdue for re-drafting. As such its power to weld nationalists and communists must be limited. Yet Tambo says that, presently, the Freedom Charter is the one instrument which does keep nationalist and communist together.

In spite of predictable denials to the contrary, the communists certainly hold the trump card, if not

majority support. By Tambo's admission the ANC has never had to buy a weapon. He receives all arms free from the Soviets, though he claims that money for general usage also comes from other sources. If the armed struggle escalates, it is clear that the SACP and its Moscow connection will become more important. There is also a distinct danger that the SACP will yet wrest control from Tambo, an avowed non-communist, if he takes a too conciliatory line.

Those who know him, and have spoken to him have been impressed by his preparedness to listen to the other man's point of view. The communists, however, reckon this is a dangerous strategy – and could lead to a softening of resolution to continue the armed struggle.

Joe Slovo, a member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the SACP, who is a member of the ANC's National Executive, has made himself quite clear in this regard. In a broadcast on Radio Freedom on October 6 this year, Slovo warned: "We must be careful not to allow ourselves to become victims of the enemy's dirty tricks. Brother must not fight brother, comrade must not fight comrade... The (Communist) party is also a part of the vital alliance at the head of which stands the ANC. The enemy, in desperation, continually attempts to spread the lie that in this alliance it is the (communist) party that dominates, it is the party which is attempting to infiltrate and undermine its partner, the ANC."

Talking about the people, Slovo says: "They have developed the one quality without which a revolutionary struggle is impossible – that is the contempt for death. And we are witnessing a position in which every coffin draped in the flag of the movements – coffins of our heroes – recruits thousands more into the ranks of the struggle instead of humbling them into submission."

This is the zealot with whom Tambo has to come to terms, and I would suggest there is nothing of the peacemaker in him.

Thus, members of the group that went to Zambia for talks with Tambo will be interested, as I was, to read the BBC transcript of his talk on Radio Freedom in which he dealt with the discussions (October 15, 1985). Asked whether businessmen and industrialists have any role to play in the "destruction of a monstrous system" Tambo replied:

"There is room for their participation. We don't expect them, and would not expect them, to go more than a bit of the way along with us. They assess the apartheid system in terms of the profits or losses it yields. It has always been clear that for them the apartheid system will be useful for as long as it delivers the goods. If they reach the conclusion

that, indeed, the whole apartheid system is going to destroy their businesses, even the whole economy, at that point they will want to remove the apartheid system and will even join with forces that are set to destroy the system, provided they are sure that the system will not be replaced with something worse for their economy, for their pockets, for their profits.

But to the extent that our struggle has demonstrated that there is no future for them, or even for the economy, to that extent they will begin to move against the regime. Within limits, because they are still part of it, it means they can be an additional lever – a position which favours our struggle. And that is how we see their role.

If it serves the purposes of weakening the ability of the regime to resist, if it helps to destroy the system, then we welcome that. I want the business people – of course they want – to do it peacefully. The reason they want to do it peacefully is because it is the armed component of our struggle which causes the greatest threat to the apartheid system and its economy, and under conditions of our struggle there is instability.

They would rather, therefore, that the changes were smooth, so that they have time to adjust to the change, by way of reforms, which means that there would be no rapid transformation, and we would be talking and arguing about things while they are making their profits for 10, 20 or 30 years. It is the armed struggle which has made them want to come to the ANC, to see whether there is any prospect of this being suspended.

We told them we could not abandon the armed struggle because it was a direct product of the apartheid system. And this affects the extent to which they can really come on our side.

What replaces the apartheid system? What would be their position in the new system? Well, they cannot look forward to the kind of system that the ANC has in mind under the Freedom Charter, but at least they understood the reasons why the Freedom Charter had those provisions.

They also want to reform the apartheid system in such a way that the end result is a system which secures their businesses completely but is minus racial determination. And that is what they are looking for – a system that falls short of the stipulations of the Freedom Charter, but moves away from a system that thrives on violence and produces counter-violence. Well, we do not think that such a system is different."

It would have been surprising if Tambo had taken a

different line in his own constituency – nor, indeed, did he adopt a much different approach with those of SA's business leaders who visited Zambia.

Yet there was something indefinable there – a glimmer of something else. Conciliation is too strong a word. Only time, and eventually more contact, will clarify what it was.

But there will be no quick fix with the ANC. Attitudes, some of them regrettably destructive, have hardened on both sides. And just as it is unwise to underestimate the influence of the ANC, so is it very foolish indeed to sell short the South African authorities.

There is still an iron resolve to rule, and very few options have yet been exercised. As the State of Emergency has demonstrated, the government can contain the violence to a surprising degree. The ANC is *not* about to seize power, no matter how hyped up the organisation may be at the moment.

Everyone demands change from the government. But if the excerpts published from BBC transcripts of ANC policy broadcasts are anything to go by, I would suggest Mr Tambo also goes back to the drawing board.

Until he stops trying to sell violence-related policies here, or in the West, he will have no real success – and rightly so – no matter how charismatic he is.

The world may be ready for change in South Africa. The majority of South Africans certainly are. They want to live together – not die separately.

Therefore, few will endorse the kind of tyranny articulated by the voice of Radio Freedom.

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CSO: 3400/1001



SOUTH AFRICA

INEVITABLE END OF APARTHEID DISCUSSED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 4 No 4, 1985 pp 55, 56, 57, 59

[Article by John Kane-Berman: "The Crumbling of Apartheid"]

[Text]

South Africa is not an easy country to view objectively.

Six years ago a senior minister said that apartheid was dead. But if you happen to be a black teenager whose father has been dismissed for going on strike, who is studying in an over-crowded classroom with a badly under-qualified teacher, using the floor as your desk, with no heating in winter, no money to buy stationery or set books, who probably went to school that morning, like every other morning without breakfast, and whose family is about to be evicted because it can no longer pay the rent, nothing has changed - except that the anger which has been building up feels like a mighty force capable of breaking your oppressor in half.

If you happen to be a semi-literate migrant worker retrenched at 24 hours' notice, evicted from your room in your employer's back yard and then thrown into jail because you did not leave the white town and cannot pay the heavier fine imposed a few years ago for pass law violations, you know not anger so much as despair. The only place in the country where the apartheid laws allow you to be is a homeland but there are no jobs there. Apartheid is not dead for you either.

On the other hand, if you are a white production worker in a motor assembly plant who now reports to a black supervisor earning more than you do, and who has had to swallow his pride as a white man and go and ask the shop steward of a black trade union for help because the white union's shop steward could not sort out your difficulties with management, the world is changing, although you are not yet sure whether it's for the better or for worse. But if you happen to be an elder of the Hervormde Kerk from a small country

town where blacks are not allowed into the church services, who has come to Johannesburg, is staying in a three-star hotel, and finds that the occupants of the room down the passage are a black pop singer and his white girl-friend, the value system of a lifetime is in tatters.

All four of these pictures are simultaneously true. They are contradictory pictures of the same reality, and they illustrate how difficult it is to look at South Africa objectively. We must nevertheless try to do so.

Apartheid is a system so comprehensive and pervasive that it is hard to think of any aspect of life in South Africa that is not in some way shaped by it. It touches everyone but it is the black people who are the victims. This system, backed as it is by military and police forces, a largely self-sufficient arms industry, detention without trial, and the like, is beginning to crumble. The process will be too slow to prevent a steady deterioration in race relations and continuing outbreaks of violence, but it cannot now be stopped.

TREND TOWARDS DESEGREGATION

The medium-term problem South Africa faces is that of building something in the place of apartheid, while the longer-term problem is one of repairing the serious economic damage already caused by it and preventing the country from being overwhelmed by unemployment, poverty, degradation and all the other tragedies that have already overtaken parts of Africa.

Most obviously, social segregation is beginning to crumble. For the first 30 years of its post-war rule, which began in 1948, the National Party government

assumed more and more powers to impose segregation in every walk of life. The trend of policy is now towards desegregation. When the new State Theatre was opened in Pretoria a few years ago the authorities said it would be for whites only.

Now not only have all theatres been desegregated but the chorus in the government-financed opera company based at the State Theatre now contains black faces. Sports facilities, hotels, restaurants, and cinemas are now also being desegregated. Some of the big hotel chains are looking towards the black market as their main source of custom in the years ahead.

The process of social desegregation has only just begun, but where it has occurred, it has been remarkably free of unpleasant incident, which not only shows up the hollowness of the conventional white view that social apartheid is necessary to prevent racial "friction" but also undermines the racial stereotypes on which the entire system rests.

There is a certain logic in desegregation in one field leading to desegregation in another, and the fact that social desegregation has been eased without incident must have played a part in encouraging the authorities to take the next logical step, the repeal of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and of the clause in the Immorality Act which outlaws sexual intercourse across the colour line.

## INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

None of these changes affects the balance of black/white bargaining power in South Africa. However, the same cannot be said of the recent changes in the industrial relations field, which are by far the most important that have occurred. Ten years ago black trade unions had no statutory rights, and state and employers alike were almost uniformly hostile towards them. Since 1979, however, black workers have had the same legal trade union rights as workers of other races. These rights were gained not because the government or employers had a rush of liberal blood to the head, but because black unions got themselves organised on the factory floor and demonstrated so effectively an ability to use collective action that state and employers alike had reluctantly to accept that black trade unions could not be crushed and therefore had better be brought into the official bargaining framework.

South Africa's industrial relations laws are thus now effectively colour-blind. Unlike the desegregation of theatres or hotels, which benefits a relatively small and privileged class of people, the industrial relations reforms benefit some of the poorest people.

Perhaps the most important point to emerge from the advent of black trade unionism is that this important reform has also been accomplished with remarkable smoothness. Attempts by the right wing of the white labour movement to whip up a revolt against black unions were largely a failure, and certainly the government paid a remarkably low price for it in the 1981 general election.

The change that has taken place in the official attitude to black trade unions is being accompanied by other changes in the labour field – the abolition of the statutory industrial colour bar and the opening up to blacks of the apprenticeship system. It was as recent as 1971 that a government White Paper said the blacks should not be trained for skilled jobs in the white-designated areas. This aspect of apartheid in industry is being abolished, the reason being that the government has finally realised that continued economic growth now depends crucially on skilled black manpower, as the white population approaches zero growth and immigration fails to make much of an impact on the skills shortage.

One important consequence of the realisation that continued economic growth and therefore continued white prosperity depend on accepting blacks as full economic participants is the discontinuation over the last 10 years of the policy of financing black education on a shoestring because blacks were not intended to perform anything except labouring jobs. When the National Party government took over black education in 1953, the state was spending about seven times as much on the education of each white schoolchild as on the education of each black schoolchild. The gap widened to about 18 to 1 in the early Seventies, since when it has steadily narrowed until it is now back to the 1953 level. This trend will certainly continue now that the government has formally committed itself to equality in education.

The attainment of real educational equality is nevertheless a long way off, because the backlogs of classrooms and qualified teachers, which are the result of generations of neglect, are enormous. Whether South Africa even has the financial resources to eliminate them is open to question. Another major problem is that the government is still committed to educational apartheid. Controlled as it is by 18 different departments, the entire structure of education in South Africa is riddled with apartheid.

White universities are now permitted to admit more blacks than in the past (although they are still about 86 per cent white), and the government is turning a blind eye to those few private schools that are desegre-

lating themselves, but the maintenance of segregated government schools is near the top of the government's list of non-negotiables. This is likely to remain a continuing source of profound resentment among young blacks. We are also in the absurd situation where there is a desperate need for more black teachers and more black artisans and technicians, but segregated white teacher and technical colleges sometimes stand half-empty.

Before proceeding further it is necessary to refer to two sets of the most fundamental apartheid laws: the Land Acts and the pass laws. The former, which date back to 1911, are the basis of territorial apartheid. They divide the country into the white-designated areas, comprising about 86 per cent of the land surface, and the 10 homelands set aside for blacks, comprising the remaining 14 per cent.

The pass laws regulate the presence of blacks in the white-designated areas, the underlying principle being that they are welcome there only for as long as their labour is required. About half of the black population resides in the white-designated areas, but they have never been allowed to own property there as this would imply a permanent status incompatible with the notion that their presence is for labouring purposes only.

The construction of black housing in most black townships in the white-designated areas was thus frozen in the late Sixties, the idea being that blacks should go and build houses in the homelands. Couple this with the idea that blacks should lose their South African citizenship in favour of homeland citizenship, and you create a situation where black workers are merely foreign guest workers in the white-designated areas, like Italians working in Germany or Moroccans in France. This is classical, orthodox apartheid ideology: guest worker status and foreign citizenship, franchise rights being exercised not where you work but in the homeland to which you have been assigned.

This entire edifice is now beginning to crumble. The housing freeze in Soweto and a number of other large townships was lifted a few years ago. The government has recently also finally agreed to grant freehold home ownership rights to blacks in the white-designated areas. This is a policy somersault and a step of great symbolic importance, because it recognises the permanent status of black people outside the homelands. The President's Council, a statutory body closely linked to Parliament, has recommended the abolition of pass laws.

The crumbling of classical apartheid with regard to land rights and permanent status is now extending to political rights. Broadly speaking, the policy of the

government has been that blacks should exercise their political rights exclusively through the homelands, irrespective of whether they wished to do this, whether they had ever been resident in a homeland, or whether they ever wished to settle in one. But the government has now admitted that permanent black communities outside the homelands "consist largely of people who cannot and do not find satisfactory political expression through their contact" with the homelands.

It has stated that it does not intend forcing independence on homelands that do not wish to take it, which means that it has also abandoned any notion of fulfilling its dream of a South Africa entirely purged of black citizens, since blacks automatically lose their South African citizenship when and if the homeland to which they have been politically assigned becomes an independent state. In fact, it is now talking of restoring South African citizenship to blacks who lost it when four of the homelands became constitutionally separate states.

The crumbling of apartheid is going to be a long, untidy, and cumbersome process. When an entire political structure, with hundreds of laws to back it, has been built up over nearly 40 years with the single overriding purpose of imposing apartheid in every nook and cranny of national life, it cannot simply be stopped overnight. Apartheid is a bureaucratic machine with a momentum of its own. It does not need daily policy decisions and directives to happen. There are thousands of bureaucrats who have been hired to implement various aspects of the grand design, and they go to work each morning and simply take up the process of implementation where they left off when they went home the afternoon before.

This is why I have talked not about the dismantling of apartheid, but about the crumbling of apartheid. There is certainly no systematic plan by the South African Government to dismantle it. One can expect that, far from devising such a plan, the government will hang on to as much of its old ideology as it can, and that it will pursue yet more dead-end policies before it finds that they, too, will not work. There are signs that it may try to do this with the pass laws, for example. But the reality is that, behind the smokescreens and the confusion, the pillars of the temple are crumbling.

The fits and starts, and the familiar process of two steps forward and one step back should not be allowed to conceal the fundamental truth that has become apparent in the last eighteen months: the National Party has stopped believing in its own ideology. There was a time when the answer to almost any social and economic problem could be found in the gospel of

classical apartheid. The realities are now crowding in on the National Party so forcibly, and the pressures against them mounting so strongly, that they are no longer sure that their equivalent of the little red book contains all the answers.

### REAPING THE WHIRLWIND

When I say that the National Party no longer believes in its own ideology, I am not saying that it shows a loss of confidence in its ability to rule, or a reluctance to use the power of the state to crush rebellion. This power has hardly been tapped. The South African Government is not a colonial regime fighting a distant war or occupying a foreign country. It is fighting on home ground, and any suggestion that the security of the state is fundamentally threatened by the recent violence and turmoil in many black townships is fanciful.

It is no coincidence that the current wave of township violence began last year in the very week in September when the new South African constitution came into effect. The single most important features of the new constitution are the incorporation of the coloured and Indian minorities into the hitherto whites-only Parliament, and the exclusion of blacks. The country is now reaping the whirlwind.

A senior minister recently admitted: "We failed to reckon with the great bitterness and frustration evoked in blacks by what they regard as their exclusion from constitutional development." Indeed, the government has been so taken aback at the violent disturbances that the new constitution precipitated among blacks, that it has now put black constitutional reform back on its agenda.

Apartheid, once so confidently and arrogantly on the offensive, is now on the defensive. I am well aware that tomorrow's newspapers could carry a front page report of some new horror, some ghastly slaughter, some fresh act of astonishing brutality. I am nevertheless convinced that the system is collapsing in the face of its own contradictions. For apartheid rests on the fundamental absurdity that one can make use of blacks as labour but deny their existence as people. The new constitution attempted to impose on South Africa a system of political segregation at the very moment when the momentum towards economic integration had become unstoppable. One or the other had to give, and it cannot, in my opinion, be denied that economic integration is beginning to win the day.

Although the government has stated its commitment to political negotiation with blacks about constitutional change, and claims to be talking to a number of black leaders through a new constitutional

forum, it has not really begun to contemplate political change fundamental enough to win acceptance among black people. State President, P W Botha has introduced more policy changes than probably any prime minister since Union, but he does not seem to be aware of the great depths of frustration and anger – to use mild words – among blacks.

Not one of the black leaders presently holding discussions with the government in its new constitutional forum has enough of a political power base to be able to make any political deal with the government that could command support from even a substantial minority of black opinion. There are important leaders within the country who, I believe, would be willing to enter into political negotiations through the forum. However, President Botha has failed to make it politically possible for them to do so because he has not so far given an unambiguous indication that the purpose of the talks is to find a formula to bring blacks into Parliament rather than to enlist their co-operation in some new variation of racially separate structures. The nettle of a single parliament simply has to be grasped.

### POLITICAL STALEMATE

The distinguished South African writer, Mr Alan Paton, said at a major public address delivered under the auspices of the South African Institute of Race Relations earlier this year that he did not believe that whites could ever be induced to accept a political system based on one man, one vote in a unitary state. He urged the government to give serious consideration to federalism as an alternative. Mr Botha, however, said on a British television programme a few days later that he ruled out federation totally. The traditional demand of black South Africans – which transcends all political differences between them – is for one man, one vote in a unitary state.

Important black leaders within the country have nevertheless stated their willingness to compromise, not on universal suffrage, but on the principle of a unitary state, because they recognise that the great white fear of black majority rule cannot be wished away. There have also been indications that some of the important black leaders in exile would not be averse to talking about federalism. Until Mr Botha agrees that some sort of federal option can at least be discussed, the political stalemate between blacks and whites will continue.

Black anger and white fear are the two most powerful forces in South Africa and there is no future outside of a compromise between them. Statesmanship on both sides is required. But Mr Botha is the one with the power, so it is up to him to make the first bold, magnanimous, and concrete gesture.



SOUTH AFRICA

SLABBERT DISCUSSES HOPE FOR RECONCILIATION

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 4 No 4, 1985 pp 78, 79, 80, 82

[Interview with Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the opposition, by Professor David Welsh, date and place not given: "Honest Broker"]

[Text] *Few political figures in South Africa command a respect that transcends traditional party lines. That is why Van Zyl Slabbert is so crucial a figure today. His party's electoral base may be small in comparison with that of the Nationalists, but his influence is considerable.*

*A major component of this respect is simply explained: Slabbert is decent and straightforward. One need never be suspicious of being*

*conned or tricked. Even his opponents acknowledge this.*

*There are many who believe Slabbert to be the vital broker who could persuade warring groups to arbitrate their differences and negotiate.*

*Leadership asked David Welsh, Professor of Southern African Studies at the University of Cape Town, to interview Dr Slabbert.*

Welsh: What level of job satisfaction do you have as Leader of the Opposition?

Slabbert: I never know how to answer this question. My job satisfaction is reasonably high in the sense that I am absorbed in what I am doing, so it is exciting, it's challenging, but it's also very tiring and sometimes very frustrating. I do get hankerings after academic life, particularly when I think back on seminar situations and the discussions one can have; but generally speaking I would say that I have been intellectually more stimulated since I have gone into politics than when I was in academe.

Welsh: What has the repeal of the Political Interference Act meant to the PFP?

Slabbert: I think we never underestimated the difficulty of becoming a non-racial party in a racially-structured society. The repeal of the Political Interference Act was one specific and necessary measure, but to become a non-racial party in a society

socially structured on racial lines, is not very easy. Quite frankly, what do you say to a black person about the advantages of joining the PFP? It's supporting a philosophy, it's supporting certain policies and principles, but it doesn't have immediate and obvious advantages for that person *within* the community in which he or she finds itself. But I still think it's important to go ahead and recruit on a non-racial basis as widely as possible, simply to make the point that this is a new possibility.

Welsh: Do you suppose the kind of alliance that the PFP is building could become a powerful factor in South African politics?

Slabbert: I certainly hope so, and I certainly would go on trying to bring that about, but here again I think one has to understand that the apartheid structure that has been built up over the last 37 years has placed people in different contexts and different positions from which they have tried, in



their particular way, to oppose the system. That's why there is what I always call "a crisis of strategy", in opposing apartheid in South Africa.

You have people who will not participate in racially-structured organisations. You have people who will not tolerate any organisations involved in Parliament. You have the old "inside/outside-the-system" debate. I have always argued that until those who genuinely oppose apartheid and wish to bring about a non-racial democratic alternative can resolve these strategic debates, until they can resolve their own sensitivity about these issues, it is going to be very difficult to have a consolidated broad-based opposition to the apartheid structure.

**Welsh:** Is it not necessary for blacks to come into the system before there is much hope for progress?

**Slabbert:** This is going to depend very much on white initiative and black response to it. I opposed the tricameral system very strongly and I still do – I think it is a useless constitutional set-up – but the one thing it did do was to co-opt people of other colour into the centre of power, and that generated the whole new dynamic we are experiencing at the moment.

The problem now is how can blacks get access to the centre? Is it going to be through co-optation? Is it going to be through negotiation? Is it going to be through violence and revolution? Until that problem is resolved, I can't see how we are going to make any progress in getting rid of apartheid.

**Welsh:** If you look at the changes that have taken place in industrial bargaining over the last seven or eight years, it seems to me that there you have a possible parallel – legislation passed by this Parliament creating structures, facilities for black movements. It seems to me that they have come on board and they have had a profound impact.

**Slabbert:** Yes, but I think the point one has to make here is that this is a clear example of an interaction between government initiative and black response to this. You know, the opportunity had to be created before it could be exploited, and although the government may have eased up on labour legislation for their own particular

purposes, worker unions seized on these new opportunities for *their* particular purposes. In that interaction I think they have been effective and I think the underlying principle here is of engaging the system, and not being seduced by it or co-opted into it, and being neutralised.

Now, the equivalent of what happened in the labour field, I believe, has to happen on the political and community level before you are really going to have an effective engagement, politically or constitutionally, of the apartheid regime – where you can stiffen that type of opposition.

**Welsh:** This would presumably require some considerable incentives offered by the government before it would be a realistic possibility. What incentives do you suppose might be sufficient?

**Slabbert:** I don't work so much on the question of incentives as on the question of the government having to relinquish control. In other words, they have to relinquish control on a community level in black townships. So, to the extent that they give that kind of autonomy, I believe that autonomy should be seized to demand more autonomy and to demand more involvement.

Obviously, it's not an easy one. I personally think that the new Regional Services Councils are abominations; they don't really relinquish control. They decentralise functions while centralising power – that's not the same thing. I would say to the extent that government is going to decentralise power, those areas should be seized upon, because that's effectively what happened in the labour field. They relinquished power; they said, "You can now organise and bargain for yourself", hoping that they would bargain in such a way that it would satisfy the needs and goals of government, and they did exactly the opposite.

Now I can see the same thing happening in the political field and that's not so much a question of dispensing patronage or handing out incentives as actually saying, "Well you know, I can't administer the thing on my own. You have to take charge of a certain corner of political administration." They may do it for their purposes, but the blacks will say, "Sorry. This is the way we are going to do it", and I think this is the kind of development we are heading for.

Welsh: How do you think Afrikaner Nationalists regard you – why do they not move to support you openly?

Slabbert: It is not very difficult to understand. There are many elements that come into play. One is obviously the tribal connection, but I don't set a high store by that. Far more important is the power of patronage. This determines career opportunities and is a very powerful incentive to keep the people within the Nationalist Party.

In addition, you have a dominant establishment which can prevent people from following their convictions.

Welsh: How can the PFP extend its base among Afrikaners?

Slabbert: I think that we simply haven't the infrastructure, politically speaking, for moving into a grass-roots Afrikaner market – to go to Malmesbury, Piketberg or Pietersberg and say, "Let's take them by storm". We haven't a newspaper that supports our point of view in Afrikaans, and we don't have easy access to public-controlled media, to TV – although we get more exposure now.

I think the kind of impact we have on Afrikaners is on the opinion leader, on academics – that's where we can engage. I make a point of going to all the Afrikaans universities every year or whenever they ask me, and talking to them there.

If anything has happened to break down Afrikaner hegemony over the last 10 years, I would say it would be

loss of ideological control, ideological cohesion, loss of intellectual commitment, intellectual conviction about the workability of that system – which is another way of saying that the young Afrikaner academic, intellectual, poet, artist has abandoned the tribe. From that point of view, he is no longer part of it. And that is a very, very important political life support system in any movement. Once you start losing that kind of support, you end up with mediocrity, and we are blessed with mediocrity in abundance at the moment as far as the Nationalist Party is concerned.

Welsh: You recently talked to the ANC. Did you come away with the view that the ANC was a body that was reasonable, in the sense that under certain circumstances it would be prepared to negotiate – that it was not simply a show of sham preparedness to negotiate that they put on for you?

Slabbert: Let me begin by saying that in any conflict situation no side that defines the conflict as winnable on its terms is going to be prepared to negotiate or even pretend that it will negotiate. In talking to the ANC, the impression that I had was that there were clear circumstances under which they ~~were~~ prepared to consider talking, negotiating, and so on, and we tried to pin them down on those conditions.

They are not going to negotiate as long as apartheid structures continue. When I talk about apartheid structures I am talking about those structures that depend on the Population Registration Act for their continuation and their existence – the Group Areas Act, compulsory group membership in an ethnic group or a racial group and so on. There is *no* way they will negotiate as long as those structures persist.

There is also no way that they will negotiate as long as they, or other organisations are not allowed to peacefully organise and enlist support in South Africa. Also, they will not negotiate as long as they feel their leaders are in jail or detained or their meetings banned. But I do think that if they can see that there is a dismantling of those apartheid structures and conditions of voluntary association beginning to develop, they will be quite prepared to negotiate an alternative democratic constitution for the country.

I again put the question: "Do you mean *your* democratic system? Must it be one-man-one-vote majority rule?", and they said: "No – we can negotiate the exact structure". I can simply say this is what I picked up from them. One could be cynical and say, "look, they may have given me a good public relations exercise". I would say, it's very difficult to sustain that level of acting over 72 hours.

Whether the people I spoke to represent the total view within the ANC and whether they can make that view binding on, say, their latent support inside South Africa, that is a problem of a different order. I am

not for one minute saying that the angry black youngster in the township, who feels that at the moment throwing rocks is the only way he can satisfy his anger and his sense of deprivation, is going to accept those decisions; that's yet another problem. But I certainly came away from that weekend thinking that it wasn't a "total-commitment-to-armed-struggle-until-they-were-victorious" kind of situation.

**Welsh:** The old accusation which the government so often trots out about the ANC being essentially a communist front – did you come away with any sense of how strong the Communist Party is in relation to the ANC?

**Slabbert:** It was difficult to assess. I did ask the question. They made the point that there were communists in the ANC but that they were not dominated by the communists nor taking orders from Moscow. They negotiated with governments as an autonomous body. The ANC was tolerant of the communists in their midst, but were certainly demanding of them to give their prior allegiance to the ANC.

I think the important point here is not to see the ANC as a political party. It isn't a political party. The ANC is an alliance really, and it's an alliance-in-opposition. What I am very interested to see is what would happen to the ANC once it actually committed itself to a particular policy, to a constitution, an economic philosophy or economic policy. Would it break up, would it split into different factions?

How reconcilable are the nationalist and the communist part of the ANC in a post-apartheid South Africa? That's the really interesting question. Once the object of their unity, namely the apartheid regime, was no longer in power, would they have the same degree of solidarity in trying to participate in a democratic alternative or a free-enterprise mixed economy, or must it be socialist? Those questions have never really been resolved within the ANC because there is a strategic solidarity in opposition to the apartheid structure.

**Welsh:** If they tried to resolve them now would it have dangerous implications for this "coalition of interests"?

**Slabbert:** Oh yes, I think so. I think the same applies to the UDF inside South Africa. The UDF was born in opposition to

the tricameral system, so that decides their political action. That's the major motive that keeps them going. But if you had to ask the UDF what kind of constitution they think would work for South Africa and they had to move away from the clichés of "power to the people" and, "democratic forces unite" and that kind of thing – the result would be interesting!

**Welsh:** You have been critical of big business in the past, particularly because much of big business voted "yes" in the constitutional referendum of 1983, but would you say that the stance it has adopted over the past year or more is encouraging?

**Slabbert:** What is particularly interesting is that all business is beginning to realise apartheid is *bad* for business. In the long run, it is bad not only because it affects profits but because, if business does not make its stand clear on apartheid, it is assumed more and more (as you very well know) that apartheid and free enterprise are actually just the flip side of the same coin – that you can only have the kind of free enterprise we have in South Africa because you have apartheid.

Now there is a certain truth to that because there are a lot of millionaires in South Africa who made their money very handsomely through the apartheid era. But there is also a recognition, and it is a growing one, that apartheid is contrary to the interests of economic growth, to the free-enterprise ethic and the free-enterprise system, and I think business has suddenly begun to stiffen its back against the apartheid regime on this particular issue.

This is not very difficult to understand. If you look at the price of the rand and you look what's happening to foreign confidence in our political stability, and you look at what domestic companies are saying to us – they are giving us a very simple message. The climate that has been brought about by apartheid after 37 years is simply not conducive to good business.

**Welsh:** As regards the question of business people in politics, what role do you think they should play, and perhaps even more important, what role *can* they play?

**Slabbert:** I think one of the enduring myths in South Africa, even now, is that business should not get involved in

politics, and particularly party politics. I think more and more businessmen are beginning to discover that the very way in which they run their operations is deeply involved in the politics of this country. I mean, recruiting labour, training labour, looking after the social circumstances of your labour force – these have immediate political consequences and that's why businessmen have said "do away with influx control".

I remember very well, eight years ago, when businessmen were horrified at the prospect of influx control being abandoned, and there was no way in which they could see that influx control itself was making their labour force less effective, and therefore affecting the business itself. More and more, I think business is going to have to get up and say that those laws, those policies have to go, not only because they are morally bad or because they are racist and so on, but because business cannot provide the taxes which the government demands in order to administer its social, economic and political programmes.

That's why businessmen, if they want to continue to do business, will have to take a more overt political stance. I don't think that they have much choice in that.

**Welsh:** When you talk about a more overt stance, what do you mean? How do businessmen actually engage the system?

Slabbert: They can do it in a number of ways: they can do it through what I would call special interest organisations, like the Urban Foundation, the Institute of Race Relations, or through their own particular lobbies – the FCI, Assocom, Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut. They can do it by just being a lobby against government and I think they can do it by supporting political parties, by getting involved with political parties. Why not? After all, businessmen have been involved politically or are politically involved in any other society. American politics couldn't survive if you didn't have your Democratic and Republican businessmen. In South Africa you have this pretence that businessmen are not involved in politics, either Nationalist or PFP, but then secretly they funnel a lot of

funds into the dominant party because the dominant party has the patronage and determines contracts and so on. It's just an illusion to say that businessmen are not politically involved and then give money to the Nationalist Party in order to ensure that their contracts continue.

**Welsh:** Can you foresee any kind of circumstances in which business could, as it were, hold the government to ransom?

Slabbert: I don't know whether it could hold it to ransom, but I can see – and it's happening now – that business is simply saying, "we are not going to do business, we are not going to expand, we are not going to decentralise for ideological purposes, do whatever you want to. We are not going to give you the benefit of our economic development so that you can use it to service apartheid structures". That is what businessmen will be saying. The more they do that, the more they drive home to the government that the kind of political programmes it has in mind are simply of such a nature that businessmen cannot support them. You cannot make the money to support them. Take the question of economic decentralisation. Nobody objects to that, but economic decentralisation is usually a consequence of growth, not an alternative to growth. Yet here we try and say, "go to the rural areas and start a new industrial growth point". In the old days, the border industrial development programme was based on the assumption that businessmen would go there voluntarily in order to help the homelands policy get off the ground. We have now realised that that is not going to help. And yet, government is spending millions of rands in getting economic decentralisation going.

**Welsh:** You have always drawn a distinction between simple majoritarianism and democracy. I wonder if you could explain that, and say whether the kind of proposals which the PFP makes have some chance of general acceptability among blacks?

Slabbert: I think the reason this idea of the sanctity of the majority holds such a powerful centre spot in South Africa and Africa, is that we have inherited British parliamentary tradition.

But in fact if one looks around the world where there is functioning democracy, you don't have simple majorities operating; you



have checks and balances, you have proportional representation, you have division of power. In the American federation for example, there is a division of power, checks and balances built in there. There is no single site of decision-making where a simple majority determines what the policy will be for the rest of the country, and I believe particularly in a country such as South Africa, and in many African countries for that matter, simple majoritarianism leads to a kind of simplistic tyranny that cannot sustain any kind of democratic government.

So for me, it is not trying to avoid the consequences of the majority of people in South Africa being black and being involved in politics. My more generic problem is: how can you get democratic government going in a country such as ours? Even if you didn't have one white person in South Africa, I believe, as I believe for countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania, that a simple majoritarian kind of democracy cannot survive, because the political forces in those countries will not let it survive.

In South Africa, I feel strongly that things like a federal structure, proportional representation, a division between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, a Bill of Rights, an independent strong judiciary, a fairly strong constitution, are all constitutional mechanisms that can assist in maintaining democratic government. But, we have also argued very strongly that a constitution doesn't survive because of the eloquence of the clauses in it. Constitutions survive because people have a commitment to a democratic kind of government. We

have to develop a feel for democracy in South Africa. We have to develop a feel for democratic government that must be reflected in a constitution that has been bargained, because if we don't develop that kind of a feel, no constitution is going to survive, and no democracy can survive. That's why whites are doing the idea of a democratic government so much harm by saying, "look at the rest of Africa, they have one-party states". Well, we have had a one-party state for 37 years. They argue that South Africa is not ready for a democracy, and that the only way you can preserve a democracy is to withhold it from the majority of the people in the society.

**Welsh:** Are you optimistic or pessimistic, in general terms?

Slabbert: I am hopeful but not optimistic, if I can draw that distinction. Optimism means that you just think things are going to come right. I live on hope. Being a politician, I have to live on hope, but I am not all that optimistic. I have no easy optimism to dispense.

**Welsh:** But you don't subscribe to any *götterdämmerung*?

Slabbert: You mean "the crunch"? No! I don't have any kind of crunch vision of the future. If we had a crunch that was short, sharp and sweet, you could at least hold your breath and hope to survive it, but we are not going to have that. It's going to be a long, dreary, hard, tough bargaining situation in which we will hover between siege and co-operation for a long time, I'm afraid.

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SOUTH AFRICA

LEADING ARCHITECT PROPOSES OPENING CITIES TO ALL RACES

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 4 No 4, 1985 pp 90, 92, 94, 95

[Article by Hans Hallen: "Of Dreams and Cities"]

[Text]

Our divided cities are split not only by race, privilege, and political rights but by the manner in which the two halves are planned and developed. And as in the parable of Naboth's Vineyard, the price of the follies of the Group Areas Act is now being paid.

These have been well described by others and do not require much elaboration. But as there is a broadly-based support for the free-enterprise system which extends from its inclusion in the constitution, to statements by political leaders and prominent figures in business life, I intend here only a reminder of what a broader application of its principles could mean for our cities – and what for some it has meant during their lives.

It was stated firmly, some years ago, of Umlazi (a large 20-year-old township south west of Durban) that it was on its way to becoming a large city. Something similar has been said of Soweto and more recently Khayelitsha. The latter is described as having in its plans all those amenities that make a big town and eventually, I guess, a city.

Cities are, however, made up of more ingredients than are described in a comprehensive list of physical amenities, of houses, shopping centres, schools, civic complexes and the like.

I was born in Durban, of Norwegian parents, in what was then a predominantly English-speaking city, and for many it was, in a sense, still tied to the gradually subsiding and physically distant empire. All around in my community were signs of city-making. There were builders big and small, builders' suppliers, agents for property and insurance, lawyers and con-

veyancers, architects and engineers. Those in my community were Norwegian, which they spoke as a language of choice and in which they made their speeches, sang in choirs, used in the writing and reading of poetry and verse and it was the language in which they worshipped, celebrated – and, on occasion, argued!

They had arrived, in the main, at the end of the last century and during the first half of this, pushed by lack of opportunity at home and driven by a spirit of adventure. They came from towns, villages and remote farms, and South Africa was for many who emigrated from Europe, the place of second or third choice after America and Australia. But Durban attracted a larger number than most because Norwegians had started the whaling industry, were involved in shipping and had an extensive Lutheran mission service in Zululand. Some of those who came had advanced training in specialist fields. Most did not!

They stayed and joined in the building of Durban. They built houses (even streets of them), blocks of flats and business premises. Names like Larsen, Meydel, Eckhoff, Rorvik, Stueland, Nero, Meyer, Rosholt, Egeland, Frolich and Grinaker are some that come to mind. Many were involved in building and development.

They bought land sold by the city (or borough as it was then) or from others, they drew plans, had them approved, invested their own and loan money and sold the houses and buildings or rented them. Nothing much got in their way, in fact there was a general air of encouragement. And so it was for the commun-

ity at large, there were boys at my school from families who had immigrated from many countries over a long period who were involved in trading, commerce and industrial development.

And, of course, we could choose what we wanted to do! We could also choose to be very "Norwegian", just modestly so (if such a thing is possible) or South African. But we were free to choose!

The point of this story is simply that our cities have been made in part by people immigrating to them – in a process that for many was a process of urbanisation – and they did so from modest circumstances and often with limited specific training for the tasks that their new homes needed.

It is these people, bent on furthering and improving their lot, going about their increasingly large variety of activities who built and still build our cities. They created its institutions, its universities and technical institutions, built church and community halls and city halls, and it was they who set its tone in cultural matters. It was also they who planned the cities; and the cities grew by accretion and their growth reflected the changing priorities and solutions needed over time. And with their success they attracted more migrants to them.

This easily recognisable city is not especially remarkable. This is how Johannesburg, Durban, Pretoria and Port Elizabeth were built. From modest beginnings and with hard work and good fortune communities were created and leadership developed.

But in the other cities, the cities of those who are not white, the story is different. The people themselves did not build them nor did they plan them. It is probably more correct to state that they built them in the sense of being the learner tradesmen and labourers involved in their construction!

And when one looks at the plans they are also different. At first glance they appear as elegant layouts in two dimensions: housing areas laid out in a variety of patterns, with adjacent schools and playing fields, with sites for churches, corner shops, larger shopping and business areas and a central site for civic functions. But in few plans of black cities built over twenty-five years is there any idea of their economic base. These are the housing areas of the working class, and they have not developed into the model cities that were dreamed up. They are the family housing version of the ubiquitous South African workers' accommodation – the hostel.

They are hostels spread thin across the land. Land and property ownership are different, as is their management. Despite the idea that they are cities or large towns and have their own town councils – they also on

occasion have township managers. The difficulties and weaknesses of these "cities" have been too well described to require much elaboration except to remind that in them social revolt finds its easiest response and outlet.

## NEED FOR OPEN CITIES

In addition to these "cities" or more correctly, townships, are the great informal settlements – often preferred by many for economic and other priorities of personal choice. These areas house as many, or more, than the formal townships.

Essentially our cities are developed and planned to our requirements (in fact we can hire and fire our planners) but the other cities, the townships, are designed by distant planners. When the planning is done at closer proximity, as when our cities undertake the planning of nearby townships (for example, Mitchell's Plain or Phoenix) and done so with skill and sincerity, the result is still not right. One reason for this is because they are wrong in concept. No matter how attractive or well managed, they are ghettos.

Ghettos are not defined by their beauty or ugliness but by the simple question of whether when you wish to get out of them, you can! They also have another deficiency – they are too often for people who have been moved from somewhere else. Cato Manor, Block AK, District Six, and many more are all too well known to repeat here, except to remind that in the old cities, there are for all the communities a myriad of links and associations – networks that ensure survival and progress.

The poorer a community the more those networks operate to create and find jobs, and provide accommodation and food. These are the great and interrelated sub-cultures which in aggregate constitute the city, and this is true of the great cities of history! When the sub-cultures are destroyed, the networks are threatened. Eventually the capacity for development and growth is diminished. That we know has already happened.

The two cities need be welded into one, with the creative and dynamic processes of the first transferred to the new – the open city. In the process of absorption there is a case to be made for finding new land within and around our cities and after removing all restrictions with regard to opportunity (including the provisions of the Group Areas Act), let the worst of the old township be demolished. This is a drastic step, but it is being faced elsewhere where housing has been politicised in ways that made renewal impossible.

This applies to much "social" housing in Europe built by the state and city in the Fifties and Sixties.

They are often places of social revolt and despair. I saw recently in Manchester the demolition of rows of what looked to be reasonably habitable buildings some 15 storeys high. They were only 16 years old. While it is true that there are objections to living in tall council housing – it is equally true that there are few complaints about living in tall apartments when they are not built and run by authorities. It is not as if the owners and occupiers of buildings on Durban's beachfront, or overlooking the bay, rush away in protest and, on occasion, set their apartments alight as has been the case in some council apartments in Manchester. However, the political problems and disaffection remain and, in the end, huge buildings, perfectly habitable, have had to be demolished.

There is another factor. Overseas as well as here, the view prevails that such things as slum houses need to be demolished and the people moved to new surroundings. These views, held by planners, public officers, councillors and politicians, still retain the power to deflect and stultify new approaches to renovation and to the rehabilitation of the communities by individuals themselves.

What, in our situation, can be built upon? There are initiatives that hold considerable promise. The approach to small business creation, including the establishment and encouragement of building contracting, building material manufacture and assembly, the pressure to bring industrial activities into the heart of the old townships, are all worthwhile, as is the opening up of business opportunities for all races in the central business districts of our cities. And efforts to initiate renewals of rundown areas of the townships may still offer rewards if we make the next bold move.

I believe we need to have open cities and that the "townships" need to be drawn together with our existing cities. But to do this we need to rethink how we plan and create the necessary adaptations to facilitate changes, of which there will be many. It is not much use making changes if there is no clear objective in sight and just as bad to have no clearly defined set of criteria to make it work.

Poverty, for instance, will not disappear because the people of the city change status. Neither will problems of a social nature, nor the inadequacies of different education be resolved. Not even the promise of equal education will do that in the short term. We have arranged for too long that education must come first – and only then opportunity.

Opportunity needs to be made available in parallel, for this is the stimulus that enables the individual to perceive the advantages of education. Not every sailor leaping off a ship in Durban as a settler, and eventually making good, had a PhD.

If the two cities are to be joined and function through enhanced access to opportunity, they will change from what they are now. There certainly will be many small businesses and entrepreneurs. We will need market stalls set up in the city for the smallest traders, and for hawkers, fixed sites created on the pavements and in the arcades of the city. They are all part of an entrepreneurial society. They must be able to wheel their stocks around and live close by.

Office workers must be able to live closer to their work if they so choose. And the shopkeeper, as he moves up socially, may want to live in a house located where he chooses. The managers and clerks now being drawn from all races into our companies need to live where they choose, in keeping with their ambitions and ideals. Some will stay where they are, some will move, some will live in the penthouses of new blocks of flats near the city. There will be pressure for mixed use, living above shops, or for factories below offices, let alone in the backyard. Most important of all, the ground floor of cities will become busy for longer periods of the day – and housing will start a return to the extended central business districts.

## INCREASED VITALITY

As popular use of the downtown areas increases, so will their vitality increase. The ground floors of our cities are at present tedious and dull, and often dangerous. But with more smaller business activities requiring frontage, the legitimising of the hawker, and the creation of the sidewalk cafe, there will be pressure for new and appropriate environments to be created.

This approach to the busy, safe and vital city will also affect our approach to cultural institutions, the siting of galleries, opera houses, museums and theatres. They will want to be seen as a natural part of the busy city fabric. The location of some schools and institutions, including universities, will need to be reconsidered for they will be tied to the complex and busy surroundings of mixed-use environments, with attachments to the housing, commercial and industrial components of the city.

Are we able to do this? Are the ideas, institutions, and methods of work already in place? Do we have a model in our minds, and can we achieve our aim? The planning model, where developer and authorities are cast as antagonists in a battle, needs to go. The results of that system have been disastrous in terms of environmental quality.

Added to this there has been the stultifying state and quasi-state involvement in planning decisions. We need plans that carry with them finances to make them occur directly. We need to encourage the developmental approach that puts good ideas into ac-

ceptable projects, with funds attached to make them happen.

Community interests, institutions, financiers and councils together need to identify developmental possibilities on a greater scale than before and then set about assembling the whole as an achievable reality. One building at a time is not the best way of doing so!

The attitudes in some cities are encouraging. In the city of Durban the beginnings of such an approach have been developed in the last five to six years. The city increasingly wants development, but it is fussy about the standards of environment that are to be created. And as it opens its doors to anyone who wishes to join in its development, Durban is also learning of ways to stimulate inventive ideas in urban design, management and financing.

Durban has bought and swapped land. But it has not sold this off since it is now seeking to develop joint ventures. It has leased off an old historic building for a Speciality Centre, it has restored an old historic station building, and has encouraged the siting of Durban's new theatre and opera complex in the old Playhouse.

## DOWNTOWN DURBAN

The city has encouraged and legislated for the development of the arcades and lanes system – and in the process the downtown area is increasingly becoming a pleasing, safe and friendly place that is good for both business and cultural development. There is a plan for hawkers, the smallest traders, to have better and legitimate locations. Another old building – the old station workshop has been turned into an exhibition centre on a site 300 metres from the City Hall.

Durban's "Expo", on a shoestring budget, stimulated development in the area. It also has created jobs and generated self-esteem and pride in the city among all groups.

And before these rather modest steps could happen it was necessary to create a greater atmosphere of trust and positive working climate between the city council, its officials, and the larger community. This process has started, and the city receives increasing response in business and cultural fields. The Durban Arts Association was created by the city – and this was launched as an independent venture. The informal arts are very lively at present and they have an important role to perform in the process of change in our society. It is not necessarily big projects in the arts that are needed, but a large number of initiatives that bring artists and performers together in a variety of working situations together. The new networks are being established in the process.

The type of city in which I grew up, is nevertheless a useful model – for the open city it has to be at least as good as that. All the people of the city must feel it is theirs. The black people of southern Africa are growing up increasingly in and around cities.

We need to remember that urbanisation is a hopeful and optimistic process, and that the cause of much of the anger and frustration stems from the barriers set up with political and bureaucratic thoroughness by those who are already part of an urbanised and modernised society – and who do so for concern that their circumstances will be reduced, and that competition will bring down standards and other reasons given that conceal the main motive, that of greed.

The dynamic drive towards the development and creation of a complex urban culture is the only hope for southern Africa if it is also to become a stable and creative environment. There is the idea that urbanisation is a process that still draws people of the land in massive numbers to the cities. This needs to be reviewed, for here as elsewhere, we are reaching the position in many of our cities where the population growth is in the main from those who are already in place and around the city! Durban's population within a radius of 30 km from its city hall is of the order of three million. The natural increase in that population will be the largest component of growth as the numbers reach a potential five million by the year 2000.

It requires little prophetic ability to suggest that not every law that inhibits the creation of our open cities will be removed overnight. But what seems true is that much may be achieved if the initiatives already started in the planning offices and studios of cities, in the agencies of small business and development corporations, as well as in the business houses of our cities, can be accelerated.

We need, however, to begin open debate about what our cities could be like. What are the possibilities of the creation of environments of quality? What, in a freer creative environment, can planners, urban designers and architects of our cities produce in the way of ideas? Is there not room for working sessions to explore developmental ideas and models, and for these to be conducted in the open?

Those who finance big developments need to sit together with one another, with officials from the cities and government, and with the professionals, in working situations that can lead towards the creation of new models for our city. There are ways of doing this. Much of the revitalisation of downtown American cities has been stimulated over the last 10 to 15 years by just such open workshop sessions. They involve citizens, the business community, officials, and planning and design professionals.



### ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE

On a smaller scale Durban has had two such sessions and the Institute of Architects has had its first in Johannesburg – where the Newtown area was discussed. Its report to Johannesburg's Section 51 Committee was well received, and may lead to other sessions.

The argument for the change of laws has been made by others. The case I wish to make is this. I want to see young blacks who are brought up in a city given the opportunities that I had.

Their ambitions are not unlike my own. They need to feel part of the city and to contribute to it, being dislodged from the network of their cultural roots. They must be able to move to jobs and opportunities that our cities increasingly create, and hence become part of the continuous and creative role of city-making. I don't know of any other model that seems worthwhile in our time. It is the only one that is viable. Messy, difficult to achieve, obstructed through political fear and inertia, it nevertheless will happen. The question is how and when.

But if this process is delayed, it will need to be done by another generation – and one which will need to cope first with a legacy of increased poverty and even more deeply-seated fears and angers.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

INDIANS BUYING APARTMENTS IN WHITE DURBAN--Indians from both inside and outside South Africa have been buying flats in white group areas in Durban. Carmel Rickard has this report. [Rickard] Most of the flats involved are luxury apartments with huge price tags on the beachfront. According to this morning's NATAL MERCURY, estate agents are selling the units in the belief that the Group Areas Act will be changed very soon. A representative of one company believes that if the would-be buyers come from outside South Africa, the deal is legal. Another said it is believed that as long as more than half the shareholders in the block are white, then it is legal. One group is selling to Indians in a luxury block between two so-called international hotels on the Marin Parade. But while a change to the Group Areas Act may be on the cards, an official of the department of constitutional development and planning in Durban says the present rule is that a special permit must be obtained for anyone to live outside their own group area, and that as far as he knows, no permits have been given for Indians on Durban's beachfront. [Text] [Umtata Capital Radio in English 0500 GMT 31 Jan 86 MB] /6662

EMIGRATION INCREASES; IMMIGRATION DROPS--Pretoria, Jan 30, SAPA--Last year South Africa experienced a sharp increase in the number of people leaving the country to settle abroad and a simultaneous drop in the number of immigrants, according to figures released by the Central Statistics Services in Pretoria. Last year 9,280 people emigrated from South Africa between January and October--a 36 percent increase on the figure of 6,808 for the same period in 1984. A comparison of figures for the same period shows that the number of immigrants to the country also dropped by over 37 percent from 24,844 in 1984 to 15,414 in 1985. This means the country's gain in migration dropped by 66 percent from 18,036 in 1984 to 6,134 last year. There was also a loss of skilled manpower as 1,301 professional, technical and related workers left South Africa in the period January-October 1985 as against 934 in the corresponding period of 1984. Of these, 379 were engineers, 107 accountants, 103 educationists, and 52 medical doctors and dentists. From January-October 1985, 585,531 people visited South Africa--a drop of 48,233 compared with the 1984 period. A total of 136,563 business visitors came to South Africa in the 10-month period of 1985, as against 159,954 in the previous 10-month period. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1019 GMT 30 Jan 86 MB] /6662

CERTAIN AREAS 'EXCESSIVE' IMMIGRATION--During the first 10 months of last year, 6,134 more people immigrated to South Africa than emigrated from it. Figures released by the Central Statistical services in Pretoria show that about 15,400 immigrants arrived in South Africa up to October last year, compared with 9,280 who left the country. A spokesman for the Department of Home Affairs told the SABC that in certain professions there had been an excessive number of immigrants. He said that foreign advertisement campaigns had been stopped because of the economic downswing. The spokesman said that private concerns had reduced their campaign from 142 in 1980 to 22 in 1985. He said that a smaller gain in immigrants compared with figures for 1984 could be attributed to a scaling down of the South African immigration program because of the recession. Immigrants were being selected on stricter basis and only those with offers of employment in South Africa were being accepted. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 30 Jan 86 MB] /6662

CSO: 3400/1008

SOUTH AFRICA

ECONOMIST LOOKS AT PROSPECTS FOR 1986

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 4 No 4, 1985 pp 36, 38, 40

[Article by Attie de Vries, Bureau of Economic Research, Stellenbosch University: "1986: Date We Hope?"]

[Text]

The South African economy is being buffeted by the ill winds of recession, exacerbated by very high inflation, debt repayment and political problems. Small wonder that consumers and businessmen are confused and pessimistic.

One tends to think that this deterioration in the political fortunes of South Africa really began in the middle of 1984. It is true that it has accelerated since then, but the problems started in 1980 when, as a result of a particularly sharp commodity price boom, South Africa had a growth rate of about 8 per cent and was living well beyond its means. In the four years since then SA's current account of the balance of payments showed a cumulative deficit of R8 385 million and its net reserves declined by no less than R4 708 million.

This deterioration can be ascribed to a variety of factors. After an initial sharp recession the economies of our main trading partners started to revive at the end of 1982 to early 1983. This was, however, different from the kind of upswing characteristic of the Seventies, in that monetary policies remained very strict, bringing about high real interest rates, and inflation was kept at low levels. Furthermore, the upswing was more services-oriented, militating against any sudden and sharp upswing in the demand for our type of raw material exports. To top it all South Africa suffered one of her most severe droughts in the post-war period.

Despite all these negative factors South Africa did not adjust properly to the required lower standards of living. Although it entered into a fairly severe downswing phase of the business cycle at the end of 1981 this recession was fairly short and a wrong reading of

commodity price movements early in 1983 led to a premature stimulation of the economy. The subsequent four-quarter upswing could not be maintained and was, in any case, wrongly founded on higher current spending by the government sector in particular, as well as an increase in private consumer spending based primarily on credit.

Even though the subsequent harsh restrictive measures brought about possibly the most severe recession in the post-war period, the full extent of the deterioration in the economy of South Africa over the last virtually five years was softened by the depreciation of the rand.

Unfortunately a price had to be paid for this, namely continued high inflation. Thus, although the economy is at present in a more severe recession than many believed possible, with unemployment and the number of bankruptcies high and still rising, the same applies to inflation.

Apart from pure economic factors the political situation also deteriorated. After a period of relative stability in the late Seventies, the schools' boycott started in 1980, and escalating violence and unrest in 1984 led to the imposition in July 1985 of emergency measures in certain parts of the country. The introduction of a new constitution and a variety of socio-economic-political reforms also brought about a right-wing backlash in white politics. Furthermore, overseas pressures to isolate South Africa were brought to a head by the refusal of certain overseas banks to roll over short-term loans. The latter came at an especially inopportune time. This was not so much as a result of the total extent of our foreign debt (still relatively low compared with

other developing countries), but the time structure thereof, with virtually 60 per cent being repayable within the next 12 months.

### LOOKING AT 1986

On top of it all, small but official sanctions were imposed by some of our major trading partners. And unofficial boycotts are on the increase. The final realisation of the economic impact of international political pressures came when South Africa had to declare a standstill period in the repayment of some of her foreign debt, and is in the process of negotiating a rescheduling of the repayment.

The impact of politics came at a time when the economy had started to show some improvement, in that the current account moved into surplus and interest rates started to soften.

Looking ahead at 1986 it would appear that the USA, after a brief lull in the early months of 1985 might again show higher growth. It will nevertheless be far below that of 1984. Europe, the biggest customer for our exports might also show a somewhat higher growth, compared to the lacklustre performance of the past few years. The volume of our exports might thus continue to rise but not at the same rate as the past eighteen months. It would also appear that international inflation will remain basically low and our most important trading partners will still have positive real interest rates. These factors should ensure that even though the US dollar could depreciate further, no commodity price boom will ensue. Thus, the level of South African exports, measured in any overseas currency, will still be well below that of 1980 though they will be better than 1984 and 1985. It will, therefore, not be possible to overcome our difficulties by way of higher export earnings, despite the potential created by the lower rand.

On top of this, further unofficial boycotts or official sanctions could create new problems.

The reason exports are so important is that South Africa will be a net exporter of capital, with no new capital coming in, while the country has to start repayment of its existing short-term debt. A surplus on our current account, taking the precarious position of our reserves into consideration, is thus imperative.

### OUTLOOK BLEAK

Naturally the level of imports is equally important in determining the position of the current account and this is where a policy dilemma is arising. On the one hand, the extent of the present recession together with its impact on unemployment and unrest, calls for a deflation of the South African economy. This can, how-

ever, lead to higher imports, a lower surplus on the current account and an impairment of our ability to repay foreign debt which would help regain some credibility among foreign bankers. On the other hand, the need to repay foreign debt calls for a continued restrictive policy stance. The downside is that this could have serious consequences for growth, unemployment and eventually further unrest.

The forecast that follows has been based upon the assumption that the authorities will reflate the economy – but moderately. In this process they will concentrate on bringing down short-term interest rates in particular and, rather than spending much more on the fiscal side, will cut taxes – direct personal taxes in particular. It must be stressed again that their room for manoeuvre will be rather limited.

Moreover, attention should be drawn to the fact that the ability of the authorities to reflate will be subject to political developments. This forecast is based upon the assumption that the process of reform is irreversible, and that enough progress will be made to enable a successful rescheduling of our debts and a staving off of further official sanctions, even though domestic unrest of a lesser magnitude will probably continue, and unofficial boycotts remain a negative factor.

Given the factors working in the economy the outlook for 1986 remains rather bleak. The need to repay debts and to have a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments will remain a dominant factor. A surplus of more than R800-million is expected in 1986, following a surplus of more than R600-million in 1985. This may seem surprisingly high, but as a percentage of GDP will still be below that of 1979. Furthermore, such a surplus on the current account is indicative of an economy still operating at a very low level of activity.

The extent of this surplus, coupled with the expectation that part, even though a relatively small part, will be used to build up our net reserves, may have two implications. It would lead to the rand not depreciating any more. In fact some appreciation of the rand against the US dollar (R1 = 50 cents) is foreseen. It must immediately be pointed out that such an appreciation will be principally a reflection of the US dollar coming down, rather than the rand strengthening. Against some of the other major currencies the rand will at best only stop depreciating in the second half of 1986. Then the increase in net reserves can lead to short-term interest rates declining further. A prime bank overdraft rate of about 13 per cent is expected at the end of 1986. It must immediately be pointed out that part of the further decline will be the result of the authorities forcing down rates in order to prevent interest burdens leading to further bankruptcies. Long-term rates, responding to an unsatisfactory level of inflation and no

inflow of foreign capital, will probably remain very high and at best only decline marginally.

## INFLATION STILL HIGH

On this basis only a moderate recovery is foreseen for the South African economy in 1986. From a cyclical point of view it is expected that the present recession will continue until the end of the first quarter of 1986. The subsequent recovery will initially be rather hesitant and moderate, reminding one of 1978 and early 1979 when SA was in an upswing phase of the business cycle but nobody really believed it. The recovery could begin to gather momentum towards the end of 1986, though this may only happen in 1987.

Within this broad movement of the overall business cycle the fortunes of different sectors could differ materially. Overall, a real growth rate in GDP of 2.9 per cent is expected. This again seems surprisingly high, and would be the result of the export sectors, and then mining in particular, continuing to perform excellently. The performance of the export sectors will flow from the competitive advantage afforded by the weak rand, as well as continued growth in the economies of our main trading partners. Nonetheless, intensified political pressures, whether official or unofficial, could bedevil this optimistic outlook. Against this, domestic demand will probably remain at a low level, with the result that those industries directed towards domestic demand could continue to suffer. Better protection against competition from imported goods as a result of the weak rand and the 10 per cent import surcharge might alleviate the position somewhat, but not enough to ensure that new investment in productive assets and more employment opportunities will be created. Finally, the expected GDP growth assumes a return to better weather conditions, in the summer rainfall areas in particular, and the concomitant impact on agricultural production.

Analysing the implications of this overall growth forecast it is clear that, despite continuing high inflation, salary and wage adjustments will again be rather low – less than inflation – because the overall level of activity, as well as continued pressures on company profits, will militate against large rises despite labour union demands. Coupled with individuals being in a rather negative frame of mind, trying to repay debts previously incurred rather than making use of the easier and cheaper credit facilities becoming available, this will have the impact that total private consumption expenditure will probably decline in 1986 for the second consecutive year – the first time in the post-war period. Within the total consumer spend, durables will suffer most. Thus, the furniture and appliances industry, as well as the motor industry, will again fight for survival and further rationalisation could occur.

Given this scenario, a further decline in fixed investment by the private sector must be foreseen, despite some investment by the export-oriented industries. All the sectors involved in the capital goods industries will still be operating at low levels. However, it is foreseen that the public sector will have to invest more in social infrastructure, housing and schools in particular and this could help the building industry somewhat. Nevertheless, it is expected that this industry will remain in the doldrums for quite a while to come.

Inflation, as measured by the rate of increase in consumer prices, is expected to be about 14 per cent for the year as a whole, but should decline during the second half of the year. This rather optimistic outlook is based, among other things, on the fact that no demand-pull inflation is foreseen, the growth in the money supply is at present low and could well stay rather low, the rate of increase in imported prices should decelerate with the rand not depreciating more, and salary and wage adjustments are expected to remain low. It must, however, be immediately pointed out that the inflation rate is still very high and that it could accelerate soon after the start of an upswing in the South African economy.

## STRATEGIES NEED ADJUSTMENT

It is clear that the South African economy will still be in a difficult position, virtually throughout 1986, despite the painful adjustments of the past 12 months and more. Although these adjustments helped to create a better foundation for a more stable upswing phase, this was eroded by the deterioration in the political situation. In fact, reflecting on the forecast for 1986, it is clear that the biggest uncertainty is in the political field and its possible impact on our economic fortunes. This underlines the necessity, not only to continue the process of political reform, but to do much more – and to define goals much more clearly.

Given the political uncertainties it is clear that the formal sector of the South African economy cannot provide enough job opportunities for all. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust our strategies accordingly and concentrate more on labour-intensive development that is not import-related. To my way of thinking, the best possible method of doing this will be through deregulation and active encouragement of the development of the small business and informal sectors.

This will, however, bring in its wake a lowering of standards and an adjustment to the Third World realities of our society – and thus will require a change in attitudes.

South Africa will have to develop in future by accepting the realities and implications of its present position and problems.



SOUTH AFRICA

ROLE OF BUSINESSMEN IN NATIONAL AFFAIRS DISCUSSED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 4 No 4, 1985 pp 84, 86, 87

[Article by Benjamin Trisk, Executive General Manager of the Premier Group:  
"Businessmen and Politics"]

[Text] The great British historian, AJP Taylor remarked on development differences in a most acute way. He commented that in mid-nineteenth century revolutionary Europe, workers on the continent flooded the streets demanding the right to work. Yet only a year before in England, workers had already been demanding the right to work less.

The purpose behind this illustration of revolutionary zeal is to demonstrate the continuum of history. Of course, the form that events take will differ from time to time and place to place. Ultimately, however, there is a forceful logic that works on much the same set of historical ground-rules to present fairly similar conclusions.

Naturally, it is to be accepted that any conclusion as we see it now is only a punctuation in a longer stream of historical consciousness. Clearly, developments tomorrow change today's conclusions.

Nevertheless, contemporary political history in Africa, colonial history particularly, has tended to develop in the same way or at least has given rise to similar "endings". Inevitably, white authority yields to the black majority. The legitimacy that the black majorities have acquired at different times has often been suspect or fraught with violence and tension, but it cannot be allowed to confuse our perception of the way in which events unfold. I remember very clearly an elderly professor from the University of Pretoria, Willem Steenkamp, commenting at a Cape Town conference in 1971 that "the move towards multi-racialism today is as inevitable and ineluctable as the move towards the abolition of slavery" a century and a half before.

There are any number of historical accidents, demographic reasons, and political devices to explain why the fundamental shift to black majority rule is

taking longer to manifest itself here than in other parts of Africa. The whole issue, of course, is hedged around with a variety of emotional issues. Chief among them, I suppose, is that inevitably whites, rightly, want to be assured that come the transition they will retain their place in the sun; a place, ironically, that we have assiduously refused to give to black citizens for so long.

Given the nature and form of political developments elsewhere in Africa, it is reasonable to expect that the end result of change in South Africa will be black majority rule in a unitary state. There is certainly no evidence that somehow, by a quirk of nature, black people in South Africa have any less resolve to be masters of their own destiny than black populations elsewhere in Africa. At the same time, it must be admitted that white South Africans are far more hardened in their resolve to remain in the land of their

birth than colonial adventurers looking for profit and empire.

(That may be a pointer towards a frightening future. No one needs to be reminded that white Zimbabweans took the same stance two decades ago.)

It is quite possible, of course, that there may be a number of constitutional configurations still to be manufactured and foisted on the people. But, whatever the brouhaha accompanying them, there are many serious-minded analysts who believe they can only be interim mechanisms for change and do not affect the end-play.

Regrettably, however, although Pretoria's private consensus and political appreciation may be different, its public posture ignores, if not rejects, the unfolding mind of Africa's modern history and there is a most extraordinary argot designed to persuade us that what is reality is, in truth, illusion; and what is illusory is attainable.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that there are many other vested interest groups right now seeking to do their best for their constituents by coming to grips with the reality of a dominant black body politic; it is no less surprising that government is indulging in a number of mean-minded power plays to avoid any meeting of minds that may arise between white capital and the Christian ethic on the one side and black socialism and the freedom imperative on the other.

Business' decision to move more prominently into the political arena, to add its voice unambiguously to the call for change, and to cross the divide separating the ANC from domestic debate, is undoubtedly in part a product of government obduracy and obfuscation.

Nevertheless, critics who condemn business's lethargy before, should at least be pleased that the well-tried formula of challenge and response, by which Toynbee set so much store in his historical system, has at least given rise to a higher profile of social concern among business leaders.

Their response focuses on an age old debate: What is the business of business? It is a debate that needs to be aired again in South Africa because politicians, in the Republic particularly, aver that politics is the sole prerogative of the politician and that they are outside the legitimate activities of others who wish to be involved in the kind of social engineering that is necessary for change in South Africa. Hence Pretoria's outrage over the ANC meetings that have taken place, its determination to avoid further meetings and its use of threat and force to still the communication and silence the discussion which it should be leading.

(Indeed, one has to wonder why Pretoria is so steadfast in its desire to keep the ANC isolated. After all, it has openly admitted its dealings with both UNITA and Renamo – two organisations committed to violent overthrow in their respective spheres of interest. Connor Cruise O'Brien, a noted political theorist and commentator, once observed that US foreign policy is frequently committed to right-wing regimes with appalling Human Rights records. Therefore, he argued, it clearly could not be left-wing governments' disregard for Human Rights to which Washington objected. Could it instead be the positive social content of their programmes, he asked?)

The traditional view of business, and the one advocated by its critics right now, is that it should single-mindedly concentrate on the maximisation of profits and the utilisation of resources to generate returns. There is certainly nothing wrong with that point of view and it is, after all, the essential motor that drives market values and establishes, initially at least, the valuation of a firm.

However, it raises a host of other queries, chief among which is the vexed question of the time horizon over which business should operate. Is profit maximisation a short-term accounting phenomena, or does the concept carry with it a plethora of long-term social and ethical questions concerned with the very fabric of the society in which business performs? It would seem that there is no correct answer and that it is probably more important to understand the questions than to know the answers.

Business's response will inevitably vary from society to society, from one economic environment to another, to different pressures at different times, and to movements in a host of international factors that impact upon the organisation. It is certainly not likely that we can establish a set of generalised principles that govern business behaviour or that have predictive power enabling business to react with certainty at any time.

There is no pre-emptive genius given to businessmen that enables them to understand their society better than politicians, churchmen, youth leaders or other vested interest groups. However, to paraphrase an old poet, business is not an island unto itself.

In one of the profound short novels of the twentieth century, the Polish writer Joseph Conrad sets a scene by describing the sea and the sky "welded together without a join". The reference is to the indivisibility of all experience. We are all a part of that indivisibility and to ask that a powerful sector of the community, like business, should stick to

its last in a blinkered way, uncaring about the political unrest that has destabilised its markets and alienated and demoralised its workforce, is just so much nonsense.

Profit maximisation over the short term benefits no one but the speculator. The essential truth of business, capitalism and the work ethic, lies in the creation of wealth, on-going improvement in the living standards of the whole community and the provision of security for all in a stable society. Those are long-term goals and they carry with them a message for the future and hope for the young. If capital cannot be reinvested and if lenders take fright, it is impossible for business to meet its commercial, never mind its social, obligations.

The recent decision, therefore, of a group of businessmen to visit Mfuwe Game Reserve and talk to the ANC was a laudable one. It certainly does not deserve the appellations of "treacherous", "ill-considered" or "naive" that were used by some to describe the meetings. It deserves praise because it clearly enunciated a concern over the long-term vision for South Africa and a desire to know what a possible political alternative might propose and recommend. Clearly, there are reservations over the economic intentions of an ANC that has on its executive a substantial number of committed members of the South African Communist Party. But it is certainly no reason to ignore that body because it has an economic posture at variance with our own.

There are issues at stake that South African business leaders have to address with an urgent concern. Of course, they will ultimately lose credibility with their own constituents if they cannot restore their corporations to profit and growth. However, in order to do that they require a society at peace with itself, that can once again attract foreign capital and create the conditions necessary for long-term planning and investment.

Pretoria's own creativity and vision is in doubt. Its leadership qualities have been questioned, and the

void presently created conveys a sense of a government without answers and capable only of knee-jerk response to each crisis situation.

Business cannot make political decisions, but it can give to each of its workers a feeling of care and commitment that is evidenced by reaching out still further into the areas of in-house training, education (both in the physical sense of improving standards and of changing attitudes), housing, health care, regard for families and long-term career planning at every level of the organisation.

Business has begun to understand that its workers are capable of the most extraordinary feats of adjustment; each morning they move out of what is essentially a war zone (at least in many townships around the country) and come to an area of relative peace. Each evening they move again from encapsulated white industrial and commercial areas back to the mini civil wars that rage in township streets.

It is likely that the present street rabble shouting slogans, throwing stones and looting and burning at will are, if not leaderless, at least disorganised and chaotic. However, sooner or later, so the scenario goes, the rabble

will throw up their own messianic demi-gods espousing a revolutionary theory that may be simple, but it will be easily understood and contain within it a black radical socialism that will become part of the call for change.

Under such conditions violence will become increasingly endemic and those perpetrating it, both of the Left and Right, will rise in stature.

Business and government need to work fast to avoid such a scenario.

Government should welcome business as its partner in seeking peaceful change.

To do that it should permit business the initiative it has taken upon itself to speak to other organisations, to understand their viewpoints and to put its own.

In that way we have a better chance in reaching out for a new society that will welcome us all.

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